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M

y father was an Army officer, so I spent at least half of my childhood outside the United States, graduating from high school at
the Department of Defense school in Seoul, Korea. At the end of my
father’s tour of duty in Korea, we were flying across the Pacific Ocean:
he and the rest of the family headed to Fort Devens, in Ayer, Massachusetts; I headed to Brigham Young University as a first-year student. At
some point in the flight, my father handed me an envelope containing
a letter. In it he gave me advice about the life I was beginning by leaving
home. Among other things, he said he hoped that I would think about
becoming a teacher.
I had never considered teaching. I liked many of my high school
teachers—such as Mr. O’Brien, my art teacher, and Mr. Smith, my
English teacher—but I couldn’t imagine myself doing what they did.
I thought I wanted to practice medicine. However, years later, after
studying at BYU, serving a mission, and marrying—and for much of
that time no longer knowing what I wanted to do—I realized that my
father knew me better than I knew myself. I wanted to teach. So, I
went to graduate school in philosophy and, in 1975, came back to BYU
as a professor.
Professors have three primary duties: teaching, scholarship, and
participation in the organizing and overseeing work of the university
and their profession. For me, each of the second two flows from the first.
Scholarship is a way of preparing to teach more and a way of extending
my teaching; doing the work of the university and profession are ways
of supporting teaching. Teaching is what I do. The other things are
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what I do so that I can teach. Being a good university and professional
citizen is necessary, though occasionally drudgery. Being a scholar is
hard work, and often very intellectually stimulating. Neither, however,
gives the kind of personal fulfillment that teaching gives.
Thus, the ten essays in this book are the result of my profession as
a teacher, the work I do, of course, but more importantly that which I
profess as a teacher. I am a profess-er, so I profess, and these essays are
about the most important things I profess: faith, philosophy, and the
scriptures. My faith has been central to my life since my conversion.
The scriptures were important before that and have become more and
more important as I have studied. In fact, graduate school was a turning point in my study of scripture, for it was there that I came to understand fully the scriptures’ power to teach and the blessings to be
had by studying them carefully.1 Philosophy has been important in
my life because, of course, it is how I have earned my living and supported my family. But it has also been important because it has been
a way of life.
For many of the ancients, philosophy was a competitor with religion because it offered an alternative way of understanding what it
meant to be a human, how we are related to each other and to the
cosmos, and what is expected of us. For me, however, philosophy has
the same relation to religion that it had for those such as the fourthand fifth-century Catholic thinker Augustine of Hippo: it is a supplement to rather than a competitor with religion. The confidence of
my faith, a confidence that came by revelation, has allowed me to hear
the questions of philosophy without fear, and philosophy has never
asked me to give up my faith, though it has asked questions about it.
Those questions have often been of great help in refreshing my understanding of the gospel, in helping me see it with new eyes. I offer these
essays so that others might see how these three—faith, philosophy,
1. For an account of one of the experiences that has been pivotal in my in learning
about scripture study, see “Studying the Scriptures” in my Scripture Study: Tools and Suggestions (Provo, UT: FARMS, 1999), 1–15.
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and scripture—can be part of a whole life, each helping make sense of
the others, with faith as the ground and center of them all.
To make a more or less coherent whole of this collection, each of
the essays has been revised, some of them lightly, some more heavily.
The first essay, “Remembrance,” reflects on the importance of
remembrance to my life as a Latter-day Saint.2 I argue that memory
and conscious recollection are not the same, and that we remember
by means of signs, symbols, tokens, institutions, acts, rituals, memorial objects, and many other things. Often we are not engaged in the
conscious recollection of that which we remember—as when we wear
a wedding ring—yet even when we are not, we remember. Or, as I
suggest, it might even be appropriate to say that those signs, tokens,
objects, and rituals remember for us. In our relation to us, they always
remember for us that which we sometimes bring to explicit memory.
By doing so, they make those explicit memories possible. Explicit
memories of profound faith-events put us back in touch with those
events, safeguarding our faith, but memory keeps them ready for
recollection even when we are not recollecting them.
“Room to Talk: Reason’s Need for Faith” was originally written
as part of a Festschrift for Truman Madsen.3 I have great respect for
Professor Madsen. I had my first experience with university teaching
when I worked as his assistant in 1971, grading papers and leading
discussion groups. Responding to Truman Madsen’s work as something that created room for Latter-day Saints to talk about their faith,
I argue that the tension between faith and reason is, ultimately, not
real, for faith is the foundation of reason.
During the 1994–95 academic year, David Paulsen, a professor
of philosophy and a specialist in the philosophy of religion, as well
as a previous holder of a Richard L. Evans Professorship of Religious
2. “Remembrance” was first delivered as a devotional address at Brigham Young
University, 23 June 1998.
3. It was published in Revelation, Reason, and Faith: Essays in Honor of Truman
Madsen, ed. Donald W. Parry, Daniel C. Peterson, and Stephen D. Ricks (Provo, UT:
FARMS, 2002), 85–120.
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Understanding, brought a variety of theologians to BYU’s campus to speak of their views on theological topics. A Latter-day Saint
scholar was asked to respond to each. Paulsen gathered the presentations together and, with Donald W. Musser, eventually published
a book, Mormonism in Dialogue with Contemporary Christian Theologies. That volume contained not only the initial presentations and
responses, but also additional responses. I wrote one of the additional
responses to the Catholic theologian, David Tracy: “A Mormon View
of Theology: Revelation and Reason,” chapter 3 in this collection.4
Professor Tracy’s essay asks how Latter-day Saints understand the
relation of revelation and reason and the relation of the two to theology, and I respond by arguing that there are a variety of views among
us, but that few do what would count as academic theology. I give
three reasons for that absence, reasons that figure importantly in later
essays: continuing revelation, the nature of scripture, and the fact that
religion is a matter of practice more than it is a matter of belief.
In the same volume, I contributed a response to the work of the
Protestant theologian, Langdon Gilkey: chapter 4, “Myth and Religion: Theology as a Hermeneutic of Religious Experience.”5 Gilkey’s
argument is that science and religion can coexist. However, we live
in an age that is fundamentally secular, so scriptural language is no
longer truly meaningful. Gilkey sees the job of the theologian to be
to help make religion once again meaningful. Doing so means using
the language of secularism against itself to “translate,” as it were, the
religious understanding of the world into secular terms. My response
is that Gilkey has misunderstood the conflict between religion and the
secular by privileging the secular. We cannot, as he proposes, rewrite
the truth of religion in secular terms. Neither of the two languages is
reducible to the other. But we can use the truth of religion to create a
“space” within the secular world for religious understanding. To show
4. “Response to David Tracy: A Mormon View of Theology: Revelation and Reason,”
in Mormonism in Dialogue with Contemporary Theologies, ed. Donald W. Musser and
David L. Paulsen (Atlanta, GA: Mercer University Press, 2007), 468–78.
5. Faulconer, “A Mormon View of Theology,” 423–34 and 445–48.
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that possibility, I argue that we can understand, philosophically, how
the sacred manifests itself in the world. However, that sacred is manifest mostly in the lives and practices—the way of being—of believers.
The fifth essay, “Why a Mormon Won’t Drink Coffee but Might
Have a Coke,” deals with the problem of why Latter-day Saint doctrine is often difficult to explain.6 I say:
It is a matter of curiosity to many and an annoyance to a few
that it is sometimes difficult to get definitive answers from
members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
to what seem like straightforward questions—questions of
the form “Why do you believe or do x?” Latter-day Saints
subscribe to a few basic doctrines, most of which they share
with other Christians (such as that Jesus is divine) and some
of which differentiate them (such as the teaching that Joseph
Smith was a prophet of God). They also accept general moral
teachings, the kinds of things believed by both the religious
and the nonreligious. Apart from those, seldom can one say
without preface or explanation what Latter-day Saints believe.
I answer the question of why it is difficult to know what Mormons
believe using the same three themes that I suggest in chapter 3: continuing revelation, the nature of scripture, and the priority of practice
over belief. I give an extended argument under each topic for why theology is dangerous and conclude that there are nevertheless kinds of
theology that are more likely to avoid those dangers.
“Rethinking Theology: The Shadow of the Apocalypse,”7 chapter 6, argues that, in spite of the arguments in chapter 5, arguments
6. First delivered to a conference, “God, Humanity, and Revelation: Perspectives
from Mormon Philosophy and History,” Yale University, 29 March 2003. A slightly edited
form was later published in Element: A Journal of Mormon Philosophy and Theology 2/2
(2007): 21–37.
7. First delivered for Brigham Young University’s Harold B. Lee Library House of
Learning Lecture Series, 25 January 2007. This piece was published in the FARMS Review
19/1 (2007): 175–99.
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that conclude that systematic theology is more dangerous than other
types, the kind of theology one does is not as important as whether
that theology testifies of the nearness of the kingdom of God. Though
Latter-day Saints have no official theology except the scriptures and
the declarations of modern prophets, and though I think that theology can be dangerous, it does not follow that we should avoid all theology. Food can be dangerous, but it does not follow that we ought not
to eat. Instead of avoiding theology altogether—which is probably impossible—we must be aware that our theology can be dangerous and
be sure to avoid that danger. Theology can do that if it understands
itself as a kind of testimony.
In chapter 7, “The Writings of Zion,”8 I argue that the point of
scripture reading is to be called to a different way of being-in-theworld, the way of Christ. I argue that the way to hear that call is
through an appropriative reading—through making the scriptures
our own, in Nephi’s language, likening the scriptures to ourselves—
and I show that historical meaning is not only not irrelevant to an appropriative reading, it is often important to it, though never primary.
I argue for a particular understanding of what it means to liken the
scriptures to ourselves, seeing our lives as types that are prefigured in
various ways in scripture and the scriptures as teaching us, through
those types, how to live in covenant with the Father and the Son, and
therefore with one another. In the end, the most important meaning
we find in scripture is that revealed through the Holy Spirit, a revelation that occurs, most often, if we liken the scriptures to ourselves.
The longest and probably most difficult essay in the book is “Scripture as Incarnation,” chapter 8.9 In it I ask what it means to say that
the scriptures are literally true, and I argue against the usual understanding of that claim: they do not necessarily give us a description
of what one would see were one to see a movie of the life of Abraham
8. The first version of this piece was given as an address at the annual meetings of the
Association for Mormon Letters, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah, 8 March 2008.
9. Originally published in Historicity and the Latter-day Saint Scriptures, ed. Paul Y.
Hoskisson (Provo, UT: BYU Religious Studies Center, 2001), 17–61.
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or Moses or the ministry of Jesus. Instead, the scriptures are literal in
the root sense of that word: they mean what they say “by the letter.”
The problem with the usual view of scripture is that it uses the canons of modern, scientific history to judge the meaning and veracity of
scripture, but doing so is anachronistic, for the books of scripture were
written by people with a different understanding of history. I explore
the difference between the premodern and modern understandings of
history, and I argue that the premodern understanding has a great deal
to teach us (though we cannot merely return to it). As I explain it, the
premoderns understood history as an incarnation—the entry into historical “flesh”—of a divine order of meaning. On this view, the divine
order of meaning shapes and gives meaning to the events of human
history. This means that whereas for moderns religion is one sphere
of life among others in which we can participate and which we can
investigate, for premoderns it was not a sphere among others, but that
which makes sense of all the various spheres of our lives. Scripture is
the multivocal expression of that order; its incarnation in words.
Chapter 9, “On Scripture, or Idolatry versus True Religion,”10 asks
what idolatry means in a contemporary context, argues that we often
think about that question naively, and contends that some contemporary thinkers give us tools for thinking about what it means to live
non-idolatrously. Nevertheless, more than those thinkers, the scriptures can bring us to repentance and true religion if our reading of
them is an event in which we hear the preaching of the gospel, an
event in which we are called. Chapters 2 through 9 make an extended
argument for the importance of reading scripture in an appropriative
way, making it one’s own by likening it to oneself, but not interpreting
in a merely subjective manner. So chapter 9 ends with examples of the
kinds of readings of scripture that can be done, readings of the story
of Adam and Eve and of Abraham and Isaac.
10. An earlier draft of this piece was published in Discourses in Mormon Theology, ed.
James M. McLachlan and Lloyd Erickson (Salt Lake City: Kofford Books, 2007), 247–64.
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The final essay, “Breathing,” concludes the book with a meditation on the last half of Romans 7 and the first half of Romans 8.11 That
meditation centers on the role of the Holy Spirit in the change that
occurs when, having found ourselves unable to live the commandments, we are inspired—literally “breathed into”—by that Spirit. As
an appropriative reading of scripture, I think it is a fitting end to the
book because it brings together the themes of the preceding chapters:
faith, reason, and scripture.
I have arranged these essays in an order that I think will help make
my arguments more clear. Indeed, in general, chapters 2 through 8
move from the simpler to the more difficult, with chapter 9 providing a
transition from the more academic back to the more general, and chapters 1 and 10 providing “bookends” for the discussion between them.
Of course, a person need not read the essays in the order in which
they occur here. Each began its life on its own and can continue to
stand independent of the others. Nor should anyone feel obliged to
slog through all of the arguments in a particular essay if he or she does
not have an interest in the intricacies of the argument. Some of these
pieces were originally addressed to audiences of lay members, others
were addressed to Latter-day Saint philosophical audiences. Even with
editing, those differences remain.
What I say may be confusing or difficult in places, sometimes
because I have not expressed myself as well as I ought, sometimes
because the material itself is difficult. I am tempted simply to quote
the twentieth-century German philosopher Martin Heidegger.12 He
began a lecture, “Time and Being,”13 by remarking that if we were to
see two pictures by Paul Klee painted in the year of his death, “Saints
from a Window” and “Death and Fire,” we would want to stand before them for a long time, and we would not be bothered by the fact
11. An early version of this essay was first delivered to the Sunstone New Testament
Lecture Series, in Salt Lake City, Utah, April 1991.
12. For more on Heidegger, see chapter 2, note 62.
13. Martin Heidegger, “Time and Being,” in On Time and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 1–2.
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that they were not immediately intelligible. Similarly, if we were to
read a great poem (he suggests Trakl’s “Siebengesang des Todes”) or
to have it recited to us, we would want to hear it more than once, and
we would not think it should be immediately intelligible. Or if Werner
Heisenberg were to present some of his work in theoretical physics, at
most two or three people in the audience would be able to follow him.
No one would offer it as a criticism that his work is not immediately
intelligible. In each of these cases, we would be satisfied to listen, to
listen carefully and more than once before we made our criticisms.
The same thing is not true of philosophy. Those who do philosophy are supposed to offer “worldly wisdom,” and it is supposed to be
immediately intelligible. Everything is supposed to be clear and distinct; nothing should be difficult. If philosophers do not make themselves immediately intelligible, then they, not the subject matter or the
audience, are assumed to be at fault.
But Heidegger’s remark will not do for me—partly because I
am not yet presumptuous enough to compare myself to Klee, Trakl,
Heisenberg, or Heidegger, more because ultimately my subject matter
is not philosophy, but the gospel of Jesus Christ, and in some sense
that must be immediately intelligible (though I would emphasize the
words “in some sense”). Nonetheless, I doubt that everything I say will
be immediately intelligible to most readers.
There are at least several possible reactions to that difficulty: one is
that of the naive, and I mean that word to have positive connotations.
The naive are of two types, those with childish faith and those with
more mature childlike faith. Those with childish faith will find what
I say difficult because it makes the obvious difficult. They are likely
to be bored or, at best, indulgent of me, and their reaction is the right
reaction. I have nothing to say to those who are naive in a childish
way because anything I say would be superfluous. Those with more
mature, childlike faith have moved from their initial naivete to one
that knows the obstacles to faith and has faith anyway—not necessarily in spite of those obstacles, but aware of them and able to cope
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with them.14 Often those who have a second naivete are aware of the
problems but do not find them problematic, though perhaps once they
did. It is as if they do not care because their faith has made them secure. I especially like to read the work of those in their second naivete,
or listen to them speak, but what they say is not philosophical. If it
were, it would not be naivete. The second kind of naivete is better than
philosophy since philosophy is more like adolescence than childhood.
Another group of readers may find what I say difficult because it
invokes difficult concepts and calls the ordinary way of thinking and
speaking of things like faith and scripture into question, offering a
different vocabulary, and they are afraid to have their ordinary concepts and vocabulary questioned. Those in this group have a dangerous naivete. In the face of the difficulties any child soon encounters,
in the face of evil and indeterminacy, they have given up their childish
faith and turned to “what everyone knows.” Sometimes what everyone
knows is what everyone in church knows. Sometimes it is what everyone in a particular culture knows. Sometimes it is what everyone in
a particular profession knows. There are many ways to succumb to
“what everyone knows.”
Those with this kind of naivete assume the values and ideas of
their history and culture without question, though they sometimes
pride themselves on questioning, especially if the “everyone” who
“knows” is a professional or academic community. Unaware, they
mingle scripture and the philosophy of men—the ideas that most
people in our time and culture take to be true. They are fish that do
not know the water they swim in. For them, perhaps Heidegger’s quotation would be appropriate if it were not for the fact that I am sometimes one of them.
A third group may find what I say difficult mostly because of my
shortcomings. I may have made the simple unnecessarily difficult. I may
14. See Paul Ricoeur, “Religion, Atheism, and Faith,” in Alasdair MacIntyre and Paul
Ricoeur, The Religious Significance of Atheism (New York: Columbia University Press,
1969), 58–98, for a discussion of this second naivete, though he does not use the term in
that essay.
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not express myself as well as I should. If you are among this third group,
please bear with me and forgive. I have not done so intentionally.
Given the various audiences to which these essays are addressed
and the difficulties some may encounter in them, readers should feel
free to skim those parts which they find either irrelevant to their interests or more philosophical and academic than suits their tastes. Pick
out the conclusions and move to the things that interest you more. Just
as not everyone needs to be a scientist to enjoy learning about science
or an art critic to enjoy looking at a painting, a person need not be an
academic philosopher to read these essays. Philosophy is not to everyone’s liking, and those who do not like it should feel free to ignore
the more technical parts in order to focus on that which they—and
I—find more important.
Finally, I owe thanks to so many people that I fear that in naming
any I may inadvertently exclude someone important. My wife, Janice,
and my family (children, in-laws, and grandchildren) have been and
continue to be of enormous support to me. Only a few of them have
much intellectual interest in the things that I do (though they have
powerful intellectual interests of their own), but for many years they
have unfailingly put up with my shortcomings and idiosyncrasies as
well as my philosophical interests and the absences those interests
have sometimes caused. I cannot tell how important their love and
support has been and continues to be.
Outside my family, the number of people to whom I am in debt is
staggering, but I should name a few and apologize profusely to those
I overlook. My oversight is not a reflection of the value of their contributions. Some to whom I am indebted and whose names come to
mind are Brant Bishop, Grant Boswell, Sabrina Clifford, Robert Couch,
Alison Coutts, Elder Henry B. Eyring, Stephen Goldman, Daniel
Graham, Ralph Hancock, Paula Hicken, Paul Hoskisson, Jeff Johnson,
Bruce Jorgenson, Brenna King, Keith Lane, Adam Miller, Paul Moyaert,
Nathan Oman, Noel Reynolds, Shirley Ricks, James Siebach, Joseph
Spencer, Brandie Siegfried, Carl Vaught, Rudi Visker, Mark Wrathall,
. . . . Thank you all.

chapter one

Remembrance
•

I

do not know when children begin to remember, but I know that
my earliest childhood memories are an important part of who I
am even though I do not have a good memory for things that I really
should remember: people’s names, things that happened to me, important events. For example, I was fourteen when I was baptized, but
I remember only a few details of what happened, though I remember
vividly some things surrounding my conversion. Perhaps it is true that
you do not remember what does not matter to you or what is painful,
but I do not think so. I remember relatively little about my childhood,
but I know that it was a happy one. I remember relatively few details of
when Janice and our sons and I lived in Pennsylvania while I went to
graduate school, and that was one of the most important and happiest
times of my life.
In spite of my poor memory, some memories stand out. One of
my earliest is a game that my mother and I played: she chewed gum
and blew as large a bubble as possible, and I tried to break the bubble
before she could suck it back into her mouth. I also remember the
interior of my Grandfather Sammon’s car. It was dark and warm, and
I especially remember the seat covering—gray, rough, and musty but
pleasant smelling. Was it made of horsehair or wool? I do not know, but
once in a great while I smell the smell again, though I can never quite
decide just what I am smelling. In new-car showrooms or dry-goods
stores I often sniff the air, unsuccessfully searching for that smell.
I remember riding in the back of that car with my mother—my
grandfather driving while she pointed at the telephone poles going by
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outside. I think she was counting them, and we pointed to animals in
the fields: “Look, a horse” or “See the cow?”
These two shadows of memory come together in one vivid memory. While my father served in General MacArthur’s honor guard in
Japan during the Korean War, my mother and I lived sometimes with
and sometimes near my grandparents in central Missouri. I remember riding with my mother one afternoon, probably in the fall—my
mother on the right and me in the middle of the backseat, and my
grandfather in the front, driving. Mother blew an especially large
bubble, and this time I won, exploding the bubble before she could
pull it back. When it burst, it was all over her face and in her hair,
and she laughed. But Grandpa did not laugh. I think he was probably
afraid we would get gum on the upholstery of his car.
I also remember my first experience with death, though I did not
know that was what it was. The house where my grandparents lived
when I was young is gone now, torn down after both had passed away
because it was dilapidated. I am told that the large room in the northwest corner at the front of the house was the bedroom for my mother
and me when we came back from Colorado after my father left for
Japan, but it was not until many years later that I remember being allowed in that room, a sitting room. In the early days its large double
doors were kept closed, and I had to be quiet when around them. At
that time my Aunt Betty, Uncle Ermon’s first wife, slept in the room
behind those doors. In fact, she was confined there with tuberculosis—which I only learned when I was quite a bit older.
I remember nothing about Aunt Betty except being kept from
her, but I remember standing in the front yard one day, north of the
yard gate across from where the chicken coop was later built, watching
Uncle Ermon carry a small woman wrapped in a light-colored blanket
or quilt out to the car, her head on his right shoulder. My mother and
grandmother stood watching from the porch. My grandfather got in
the front seat to drive.

Remembrance
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The memory ends there, but my mother says this must have happened when I was about two years old, perhaps on a visit, because by the
time we returned to Missouri to wait for my father, my aunt was dead.
I also remember well the first time my father talked to me about
baptism, several years before we joined the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints. I was in the fourth or fifth grade, and we lived in
Munich, Germany.
One day, I suppose it was a Saturday or Sunday, my father took
me for a walk. We crossed the two-lane highway (now a freeway) west
of our apartment building, and we walked along the forest paths with
others out for a stroll. The sky was clear and bright, and the green and
black of Perlacher Forest contrasted beautifully with the light of the
sky. My father talked to me about whether I wished to be baptized,
and I consented. I only vaguely remember being baptized by the Protestant chaplain, but I remember well the event of our conversation. In
a certain way, that walk in the Bavarian woods, talking with my father
about serious things on a beautiful day, has come to define my experience in Germany.
Such memories have played a large part in shaping who I am. I
do not believe in what many refer to as “the unconscious,” at least not
as it is usually described. I cannot make sense of what is said about
it. Nevertheless, it is obvious that there is much about myself that I
cannot bring to explicit consciousness. Memories such as those I have
mentioned are the tips of icebergs floating in my consciousness; they
indicate places where matters of considerable weight can be found,
even if I cannot explicitly name or bring them to consciousness. They
reveal not by exposure, but by suggestion.
As the title of this essay suggests, I want to think about memory
here, partly because it is a professional interest of mine, most of all because memory is so central to the gospel that we covenant to remember every time we take the bread and water of the sacrament.
Philosophers have had quite a bit to say about memory. Reading and teaching philosophy, I have learned to distinguish between
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recollection and memory. The former is a psychological phenomenon
that is a subset of the latter. Memory includes the things I can recollect, but it is not limited to it.1
You may ask, “What in the world can he be talking about? What
could memory be except a subjective psychological phenomenon—
what I call to mind?” To think about that, consider an example.2 Like
most married people in our culture, I wear a wedding band, and it
cannot be reduced to its economic value as a piece of gold or even to
its instrumental values. That is because, beyond having economic or
instrumental values, my wedding band is a symbol of my marriage.
As a symbol, it is obviously connected to memory. However, though it
serves to remind me that I am married, it is more than just a reminder.
What more could it be? First notice that if my wedding ring were
only something for reminding me, then I could also have chosen to tie
a string to my finger. However, though I can create such reminders—
putting yellow sticky notes on my computer monitor or remarks in my
daily planner—a wedding ring “works” differently than such things.
My wedding ring is more than a reminder at least because my
wife, Janice, gave it to me. It is different from a reminder because it
has a physical relation to her and so mediates my physical relation to
her. However, when I wear the ring, it is not that, by doing so, I touch
Janice in absentia. The ring is not a substitute for my wife. Though
the ring can remind me—it can cause me explicitly to think about
my marriage—most of the time I wear it without explicitly calling my
wife or marriage to mind. And yet it continues to do its work, as I notice quickly if I have taken it off to work and forget to put it back on.
I am more conscious of its absence than its presence, so I cannot ex1. Recall is a psychological event. Memory is what we share and participate in. As
such, it gives us direction (intention) beyond our subjective intentions, often intentions
we do not know. It also creates expectations of us that are beyond our will but are part of
who we are.
2. My thinking about memory is heavily influenced by the Belgian philosopher Paul
Moyaert. For more on these issues, see chapter 8 in this volume.
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plain its work by the way in which it is, sometimes, explicitly present
to thought.
Thus my wedding ring is a memorial of our relation because it
does something for me in spite of myself. Even if I am not thinking of
my marriage, the ring demands a certain attitude toward the world, a
certain reverence and respect for Janice; it connects me to Janice even
when I am not explicitly thinking of her. My wedding ring makes possible certain relations in the world by embodying those relations.
Said another way, my wedding ring gives order to my world: an
order that relates me to my wife and to the rest of the world, an order that cannot be reduced to an intention to remember my marriage.
Though it is odd to say, it is as if my wedding ring remembers my marriage for me.3 Not only does the ring not usually refer to or represent
Janice, it does not take her place. In a very real sense, it takes my place
rather than hers. My ring can serve as an explicit reminder because it
remembers all the time, while I recollect only sometimes.
We encounter the same phenomenon in many things other than
wedding rings—for example, in other physical symbols, in sacred objects, in ritual practices, in a variety of institutions. I mentioned the
sacrament earlier, perhaps the most important of such event-symbols
in Latter-day Saint experience, but we can also see the phenomenon
in other, more mundane places. Perhaps all symbols remember for us
rather than merely reminding us.
The university is an institutional repository of memory. As an institution, it remembers a great deal for us: making our explicit recollection of many things possible, giving our lives a particular character,
and creating possibilities for us that we have often not yet envisioned.
The university is a memorializing object and institution, not only in
the library collections but also in its organization and influence, in
such things as our academic regalia and other traditions (recognized
or unrecognized), in our folklore and style of gossip, and in courses
3. Remember that I distinguish memory from recall. Though the ring remembers for
me, it does not always or even usually recall for me. Probably it never does.
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such as the civilization courses or American heritage classes. We often
see the university as a place from which we look to the future—a place
where we prepare for jobs, where we produce knowledge that will have
effects in the future. But it is equally important to recognize that, as
an institution, the university is a place of remembrance and memorial.4 In fact, I suspect that a university can be oriented toward the
future only because it is an institution of memory. As a Latter-day
Saint institution, Brigham Young University is the repository for one
particularly important memory, that of the restoration as it enlightens
the academy. That memory orients us to the world and the future in a
unique way.
At the personal level, memory resides not only in my subjective
recollections, but also in things I may seldom notice, such as the ways
I speak—ways that sometimes betray my origins, as when I say “Missouruh” rather than “Missouree.” More broadly, that I speak English
rather than Korean or Swahili or Romanian as my native language is
a memory of my cultural inheritance. The ways that I interact with
others are memories of the interactions of my family and childhood
as well as the accumulated results of countless human interactions in
ages past. When I joined the church, such things as our pioneer heritage became part of my memory, as did a uniquely Latter-day Saint
vocabulary and various social practices. Most important, by joining
the church, the memory of the prophets became part of me, as did the
atonement. Though I was raised a believing, Bible-reading Christian,
through my conversion a vast storehouse of memory was added to my
being, an important part of which is latter-day revelation.
While studying the scriptures a few years ago, I was impressed
by the importance of memory when I read a passage from the Book
4. This should make us wary of sudden or drastic changes in the university. Revolutions, whether cultural or political, rarely succeed because they propose to cut themselves
off from the very memory that makes them possible and meaningful. Progress can be
important (though we often overrate it), but it rarely, if ever, requires what have come to
be called, in a mistaken understanding of the philosophy of science, “paradigm shifts”:
Even when it does, such shifts are events that happen as we work and learn but that we can
rarely, if ever, engineer.
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of Mormon. At the end of 1 Nephi 1, the prophet tells us that he will
abridge the sacred record that his father, Lehi, kept, and he will give
an account of his own life. He then tells us that Lehi prophesied to the
people of Jerusalem, but they refused to listen. Instead they mocked
him and sought to kill him. Then, having set the context and the
mood of his message, Nephi says, “I . . . will show unto you that the
tender mercies of the Lord are over all those whom he hath chosen,
because of their faith, to make them mighty even unto the power of
deliverance” (1 Nephi 1:20).5 As I read this sentence, it struck me that
we might take this to be Nephi’s “thesis statement” for the Book of
Mormon: Nephi and the other Book of Mormon prophets give us to
remember the tender mercies of the Lord so that we can be delivered
according to our faith.
As I reread the Book of Mormon with Nephi’s statement in mind,
I was struck by how often the prophets begin by calling us to remember the Lord’s mercy.6 However, given that the Book of Mormon ends
with the annihilation of the people of Mormon and Moroni, we may
find this thesis startling. How does a record that ends in disaster and
genocide show us the tender mercies of the Lord? Moroni’s answer
is clear: By showing us that the Lord has, over and over again, been
merciful to his children, the Book of Mormon, like the Bible, gives
us hope, even when we are in what would otherwise seem a hopeless
5. Nephi’s language seems to be influenced by Psalms. See Psalm 25:6: “Remember,
O Lord, thy tender mercies and thy lovingkindnesses; for they have been ever of old.” We
find similar language in other psalms.
6. The Book of Mormon as a whole begins with such a call. Its preface tells us that the
book was provided: “to show unto the remnant of the House of Israel what great things
the Lord hath done for their fathers; and that they may know the covenants of the Lord,
that they are not cast off forever—And also to the convincing of the Jew and Gentile that
Jesus is the Christ, the Eternal God, manifesting himself unto all nations.”
Lehi’s descendants will learn what the Lord did for their fathers, and the Jew and
Gentile will be convinced that Jesus is the Christ by seeing that God has revealed himself
to all nations. In other words, by seeing what the Lord has done for the descendants of
Lehi as well as for those in Jerusalem. Moroni’s preface confirms Nephi’s thesis statement: In the Book of Mormon we are reminded that the tender mercies of the Lord are
over the faithful to their deliverance.
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situation. In Moroni 10:1, Moroni begins his final exhortations. To the
remnant of the Lamanites he says:
Behold, I would exhort you that when ye shall read these
things, if it be wisdom in God that ye should read them, that
ye would remember how merciful the Lord hath been unto
the children of men, from the creation of Adam even down
until the time that ye shall receive these things, and ponder it
in your hearts. (Moroni 10:3)
And he follows this exhortation to remembrance with an exhortation that those who receive the Book of Mormon should ask the Father
whether it is true. In other words, they should ask the Father about the
truthfulness of the record of God’s mercies in the Book of Mormon. In
verse twenty-four Moroni turns from the descendants of Lehi to the
rest of us, exhorting us, too, to remember the things we have read—
namely, the account of God’s tender mercies to his people, tender mercies that “make them mighty even unto . . . deliverance” in faith.
As do the psalmists, Nephi and Moroni see a close connection,
perhaps even an identity, between remembering the tender mercies
of the Lord and repentance. Without such memory, we seem unable
to repent; if we repent, remembering those tender mercies is always
part of our repentance. Over and over again we find this theme in the
Book of Mormon: conversion and reconversion come by remembering; dedication, sacrifice, and covenant are one with memory. Sermon
after sermon begins with a prophet reminding his listeners or readers
of what the Lord has already done for them. They remind us of the
flood (Alma 10:22), of the exodus from Egypt (Mosiah 7:19), and of the
journey across the ocean (2 Nephi 10:20). Ammon converts Lamoni
by rehearsing these stories to him, beginning with the story of Adam
and Eve (Alma 18:36).
Once I noticed this theme of remembering God’s mercy, I saw it
everywhere. The Lord announced himself to Moses by calling himself “the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob”
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(Exodus 3:6), a common appellation and a name that reminds us of
the mercies that he showed to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, particularly as those mercies are manifest in his covenant with them (see
Leviticus 26:42).
Occasions for memory are found not only in the scriptures. Each
Sunday we renew our covenant with the Father by taking tokens of
Christ’s body and blood in remembrance of that flesh and blood and
by promising always to remember him. I understand the Word of
Wisdom as an ongoing memorial of who we are and what we have
promised.7 One of the most obvious sites of memory is the garment
worn by those who are endowed, reminding us of the covenants we
have made; we wear sacred memory on our bodies day in and day out.
Like my wedding ring, the garment remembers for me, calling me to
recollection when need be, but ordering my world even when I do not
have it explicitly in my consciousness. Because I wear the garment, I
am in the world differently than I would be if I did not.8
In my own life, the memorializing objects and practices of the
church continue to make my spiritual life possible. When I remember
the Savior not only in my recollections, but especially in my practices
and relations with others, I bear witness of his saving relation to me,
and, as promised in the sacrament prayers, I receive the Spirit. To the
degree that I do not have memory—from the readily identifiable and
seemingly mundane culture that Latter-day Saints all over the globe
7. The Word of Wisdom may also direct our attention to the coming of Christ. Since
anticipation is a form of memory, it may call the second coming to our remembrance. The
Savior says: “But I say unto you, I will not drink henceforth of this fruit of the vine, until
that day when I drink it new with you in my Father’s kingdom” (Matthew 26:29). Perhaps
by ourselves not drinking of the fruit of the vine now, we remember the Savior’s promise
that he will drink with us when he returns.
8. Noticing the power of memory and its difference from recollection is, I argue, an
important part of renewing our spiritual life. However, sometimes memory has the opposite effect, deadening us to what is spiritual. An example would be vain repetitions in
prayer, repeating phrases because they are so much part of our memory that we need not
recollect them in order to say them. In such cases, conscious recollection can be a powerful tool for bringing power back to our memory. (Thanks to Brant Bishop for reminding
me of this problem.)
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share, to my obedience to commandments even when I am not thinking of them, to the mysteries and blessings of the temple—I am not
part of the body of Christ, I am not one of his adopted children.
Sometimes I find myself slipping from the memory into which I
entered through my conversion. I have doubts about my testimony.
Something happens that I do not understand, and I wonder whether
the church is true. I may chafe at commandments or policies. I might
think myself better than others—sometimes because of education,
sometimes because of social status, often for who-knows-what reason.
I may criticize instructors and leaders in the church, wishing (not out
loud and rarely even to myself, but wishing it anyway) that they had
more “training for the ministry,” that they were better at getting my
interest—shifting the burden of my spiritual life to them. Occasionally
I find myself bored with the talks in sacrament meeting or quietly and
self-deceptively scornful of the testimonies borne on fast Sunday. In
other words, though I may be able to recall my covenants, sometimes
I find myself no longer remembering them, no longer remembering
(whatever I recollect) that at baptism I promised to “mourn with those
that mourn; yea, and comfort those that stand in need of comfort” so
that I would “stand as [a witness] of God at all times and in all things,
and in all places” (Mosiah 18:9).9 In spite of having so promised,
sometimes I do not even learn with those who would learn or testify
with those who would testify, much less mourn or comfort. Whatever
I may recall, whatever I may repeat consciously, at such times I have
begun no longer to remember the tender mercies of the Lord; I have
begun to slip out of the ongoing process of repentance. (I hope that
you will recognize a version of yourselves in my self-description, not
because I hope you share my failings, but because I assume that I am
not the only one who finds himself slipping on occasion.)
9. Notice that Alma makes bearing witness (recollection) dependent on our relation with others (memory): “mourning with” and “comforting” make testimony possible,
suggesting that it is not truly possible without such relations to our fellows.
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Such events do not characterize most of my life in the church,
but they happen often enough that I must consider how to deal with
them. My answer is recollection. Though memory cannot be reduced
to recollection, when I begin to fade and falter, the answer is to explicitly recollect a few events in my life that have brought sharply to
my attention what living my life memorializes. Recollecting the visible tips of the largely invisible icebergs of memory helps resituate me,
bringing me back to who I am, putting me back into the larger context
of memory. Let me finish with a few of those recollections.
I share them with some trepidation. Sacred experiences are not to
be shared easily, like political slogans or loose change. One should be
careful about sharing them, for sharing them too often or under inappropriate circumstances strips them of their sacred character. They become commonplace rather than sacred. Nevertheless, there are times
and places when we can share sacred recollections with each other to
strengthen the testimonies of both those who testify and those who
hear the testimony. I pray that this is such an occasion.
The first experience I recall is that of my conversion. My father
met the missionaries through a friend at work, Robert Clark. I met
them through my parents when my mother cajoled me into taking
part in a “cottage meeting” at our house. Though I began reluctantly,
once I started listening, I was hooked. I enjoyed the missionary discussions and liked the missionaries, and I enjoyed learning what they
taught. To be honest, I did not read the Book of Mormon, and I did
not pray about the church very much. However, after several months
of discussion, with the rest of my family, I wanted to join the church.
Since we had not been to church yet, the missionaries arranged for
us to attend the next Sunday so that we could be baptized the Saturday
after that—the first Saturday of February, 1962. Sitting on the left side
of the chapel, about one-half to two-thirds back, watching the meeting begin, I was not particularly impressed. It looked very much like
the Protestant services I was accustomed to, except that there were
more people on the stand, the table for communion—what Latter-day
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Saints call the sacrament—was to the right of the room rather than
in the middle, those to say the prayers over the sacramental elements
were surprisingly young, and when the meeting began, it was almost
shockingly informal and unpolished. Though I had decided to be baptized, as yet I remained a curious onlooker more than a convert. As
the sacrament was blessed and passed, the bread came to me. In my
former church, the Disciples of Christ, we believed that everyone present should take the sacramental emblems, and though the missionaries had told my parents that this was not the Latter-day Saint practice
(at that time), no one had told me. As the bread tray came around, I
took a piece and put it in my mouth.
As I placed the bread in my mouth, I was overcome by the most
intense spiritual experience I had ever had. Instantly I knew something of what Paul had experienced on the road to Damascus. Without being especially worthy of it, without having sought it any more
than superficially, I had been touched by the Holy Ghost. My entire
soul—body and spirit—was electrified and on fire. Now, rather than
thinking that it would be a good idea to be a Mormon, that LDS theology was interesting, and so on, I knew that I had to join this church.
I was no longer a spectator. I knew that what I had learned from the
missionaries was true. I knew that what I would learn later would be
true. I knew that Joseph Smith was a prophet, as was David O. McKay,
the prophet at the time. Though I had as yet read only a passage here
and a passage there in the Book of Mormon, I knew it was the word
of God. Though I had believed in Christ all my life, for the first time I
knew that Jesus Christ had died for my sins and I understood something of what that meant.
With that experience, I suppose there was a sense in which I could
still choose not to be baptized. Nevertheless, there was a more profound sense in which I no longer had any choice. I knew that my life
from that point on would be inextricably bound to the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints. I did not know what that entailed, but I
knew it was true.
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I do not know why I was privileged to have such an experience
when others are not. I cannot explain what happened. I only know
that the experience has provided an anchor for my soul, something
to which I can return in recollection when I begin to falter, something that returns me to the ordering of the gospel and the order of
the church. This is a recollection that returns my memory to me and
returns me to it. It is something for which I am deeply and eternally
grateful.
That first taste of the sacrament has been the most important
spiritual experience of my life because it converted me, changing my
life. On the whole, since then I have lived a relatively mundane life;
though spiritual experiences are common, they are rarely dramatic.
I do not regret that. It is important to learn to see the spiritual in the
mundane, to find spirituality even when not emotionally wrought, to
recognize that the Spirit usually brings peace and speaks quietly (John
14:27). That is more important than having dramatic experiences, and
we must be wary of equating our emotional and our spiritual lives.
Nevertheless, my first experience with the sacrament was not the only
such emotionally powerful spiritual experience.
A few months after we were baptized, my father was assigned to
the Korean Military Advisory Group for the South Korean Army and
was allowed to take his family to Korea with him. We were privileged
to grow up in the church while in Korea, to be taught and guided by
such families as the Terrys and the Hogans, and to be inspired by
wonderful Korean Saints like Han Insang, Rhee Honam, and Kim
Cha Bong. In those days in Korea we did not have stake or district
conferences for people in the armed services. We had “servicemen’s
retreats,” occasions when those who could get time off could go to
Seoul and spend two or three days meeting and sharing testimonies.
Elder Gordon B. Hinckley was the visiting General Authority for Asia,
and he was often able to attend our retreats, so they were a special occasion for us.
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One year, during late fall or winter, we had a retreat in Seoul, and
Elder Hinckley attended. We started on Friday and ended on Sunday,
and as we met in our final meeting, a testimony meeting, many bore
their testimonies, including my younger brother. I recall nothing said
in those testimonies (though President Hinckley had such a prodigious memory that decades later he could tell what my brother said),
but I felt the Spirit as strongly then as I had when I first received my
testimony. I particularly remember Elder Hinckley bearing his testimony, telling us that the Spirit in our meeting was as strong as he had
ever felt it, as strong even as he had felt it in meetings of the Twelve
in the temple. He said that there were angels in the room witnessing
our testimonies.
I knew that what he said was true. I could see no angels. Tears
were streaming down my face so heavily that I could not see anything,
much less angels. But I knew, absolutely knew, that he was right. I
knew what I had learned with my first experience with the Spirit: the
church is true; the priesthood is real, and it is the power of God. I had
a feeling that I take to be a premonition of what it means finally to
be sanctified, for like King Benjamin’s people, for a short time I had
“no more disposition to do evil, but to do good continually” (Mosiah
5:2). I could not and did not want to separate myself from the church
that made such an experience possible or from the gospel taught in
that church, pointing as it does to salvation in Jesus Christ. That experience with the Spirit in the presence of one of the Twelve became
another anchor for my soul.
The Lord has not ceased to give me such anchors. One of the more
recent was in August of 1994. My second son, Matthew, was to return
from his mission to Pôrto Alegre, Brazil. He asked that his mother and
I meet him and do some traveling, but we could not do that. However,
we compromised, and I went to Pôrto Alegre to pick him up. Matthew
and I stayed in Pôrto Alegre for a few days and then set out to São
Paulo by bus. The day we were to leave for Curitiba, we discovered that
we would have to wait until late afternoon to get the bus, but we had
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already checked out of our hotel and did not have anything left that we
wanted to do in Pôrto Alegre.
Matthew had the idea to take a bus to some point midway between
Pôrto Alegre and Curitiba, spend the day there, and then catch the bus
to Curitiba as it came through our stopping point at night. He asked
the woman selling tickets to tell us a good place to go. “Rosario,” she
said. “It is a nice resort town with a beach.” We bought our tickets and
headed to Rosario.
When we stepped from the bus in Rosario, we were surprised.
There were mountains, but no beach. We were obviously inland and
rather high. We decided to get some lunch and see what Rosario had to
offer. If worst came to worst, we could sit in the bus station and read.
As we turned the corner of one of the first streets we passed, two
boys, one a teenager and the other perhaps eleven, came running down
the street shouting, “Elders! Elders!” Matthew stopped and talked
with them, explaining that although I was wearing a white shirt and
tie, only one of us was a missionary and that we were to be there for
only a few hours. They were excited anyway, not caring that I was not
a missionary as long as someone was. We must go to see their mother.
The older boy ran off to find her, and the younger boy led us toward
her. As we came around another corner, a middle-aged woman came
running down the street, tears flowing, also crying, “Elders! Elders!”
Again Matthew explained that he was the only missionary there and
that we would be there only a short time, but that was irrelevant to her.
Her prayers for missionaries to come to Rosario had been answered.
She pled, “Have family home evening with us, please.”
We could not refuse, so we agreed to go to their home early that
evening for family home evening. We spent the afternoon in the town
wandering around, buying some presents for Matthew’s sisters, and
sitting in the park, reading and talking. Then we went to their house.
We visited with them and sang a hymn. Matthew taught a lesson, and
we prayed with them. As we were finishing, the sister told us that we
must visit a young man in town who was inactive. (I was not sure how
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one knows that another is inactive when there is no branch or church
activity in a town, but she knew—and she was right.)
We walked across the small town to the highway where this
young man owned a truck stop. He fed us a gigantic, definitely nonvegetarian dinner and talked at length with Matthew. As Matthew
later explained to me, the young man had a dream the night before.
In the dream the missionaries came to visit him and told him that he
must return to church—and there we were. (He could attend church
in a neighboring city by hitching a ride with truck drivers, but he had
stopped doing so.)
I was thunderstruck. I could not believe the faith of these people.
I could not believe how desperately they hunger for what I take for
granted. I could not believe how much the Lord loves them as individuals. I could not believe that he had used our seemingly chance
wandering around Brazil to bless a few of his children. As I sat on
the bus that night, I had difficulty sleeping, not because the bus was
uncomfortable (which it was), but because I was so overcome with a
vision of the love that the Father and the Son have for us, of the need
for missionaries in places like Rosario, of the beautiful faith of people
like those I had just met, of my own unworthiness in comparison to
theirs, and of my ingratitude for the blessings I have received.
Those few hours in Rosario, Brazil, gave me a deepened appreciation for the love of God. I was reminded that his love is not a general
love but a love for each specific person. Though what we brought to the
Saints in Rosario was relatively little, that we could be instruments for
bringing it renewed my understanding of the Lord’s power to save—to
save from difficulty, from oppression, from loneliness, and especially
from sin. It made me ashamed of taking for granted the access I have
to the church and the temple, to inspired leadership and instruction.
It showed me why the missionary effort is so important and must expand, for here was a group of ten or fifteen Saints to whom the church
could not yet come because, in spite of the large numbers of young
people who serve missions, there are still not enough missionaries in
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the field. Like the previous experiences, those few hours in Rosario
became another anchor for my soul, something I recollect as a way to
continue to remember the covenants I am part of and the obligations
that have come to me.
I live in a world that gets its significance from memory: memory
manifest in wedding rings and garments and sacramental emblems,
in ordinances and practices and customs, in speech patterns and
names and literature, in universities and libraries and classes. I have
learned that I live not on my own breath but also on that of the Spirit,
without which there is only recollection at best and no memory, without which, ultimately, emblems, ordinances, and society are dead and
hollow shells. Memory—manifest in my speech, our customs and habits, our relations, our ordinances and commandments—transcends
and encompasses me, making the world I live in possible by giving it
meaning and structure.
Recollection, calling various things to mind, is not memory. Nevertheless, recollection can resituate us in memory. As I recollect—
re-collect—my experiences with the Spirit, I take my place again in
the memory that makes life possible and good, that strengthens and
continues my testimony. Most people have experienced moments of
spirituality to which their souls are anchored. Those who have not
will—sometimes in answer to prayer, sometimes unbidden. My prayer
is that, when you face doubt or difficulty, you will re-collect your souls
by recollecting those anchoring experiences. And, though I have no
authority to offer spiritual promises, based on my experience, I promise that if you will so recollect, you will continue not only to recollect
but also to remember the everlasting gospel, the covenants you have
made, and the holy name of Jesus Christ.

chapter two

Room to Talk:
Reason’s Need for Faith
•

T

ruman Madsen’s slim volume, Eternal Man,1 had a profound effect on me and, when I ask others who were students in the late
sixties or early seventies about it, I find that it was equally important
for them. The book was not academically profound, but then it had no
pretensions to be. As Madsen says in the introduction, its chapters were
intended “as a kind of ‘midrash.’ . . . The goal has been to clarify rather
than to verify, with little room for argument, except an implicit appeal
to introspection.”2
The result of that goal was that one can find much to challenge in
the book: Must we understand the doctrine of preexistent intelligences
to imply that we have existed eternally as individuals? Does Madsen
not create straw persons in his descriptions of orthodox Christian
and other beliefs? For example, is it true that religious existentialism,
such as that of the nineteenth-century Danish philosopher, Søren
Kierkegaard, is “utter pessimism”?3 And does Madsen not assume
that being is a thing rather than a process or event—does he not reify
it—when he argues against the dualism of traditional theology by dismissing its concerns for nothing and for being?4 Does he not dismiss
too easily some of the traditional problems of theology and the philosophy of religion, such as how it is possible to speak meaningfully
1.
2.
3.
4.

Truman Madsen, Eternal Man (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book, 1966).
Madsen, Eternal Man, viii.
Madsen, Eternal Man, 29.
Madsen, Eternal Man, 31–32 and 44.
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of a being who transcends our mortal finitude?5 How does defining
freedom as self-determination remove all of the problems of freedom
and determinism?6 It would not be difficult to add to the list.
But adding to the list would be beside the point. It would mean
refusing to recognize the book for what it claims to be and is: a primer
to aid us in introspecting about the intellectual strengths of our belief
in the premortal existence of spirits. If, as such a primer, the book
raises these questions and more, it fulfills its function, inducing us to
think about its topic. Perhaps it will some day even goad one of us to
provide the promised “tome which is not pressed [as Madsen’s was] for
abbreviation”7—a tome that one wishes Madsen himself could have
found the time to offer, all the while recognizing that his life continued to be busy enough to make that difficult.
But for those like myself, Eternal Man was important not so much
because of the problems with which it dealt or the positions that it
took on the questions of the eternality of individuals, divine omnipotence, the materiality of the Divine, human freedom, and so on, but
because of what it did. More than teaching a particular doctrine or
suggesting any particular solution to a philosophical or theological
problem, the book gave its readers permission to think about these
kinds of problems, to read the books listed in its many footnotes and
books like them. Eternal Man said, “It is good to think about and deal
with these issues.” It gave those of us in college and graduate school in
the late 1960s an alternative to the two most common positions taken
with regard to such things: “One position assumes that they [the ideas
about preexistence] are so remote and incomplete that a ‘practical
man’ avoids thinking about them. The other assumes that by mere reference to preexistence one can ‘explain’ all events and eventualities.”8
By writing Eternal Man, Truman Madsen said to me—and, I believe,
to many others—“Take seriously the admonition from the Prophet
5.
6.
7.
8.

Madsen, Eternal Man, 35.
Madsen, Eternal Man, 66 n. 9.
Madsen, Eternal Man, viii.
Madsen, Eternal Man, 14.
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Joseph Smith that introduces chapter two: ‘When things that are of
the greatest importance are passed over by weak-minded men without
even a thought, I want to see truth in all its bearings and hug it to my
bosom.’ ”9 Reading Eternal Man made me not want to be one of the
“weak-minded.” The book gave me an intellectual goal and told me
that my new goal was not only commensurable with my faith, but an
expression of it.
Reminding us that Joseph Smith described the gospel as requiring “careful and ponderous and solemn thoughts,”10 Madsen said, “A
related kind of authority is needed in this realm. It is what, in the vernacular is called ‘room to talk.’ ”11 By suggesting the possibility of taking our faith seriously while also understanding the writings of scholars, of thinking about both without being ashamed of or frightened
by one or the other, Madsen opened such a room and many entered.
Given today’s hypersensitivities of various kinds, such room to
talk is as difficult to come by as it ever was. Some, recognizing that
current trends of thinking are not consonant with the gospel (as if
they ever were), think that we should shut our eyes and ears to such
things and that, especially, we should not speak of them to the young
for fear of corrupting them. Others think that it is enough merely to
repeat conventional wisdom about the gospel or, perhaps, even merely
to repeat the truths of the gospel. For them, repetition without investigation is enough to answer all questions. A few others, convinced
that this or that seemingly newfangled notion is, at last, the answer to
our problems and questions, would either ignore the gospel or twist
it into a shape that fits better their newfound intellectual faith. But all
of these kinds of problems respond to the difficulties of the intellect
with one kind of dogmatism or another. They shut the door on any
room to talk.
9. Madsen, Eternal Man, 23.
10. As quoted in Madsen, Eternal Man, ix.
11. As quoted in Madsen, Eternal Man, ix.
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In this paper, I will address the relation of faith to reason. I doubt
that I will add new insights to the discussion of that hoary subject.
Rather than do so, I intend to say a few things that I hope will, in imitation of Eternal Man, use the topic to open and leave room to talk.
I will argue that faith and reason are commensurable. I have heard
persons whose ideas I respect suggest otherwise. Nevertheless, I think
my conclusion is one that most Latter-day Saints would agree with.12
In making this argument, though I argue for what I believe to be true,
I leave open the possibility that I am wrong. That is one reason that
philosophers offer arguments, to make it possible for others, by seeing
the steps of their reasoning, to show them where they went wrong.
Besides arguing for the commensurability of faith and reason, I will
go further. I suggest that faith is fundamental to reason, though I do not
more than sketch an argument for that suggestion.13 The full argument
for that claim would take at least another paper and probably a book.
Neither of the positions that I outline is novel and, in some circles, they
may even be ordinary. But the marvel of the ordinary and wonder at
that marvel is sometimes itself not so ordinary. In fact, I think it has
become so inordinate in our day that we often need to be reminded of
quite ordinary things. So, I offer here some musings and reflections on
the relation of faith to reason, with an argument or two, in the same
spirit as that we find in Eternal Man—namely as points for reflection
and provocations for thought more than as a philosophical treatise.
In particular, I want to suggest that faith is fundamental to reason, but let me begin my reflections on that claim with a story, for my
reflections have their genesis in an experience in the spring of 1993. I
think the story illustrates that rationality cannot be reduced to sets of
propositions or beliefs related to each other by implication relations.
Instead (and I will argue that this is true of every kind of rationality),
12. Of course, arguing for a conclusion with which most already agree may be a problem: we often overlook the deficiencies in the arguments of those with whom we agree.
13. A sketch can create room for discussion by suggesting a topic and outlining an
approach to that topic worth considering, while leaving the details and even the decision
about the ultimate value of the approach to be worked out in further discussion.
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rationality must begin with something outside of such sets and relations, as I think the experience I will recount suggests.
My oldest daughter had been an officer for one of the Utah chapters of the Future Homemakers of America, and they held their end-ofthe-school-year banquet in Salt Lake City. I was going through all the
usual hoopla politely but condescendingly. I was there to do my duty as
a father, though I would have much preferred to be elsewhere. Chicken
dinner for 750 accompanied by speeches and awards for a large group of
fourteen- through seventeen-year-olds was not my idea of a great way to
spend my Saturday afternoon. Sitting next to me at the table for parents
was a couple of about my age, both of whom were obviously enjoying
what I was merely tolerating, from the food to the entertainment. When
I asked where they were from, he said, “Wayne County.”
“Where in Wayne County?”
“Just Wayne County.”
“How far away is that?”
“About a four-hour drive.”
It quickly began to be more difficult for me to condescend. Their
four-hour trip made my forty-five minute one look like a walk across
the street, but I was the one who was slightly irritated about having
to make the trip. Had I stopped to reflect (although I did not), I could
have explained their enjoyment of the occasion geographically: such
things might look good in comparison to the pleasures of Wayne
County. Our conversation continued:
“About what time will you get back tonight?”
“About 11:00.”
“Well, at least tomorrow is Sunday. Maybe you can sleep in.”
Stupid me. I assumed that all people have five-day-a-week jobs,
Monday through Friday, and work from eight to five.
“Well, it’s lambing season and one or the other of us has to get up
every hour to check the ewes. We trade off, so we can sleep about two
hours at a time.”
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Condescension turned to humiliation: this man and woman loved
their daughter more than I loved mine. Though, unlike me, they actually had to sacrifice to be at the banquet, they were pleased to be
there, enjoying what happened, not because they were so intellectually blighted that they thought that seventeen-year-olds have much
of importance to say and certainly not because they liked the food on
the menu or found the pleasures of Wayne County so abysmal. They
were there because they loved their daughter and they enjoyed seeing
her enjoy herself and be honored. I love my daughter too, but what
I saw as an inconvenient and mildly irritating responsibility that is
consequent on loving that daughter, they saw as part of that love. That
experience persuaded me in a moment that they were right and I was
wrong. Their lives were right in a way that mine was not, and I came
to that understanding by seeing a small part of their lives.
The couple next to me did not—almost certainly would not have
thought to—offer me what philosophers recognize as rational arguments, and they almost certainly did not have the training to do so in
a way that I would acknowledge as philosophical. In spite of that, their
behavior did bring me to a conclusion, the conclusion that one should
enjoy such events. They did not intend to do so. I certainly had no
impression that they were trying to teach me anything—certainly not
that I was wrong. Nevertheless, being in their presence did persuade
me. They were something like evidence; they did not offer it. I would
have had to have been unreasonable to deny the conclusion that their
behavior persuaded me to accept. What was the nature of the experience I had in seeing what their lives revealed? How did that experience make it possible for me to be persuaded, to come to a rational
conclusion, immediately and without a chain of reasoning (deductive
or inductive) from assumptions to conclusion?
How did seeing them and talking with them make possible a rational belief that I was wrong (the conviction that I was wrong, if I
can use the word in both of its senses) without any chain of reasoning? What I saw in them was neither an axiomatic truth nor a truth
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deduced from axioms. It was not a “bare empirical fact” (granting, for
the argument, that there are such dubious things). It was not an objective truth.14 But neither was it merely a subjective opinion. My judgment of myself was rational. Some evidence that is was a rational belief
rather than a merely subjective one is that others, hearing the story,
know its conclusion before I tell it; they are able to adduce the same
conclusion from the story that I did from the experience. The behavior
of the couple from Wayne County was like evidence for a rational conclusion, but it did not require that I begin with a belief and then come
to a conclusion based on that belief in order to be persuaded.
Before trying to give an account of why the kind of knowledge I
acquired that afternoon was rational, let me be clear about what I am
saying: Seeing the couple next to me and listening to them talk about
their daughter was sufficient to persuade me (in a sense of the term
that I will leave open) of the inferiority of my love for my daughter
when compared to their love for theirs. That is not to say that I could
not have been wrong about that belief. It is only to say that the belief
to which I came was rational. It had sufficient grounds and could not
be explained solely in terms of my previous beliefs. It was not just
subjective. This is also not to say that persuasion cannot take other
forms. It is only to suggest that this event raises important questions
about rationality, particular questions that may help us think about
rationality as a whole. Careful readers may worry that I wash over
important distinctions: rationality cannot be reduced to a response
to relevant information; giving reasons for a belief is not the same as
14. The phrase objective truth gets used in many ways. In common usage it means
little more than something like “real truth.” The strict, philosophical sense of the word
object, however, is “that which stands at the other end of a perceptual or mental directedness or of a possible directedness.” On this understanding, there are objects that are not
physical objects (such as mathematical and other ideas) and there can be existing things
that are not objects (such as things to which no one is presently directing any awareness).
In the strict sense, to be objective is to consider things simply as standing at the other end
of a perceptual or epistemic directedness and, therefore, to ignore other possible relations
to that which one considers. I here use the phrase objective truth in this more strict sense:
the truth as it pertains to objects of that sort.
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being evidence for a belief, and so forth.15 Nevertheless, recognizing
the legitimacy of that worry, I will proceed. I am not arguing that response to relevant information and rationality are the same, and I do
not think my argument requires that they be the same. Instead, I am
looking at a particular kind of case—the case in which I find myself
persuaded of something based on something that our ordinary metatalk about reason seems to exclude or at least to render problematic,
as in the example of the couple from Wayne County. That kind of case
is sufficient for the purposes of this paper, namely to raise questions
about our understanding of reason that will allow me to argue that
reason and faith are commensurable and to sketch an argument that
reason requires faith.
I will suggest that faith and reason are commensurable by arguing
that reason always requires something outside the chain of reasons
(such as my experience of that couple). In addition, as mentioned, I
will sketch what I think may be an argument that the relation of reason to what is outside itself is a matter of faith. If that is the case, then
at least one way in which faith and reason are commensurable is that
the latter requires the former.
Before I make my case, however, let me briefly take up another
way in which faith and reason are commensurable: not only does reason need faith, faith needs reason. If, as it is often defined, faith is understood to be belief or even knowledge in the absence of compelling
reasons, then it is obviously true by definition that faith and reason
are mutually exclusive. When we are asked to talk about faith, if we
are not careful, we almost always slip into our semiphilosophical or
theological mode and, when we do, we are likely to say something in
which faith is defined in this way.16 Although this response is com15. My thanks to Mark Wrathall for helping me see the importance of this problem.
16. Although most people would not think of themselves as philosophers or theologians or even think of themselves as ever doing philosophy or theology, most still use the
methods and concepts given to them by philosophy to talk about various matters, including the nature of reason. It is natural to use that kind of thinking when we talk about certain subjects. The problem is that, when we do so, we almost always unconsciously use the
ideas, concepts, and methods of reasoning that we have inherited, without reflection, in
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mon, I think it is seriously mistaken. The American philosopher Alvin Plantinga has argued—brilliantly, I believe—that we should reject
that definition: compelling experience may be sufficient for knowledge, even in the absence of compelling beliefs.17 Faith is best thought
of, not as belief in the absence of reasons, but as fidelity to something
that one has been given, such as an experience or covenant, or trust in
someone, such as God. That is how it seems most often to be used in
the scriptures.
Besides appealing to Plantinga’s argument, I have additional reasons for rejecting the common separation of faith from reason. For
one thing, to think in that way is to confuse faith with opinion (though
even opinion has its reasons and evidence, often, but not always, poor
ones). If we confuse faith and opinion, we should not be surprised
when arguments showing the insufficiency of opinion and the necessity of moving from opinion to knowledge grounded in reason also
work as arguments against faith. But it is a mistake to define faith as
belief without reasons.
Paul is explicit about faith being a matter of evidence: “Now faith
is the substance (hypostasis; meaning “reality” or “realization”) of
things hoped for, the evidence (elenchos, meaning “proof” or “argument for”18) of things not seen” (Hebrews 11:1). Nephi and Lehi, the
our common language and culture. Since these are “natural” to us as part of our “common
sense,” it is not surprising that we use them to discuss philosophical and theological problems, whether or not we recognize that we are doing so. But since these ideas and concepts
are also unexamined, we often make mistakes when we use them, including the mistake of
introducing ideas that are incompatible with other ideas that we hold. (This natural and understandable reversion to common sense is my understanding of the phrase that speaks of
mingling the philosophies of men—in other words, their common sense—with scripture.)
17. For the details of Plantinga’s views, see Alvin Plantinga, “Reason and Belief in
God,” in The Analytic Theist: An Alvin Plantinga Reader, ed. James F. Sennett (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 102–61; Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate (New York:
Oxford, 1993); and Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (New York: Oxford, 1993).
Plantinga argues for a number of conclusions regarding reason. For my purposes, the
only one that is relevant is that it is possible to have grounds for belief that are not, themselves, beliefs.
18. I am grateful to James L. Siebach for first pointing this out to me, as well as
making me think about its importance to our understanding of the relation between
faith and reason.

28

Faith, Philosophy, Scripture

son of Helaman, convert hundreds to faith by offering them “great
evidence” (see Helaman 5:50). Several years later, Nephi, the son of
Helaman, tells the people that their unbelief is unreasonable, a rejection of convincing evidence (see Helaman 8:24). Faith has reasons and
requires them; at least part of what is wrong in the supposed confrontation between faith and reason is that a poor definition of faith is
used. Since I will assume that most of the audience of this essay consists of practicing, faithful Latter-day Saints, however, this argument
needs little development. They already know, at least in their hearts,
that there is more to faith than belief without reason; that faith is essentially trust and fidelity rather than belief, though beliefs will result
from trust and fidelity; and that when they do, they will have their
reasonable ground. Thus, my primary focus will be on the nature of
reason and its relation to faith.
Aristotle says that to be human is to be rational.19 Along with
most people, I’m willing to accept that assumption without further
proof, but the assumption cannot mean that to be human is to offer
and listen to arguments. Aristotle’s claim is not that human beings are
all philosophical in the conventional sense of the term. At best, Aristotle is making the weaker claim, that all human beings are capable of
using reason. But what does that mean?
In its essence, the problem of reason is simple: does reason have
a reason, and if it does, how do we think that reason? How do we
establish certain knowledge when reason seeks for its foundation?
René Descartes—one of the most important fathers of modernism, a
seventeenth-century philosopher to whom we owe much of our contemporary, ordinary understanding of reason (our “common sense”),
and the author of the oft-repeated and much misunderstood sentence,
“I think, therefore I am”—assumes that reason has no reason: it begins
from principles that are intuitively known to be true without reference
to anything else, and proceeds logically from step to step, establish19. Nichomachean Ethics 1097b24–1098a3.
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ing knowledge as certain when it reaches its end.20 In contemporary
philosophical jargon, he is a foundationalist: according to Descartes,
there are self-certifying, rational foundations to reason.
It is true that Descartes must know there is a God in order to know
that there really is a world that can be the object of his ratiocination,
but though the existence of the world and our knowledge of that existence require God, reason does not. If it did, Descartes believes, we
would never get to a knowledge of God’s existence or even our own,
for it requires reason to know either. Thus, Descartes’ methodological doubt can get us to the conclusions he reaches only because, for
him, reason is self-grounding and complete. It is the only thing without reason; it is its own reason. Despite the fact that much twentiethcentury philosophy on both sides of the Atlantic has devoted itself
to a critique of the Enlightenment notion of reason, and even with
the introduction of such things as probability theory, studies of induction, and new theories of logic, I think that many—certainly most
nonphilosophers—continue to think of reason in terms that are ultimately Cartesian: reason is self-grounding and, in principle, eventually capable of giving a complete description of the world. Certainly
this is the implicit view of many who advocate reason as the solution
to all problems and science as the ultimate example of reason.
But I see only two possible consequences of the claim that reason
is self-grounding and complete: radical skepticism or totalitarianism.
The eighteenth-century Scots philosopher, David Hume, an important
critic of the Cartesian understanding of the world, shows us the first
of these: if we accept Descartes’ foundationalist position and reject
the proof for God’s existence (as we most certainly can when we confine our thinking to what can be demonstrated by reason unaided),
20. For perhaps the best place to see Descartes’ discussion of reason, see his Discourse
on Method. Of course, Descartes’ view is not created out of whole cloth. It has everything
to do with the tradition from which he comes, and it remains the dominant way of understanding science—knowledge—for a long time. See Barry Gower, Scientific Method: An
Historical and Philosophical Introduction (London: Routledge, 1997), 1–108, for a good
overview of both the importance of this view of science and how it changed.
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then we are reduced to the tautologies of pure logic and to reporting
the fact of immediately present experience (which may not be able to
be plural without losing its immediacy). Even memory of very recent
events cannot be trusted.21 On the other hand, if we find a rational
way around Hume’s argument, a way of speaking about the world rationally (or if, as many have done, we ignore Hume’s argument), then
we accept Descartes’ assumption that reason is ultimately adequate to
the world: it is in principle possible to make a list of the true propositions that give a complete description of the world at any given point
in time and to relate those propositions to one another by logical implication alone.22
In the last half of the twentieth century a Lithuanian born, Jewish,
French émigré, Emmanuel Levinas, argues that such an understanding of reason is not just mistaken, but eventually amounts to totalitarianism, even political totalitarianism, and, in the end, the horror
of Auschwitz.23
As extreme as that claim is, I find it plausible, although I can here
do no more than give a précis of an argument for it. As moderns, we
assume that reason makes us masters of this world. To use Francis
21. See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature. I believe that Hume gives this
argument, not because he is a radical skeptic, but because he is radically skeptical about
rationalism. I take his argument to be a reductio ad absurdem of the rationalist position.
But that does not change the point I am making here.
22. You find the culmination of such a view in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s famous phrase,
“The world is everything that is the case” (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [New York:
Routledge], 31). Notably, Wittgenstein later repudiated that view in Philosophical Investigations (Malden, MA: Blackwell-Wiley, 2001). Wittgenstein, Austrian-born but later a
British subject, was one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century.
23. See, for example, Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: Essay on Exteriority,
trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University, 1969), 21–25; and Levinas,
Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1981), 4–5, 118–19, 159–60, and 177. Notably, almost every person in Levinas’s
family was executed by the Nazis during World War II. Though perhaps shocking, Levinas’s conclusion is shared by other contemporary European thinkers. See, for example,
Jean-François Lyotard, Heidegger and “the Jews,” trans. Andreas Michel and Mark S.
Roberts (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1990), and Edith Wyschogrod, Spirit
in Ashes: Hegel, Heidegger and Man-Made Mass Death (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1985).
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Bacon’s phrase, “knowledge is power” (rather than virtue, as it was
for Plato and other ancients). Given the modern view, the world, including other persons and ourselves, is a set of objects subject to rational investigation. If Bacon is right that knowledge is power, then
the search for absolute knowledge (knowledge without limits) is the
same as the search for absolute power (power without limits). In our
century, that search for power in the form of knowledge, loosed from
its traditional mooring in the search for the Good (as it must be loosed
if we accept Bacon’s erasure of virtue with power, and the resulting
identification of knowledge and power), has cost millions of lives and
caused unspeakable horror and suffering.24
But even if one were to reject Levinas’s claim as exaggerated,
the modern understanding of reason contains an irony: the attempt
to fulfill our desire to give a complete description—to say “the last
word”—can only result in continuing babble and never in the last,
controlling word for which the search for power hungers. In Metaphysics, Aristotle argues that without something outside of the chain
of explanations, there can be no actual explanation.25 I think that is an
argument whose power is often overlooked. Aristotle calls this something the archē, the origin. (This Greek word is the root of English
words like archaeology and architect, as well as “archangel” and “patriarch.”) It is tempting to think that the archē is either the first in the
series of efficient or other causes or to think of it as the first instance
in a chain of rational explanations. To understand it in either of these
ways is a mistake, however, for these two ways of understanding the
archē are of a piece. Each reduces the archē to something that has the
24. This is not to deny that previous eras have also been guilty of horrors and holocausts. It is only to point out the connection between modern philosophy and the modern
versions of such horror.
25. Aristotle, Metaphysics 994a1–20. Of course, not all rationality consists in creating chains of reasons. That is irrelevant to this argument. Aristotle’s point, that chains of
reasons require a ground, applies equally to any other form of rationality. So the point I
make here with regard to chains of reasons applies equally well to other forms of reasoning. For the purposes of this paper, I do not believe that the difference between chains of
reasons and chains of explanation is important.
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same way of being as any other moment in the chain of explanation
or account, the only difference between the archē and any other moment in the series is that, mysteriously, the archē is the first of those
moments. Understood that way, Aristotle’s argument makes no sense.
But, as we see in Thomas Aquinas’s use of Aristotle’s argument
in the proofs for God’s existence,26 that is a misunderstanding of the
argument. As I think Aquinas’s use shows, Aristotle’s point is that
there must be something outside of or beyond or prior to any chain of
reasons to ground the chain in question or there will be no real reasonings.27 There must be what the late twentieth-century French philosopher, Jacques Derrida,28 calls “the supplement,” though the name
itself indicates that one speaks from within a chain of reasons rather
than from any external point of view. One speaks of what is beyond
reason from within reason because there is no alternative.29
Expanded, Aristotle’s point is this: potentially every chain of reasons, every reasoning or explanation, is infinitely long. No matter
26. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae: Latin Text and English Translation, 61 vols.
(New York: McGraw Hill, 1964–1976), Q.2, A.3.
27. I have sometimes also argued, though not in print, that the belief in the archē is
at the root of the problem of the common understanding of reason. Here I may seem to
contradict that claim. I think that my claim that the archē is behind the standard view of
reason is true, though there is not space enough here to lay out the difference in the two
conceptions of archē that are at work, both philosophically derived from Aristotle. Suffice
it to say that the problematic view of the archē is a view that takes it to be the first in the
causal or logical chain, a reified originary point for explanation—precisely the position I
here argue against.
28. For a readable and accurate discussion of Derrida’s work (and accuracy is something often missing from those discussions, whether pro or con), as well as its relation
to some kinds of religion, see Kevin Hart, The Trespass of the Sign: Deconstruction and
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
29. The claim that there is no alternative outside of reason may seem too strong, but
it will do for the purposes of this paper. But I take quite seriously the idea that there is a
kind of speaking that is an alternative to the narrow, Cartesian understanding of reason.
Of course that is not an alternative that is external to reason. The alternative to reason
narrowly conceived is something that Martin Heidegger (an early-to-mid-twentiethcentury German philosopher) sometimes called poetry. He had poetry as we understand
it in mind, but he also understood poetry to include much more, such as other forms of
imaginative thinking. See my later discussion of Kierkegaard and irony for a first suggestion of how we might understand this alternative. (For more on Heidegger, see note 62.)
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where I stop, in principle someone could ask, “And what explains
that?” Nevertheless, our chains of reasoning do not go on to infinity. Something stops them; something makes any particular stopping
point of an adequate chain of reasoning the appropriate place to stop.
That which constitutes the adequate stopping point of a chain of reasons, however, is itself not part of that chain. The reason for the explanation is outside the chain. (It could be, and often is, something as
straightforward as a state of affairs, “the way things are.”)
The real origin or first cause of any chain of reasons, is not the
point at which we stop saying “A because of B because of C,” but something that is not itself part of the chain of reasons, something that we
do not account for in our chain of reasons or causal account. The real
beginning of the chain is the archē that gave rise to the chain (and can,
therefore, also give rise to a chain with only one link, the conclusion).
That which gives rise to a chain of reasons is something that cannot itself be explained; it is an “uncaused cause,” to use the traditional terminology, and cannot be included in the chain of reasons, since it could
be said to be the cause of the chain rather than a link in the chain.30
Of course, as I pointed out earlier, in principle it is always possible
to give an account of whatever we can point to, and, on reflection, we
can always point to the origin of a chain of reasons. But when we do
so, we remove it from its status outside the chain of reasons. It ceases
to be the origin of the chain and becomes one of the things in the
chain, namely, its first element. The problem is that this means something new has taken its place as the origin of the chain of reasons, as
the supplement—in other words, as the ground of explanations and
30. As used here, “uncaused cause” is not the contradiction that it appears to be. It is
a way of pointing to that which initiates the chain of reasoning, in other words brings it
about or causes it, but that is not itself part of that chain, and so, not named as a cause in
the chain. Much use of this phrase and of this argument confuses reasoning and explanation—in which there must always be an “an uncaused cause”—with what is, where it is
not obvious that there must be such a cause. Such thinking moves from epistemology to
ontology without the resources for doing so. Being outside the chain of reasons, the “uncaused cause” is not a cause, a reason, in the same sense as any of the items in the chain.
That is the substance of Aristotle’s point.
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reasons that is not itself part of the chain of reasons. Thus, if we take
the Cartesian understanding of reason seriously, if we assume that the
origin of reason is not supplemental to reason, that there is nothing
outside the process of reason because reason is self-grounding, then
we will have no way to stop giving reasons in any particular case.31
Without a supplement, an archē, every chain of reasons will go on to
infinity and so will not do as a chain of reasons. An explanation that
cannot come to an end is no explanation at all. If explanation requires
a last word rather than a supplement, then the desire for the last word
is implicitly the desire for garrulousness, not understanding.
This observation that the use of reason depends on something
external to that use is a matter of common sense. As always, philosophers argue for what ordinary people know without having to argue it.
In addition, many more philosophers have known this than have not.
Medieval Christians certainly knew that explanations require something beyond them and their processes. The various sorts of empiricists also knew it, as did the Romantics. Marxism knows that reason
has a “supplement” and, like Christianity, reminds us that ignoring
that fact is seldom innocent. Plantinga gives us perhaps the best explanation in analytic philosophy of this truth that we all already know.32
Deconstruction begins with the assumption of this need for something more and then tries to show places in texts and philosophies
at which that dependence on what is beyond reason shines through
the text. Feminism allies itself with Marxism, though sometimes only
implicitly, in recognizing both that reason is not self-grounding and
31. Descartes tells us that first principles are things that we see to be true without
further reflection. It is possible to understand that declaration as itself recognizing the
need for a supplement. In fact, his recourse to the proofs of God’s existence (see Meditations), can be read as just such a recognition. (For a reading of Descartes along these
lines, see Levinas’s interpretation of Descartes in Totality and Infinity, 210–11 and 48–52.)
Nevertheless, the standard way of reading Descartes, and, so, of understanding reason,
has been much as I describe it in the body of the text and that is what I find fault with.
Note, too, that I equivocate here on “reason” and “explanation,” but recall note 25. Every
explanation is an exercise of reason and prototypical for what it means to exercise reason.
I do not think that the equivocation damages my argument.
32. See the works referenced in note 17.
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that the claim that it is, is not innocent. Every ordinary member of
the church knows that something more than reason is needed. But in
spite of the fact that “everyone” knows at least implicitly that reason
requires a supplement, I think it is also true that few people recognize
this fact when they reflect on reason or faith and fewer still recognize
its implications or the questions it raises.
Having argued that reason requires a supplement, let me now turn
to that supplement: what can we say about its character, if anything?
and what is its relation to reason? For our purposes, these are the same
as the question of how we can reasonably talk about what falls outside
reason, so I will treat them as one question. On the face of it, we seem
to be faced with a dilemma:
In order to speak reasonably about something, it seems that it
must be within reason.
The supplement of reason is outside reason.
So, we cannot speak reasonably about it.
That conclusion at least raises doubts as to the tenability of the
second premise, the premise for which I have argued. The argument
seems to imply a self-contradiction: It is reasonable to say that the
supplement of reason is outside of reason and we cannot speak reasonably about what is outside of reason.
To deal with this problem, we need to consider a way in which
we talk about the supplement of reason that is not helpful. When we
hear people talk about faith and reason in church talks or classes or
serious conversations about serious matters, they often use the language of Romanticism: there are things to be known and things to
be felt; things to be explained rationally and things that defy rational
explanation but are known by means of some other faculty. We sometimes use the word that the Romantics gave us for that other faculty,
intuition; sometimes, instead, we speak of feeling; sometimes we associate the promptings of the Holy Ghost with the Romantic faculty
for knowing. Those who take this approach see the problem of the
realm of reason as we usually understand it, and they try to solve that
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problem by supplementing reason’s realm with another, that of feeling, a realm that goes beyond our ability to conceive and that gives
unity to the whole of experience.
But there are philosophical problems with Romanticism.33 Having created two realms of knowledge, those who think in this way find
that they have doubled their problems. The problem with reason is
that it cannot answer the question of how we can know things like the
supplement of reason. It is not clear how creating an additional realm
of knowledge, the realm of feeling, solves the problems of the first,
the realm of reason. In fact, it is unclear how having two realms of
knowledge and two faculties for knowledge undoes the problems that
follow from relying on reason alone. If I know by intuition or feeling
in one realm, why can I not know that way in the realm of reason? Additionally, if reason and intuition are separate realms, why doesn’t one
of the two realms end up encompassing the other? And if one does not
encompass the other, how can I speak of knowledge in both realms?
What do the two have in common that allows me to speak of knowledge in both without there being some way of bringing them together,
something in common with both of them? If reason and intuition are
distinct ways of knowing, what holds them together so that I, an individual, can make sense of each? With Romanticism, not only are human minds caught in the clutches of Enlightenment, foundationalist
reason, we are also hopelessly and essentially schizophrenic.
My final objection to the Romantic solution to the problem of reason is that, by moving everything that could not be understood by
Cartesian reason (such as religion and art) into the realm of feeling,
Romanticism deprecates those things. Without intending to, Romantics make any talk of knowing the objects of religion metaphorical, at
33. Though I am not a Romantic, the position for which I argue has a number of
parallels with philosophical Romanticism. That should not be surprising since both are
attempts to respond to the problem posed by Immanuel Kant’s metaphysics, in which it
is impossible to speak meaningfully of that which transcends our immanent experience.
However, I am not speaking of philosophical Romanticism here, but of its contemporary,
popular manifestation. To avoid clumsiness, I will refer to popular Romanticism as Romanticism, without the qualifier.
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best, thereby robbing important parts of our lives, such as religious
and aesthetic experience, of their ability to give us genuine knowledge.34 Their approach to knowledge creates a dilemma: I cannot
know the truth about the most important things rationally, and I cannot know what the other way of knowing them is unless I have already
experienced it.
Given these problems with Romanticism, though religious people
and artists often use the language of Romanticism to talk about the
relation of their concerns to reason and to explain their experiences
and knowledge, Romanticism will not do. Whatever the relation between reason and its supplement, that relation must be understood
from within reason or it will fall into the abyss of irrationalism or, at
best, the whim of subjective sentiment (which is where Romanticism
ends up, in spite of itself, by cutting itself off from reason). Whatever
the relation of reason and its ground, we must understand reason in a
way that will allow us to do so without dropping beauty, art, religion,
love, feeling, the good, and so on into the abyss of the irrational or
nonrational.
It will perhaps be surprising to some that I think Kierkegaard
understood that point quite well. Because he understood that we can
only understand the relation of reason to its supplement from within
reason, he used pseudonyms and irony in his philosophical texts (at
the same time that he was writing quite straightforward religious sermons). He wanted to pay appropriate due to reason without falling
into the trap of making it independent of faith. As I understand Kierkegaard’s best-known treatise on faith, Fear and Trembling, Abraham is faced with a paradox when he is asked to sacrifice his son Isaac.
He must obey God, who commands him to kill his son, but he knows
that it is unholy to kill another person. Revelation contradicts ethical obligation. It is not uncommon to understand this paradox as a
34. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd rev. ed., trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Continuum, 1993), for an important exposition of both the history of this mistake and an alternative to it.
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contradiction between reason and revelation: revelation and reason
are incommensurable and revelation trumps reason.
Instead, I think that the paradox of Abraham is not that revelation must contradict or trump reason, but that Abraham cannot make
himself understood to foundationalist philosophers and those of Kierkegaard’s countrymen who think they have gone beyond Descartes’
methodological doubt to G. W. F. Hegel’s rational certainty.35 Abraham cannot speak, says Johannes de Silentio (Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous author),36 yet he does speak. What Abraham says however
is “absurd,” meaning that it cannot be heard by the foundationalist
philosopher, not that it has no meaning. I take it that Kierkegaard is
relying on the root meaning of the word absurd: “what cannot be said,
what is voiceless,” so also, “what cannot be heard.”
The ab-surdity37 to which the story of Abraham points is the
voicelessness of what lies outside the strict economy of Cartesian
doubt and certainty. As a result, the ab-surdity that Silentio discovers
is only meaningless or irrational if we insist that meaning and rationality are products of only “the system,” of only Cartesian rationality.
To be sure, what is outside the system is paradoxical—in other words,
strange and marvelous, rather than self-contradictory (again, I take
Kierkegaard to be relying on the root meaning of the word “paradox”:
what is other than our expectations38)—but it is not unreasonable or
contrary to reason, except from the point of view of a reason that has
35. G. W. F. Hegel was an important German philosopher who lived at the end of the
eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth. Hegel is an idealist, arguing that
history is the unfolding of what is most real and that the unfolding had completed itself
at the end of the eighteenth century. To understand that history and the process of its
unfolding is to know, in principle, all of reality.
36. Cited in Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling: Repetition, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 115–20.
Notice that the name Johannes de Silentio—“John of Silence”—suggests that it is really
the author rather than Abraham who is unable to speak.
37. I hyphenate the word to remind us that I am using it in the special sense just
explained.
38. Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “paradox,” and Henry George Liddell, Robert
Scott, and Henry Stuart Jones, eds., A Greek-English Lexicon, 6th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon,
1968), s.v. “παραδοξα.”
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been artificially and narrowly defined. As I understand Kierkegaard,
Abraham cannot be understood if, and only if, one rejects the origin of
his knowledge (his religious experience), which modern philosophers
(in other words, philosophers from Descartes through at least Hegel)
and those who accept their views do reject.
To use Aristotle’s word again, what is outside reason is, in fact, the
archē of reason, its origin. But it is an archē that we can hear only from
within reason (since we take account of things always from within
reason). Thus, we tend to hear it as if it were also within reason. It is
as if we are listening to someone calling from outside the house but
we assume that they are inside, or perhaps more accurately, it is like
hearing someone quietly whisper something to us and believing that
we are hearing ourselves think.
Within reason, its archē can be said and, in fact, is always said.
Reason can and does give an account of itself. The account is always
ironic, however, in a way that I will try to explain. There is no straightforward, non-question-begging, rational account of reason. One can
be deaf to reason’s supplemental archē. One can refuse it recognition.
One can refuse to hear what is said by means of, rather than merely
within, reason. For the foundation or origin of reason does not show
itself unambiguously, clearly and distinctly, in other words, theoretically. It cannot give itself clearly and distinctly, or it would be one
more of the things within the realm of reason, rather than its supplement. But that something cannot be said clearly and distinctly does
not mean that it cannot be said well, or that it cannot be heard, or that
it cannot be understood without difficulty.
The profundity of the origin of reason is not necessarily the profundity of complexity and obscurity. The twentieth-century German
philosopher Martin Heidegger (who himself sometimes, but not always, confused profundity with complexity) writes in The Principle
of Reason of “the second tonality” of the principle of sufficient reason.
This tonality does not deny that everything has an explanation but
alerts us to the fact of the archē, of what can always be heard from
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beyond reason as well as always ignored.39 Kierkegaard helps us see
the necessity of such an archē by showing the impossibility of giving
a merely theoretical explanation of Abraham, along with the impossibility of simply writing Abraham off as a madman, as one who acts
without (in other words, outside of) reason. Narratives and deconstructions of texts can help us catch a glimpse of the archē, the unavoidable, but always indirectly seen “supplement” of reason. So can
carefully listening to the “tone” of propositions in otherwise logical
discourse, hearing what those propositions also say. But nothing can
guarantee that we will hear what comes to us from the archē, from what
reason must call its supplement but is really its origin. One must learn
to read and hear with Kierkegaardian irony, which is not to say one
thing and to mean another or to speak as if there were truth, “knowing” that there is not,40 but to know that one always says more than
is immediately apparent, and to take account of that “more than.” To
read and hear ironically is, thus, always to say something about one’s
extrarational foundations, but often and, finally, only implicitly.
Since we must assume that we speak ironically whenever we speak
reasonably, we must also be suspicious of taking up irony as a posture. In the first place, if Kierkegaard, Heidegger, the Medievals, and
important other thinkers—such as Nephi, the son of Lehi—are right,
then ordinary language, even the “clear and distinct” and often notso-ordinary language of rational philosophy is already ironic.41 I need
not add anything to it for it to be ironic. In the second place, only the
character of the speaker can give a guarantee that what he or she says
39. Martin Heidegger, The Principle of Reason, trans. Reginald Lilly (Bloomington:
IN, 1993), 39–40.
40. Thus, the irony of which I speak is not the irony of Nietzsche or Richard Rorty in
which no one way of speaking of things is closer to the truth than any other, if indeed
there is any truth besides that which one creates. The irony of which I speak assumes that
the truth exceeds what one says about it, requiring one to say it again and otherwise, not
that there is no truth to be said.
41. Nephi tells us of the importance of plain language but quotes extensively from
Isaiah. (See 2 Nephi 25:4 and 26:53.) His idea of plain language is not the same as ours,
and he makes the point ironically, though seemingly unconscious of his irony.
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is said with the proper irony, and no speaker can guarantee his or her
own character except by being of good character.
Thus, the answer to the question of how we are to understand the
archē of reason from within reason is related to that of Plato: we understand the origin of reason as we understand the sun, not by looking
at it directly with philosophical and theoretical eyes, but by the light it
sheds on the things in the world, by the fact that we can see at all, by
the fact that reason is possible. We see reasonably, in other words, we
see by the light of the origin of reason, without ever seeing that origin
directly.42 Nevertheless, the archē, like the sun, is never far from us;
it is everywhere to be seen and never to be pointed out directly even
though when we point at anything we point by means of it.
But why is that archē to be thought in terms of faith rather than, as
for Marxists, in terms of material history or, as for feminists, in terms
of the history of oppression? That question is the hardest one I brook,
but I think I can say something about it. I can at least make what I
think is a reasonable suggestion.
The first, quick answer is deceptively simple: for something to be
the ground for a knowledge claim, I must trust it and be faithful to it.
Truth requires that I be true and faithful to that of which I speak or
give an account. But, as I said, the simplicity of this answer is deceptive. Hidden in it are a host of questions and philosophical problems,
such as what it means to be faithful to an experience.
With an eye toward beginning to say something about the profundity of that simplicity, let me explore one way of talking about the
relation of reason to its supplemental, archaic origin. It takes very
little to notice that reason and explanation often involve our obligation to others. One can, of course, point out that not all reason begins
with obligation. It is not difficult to think of cases of reasoning that
have not been initiated by an obligation. That response, however, can
42. Wrathall has reminded me that Plato says the philosopher does eventually see the
sun straight on (Republic 516b). That is true, but the allegory of the cave does not have the
philosopher see the sun in this world, and I part company with Plato at exactly the point
where he proposes another world in which to see it.

42

Faith, Philosophy, Scripture

perhaps be overcome by arguing that other uses of reason are parasitic
on reason as a response to obligation. Or it may be overcome by arguing that the word obligation must be understood more broadly. The
last is, I believe, the correct explanation. In any case, for now, grant
the thesis that reason begins in obligation to another. That is, by the
way, a thesis that I take from Levinas.43 Why reason except to explain?
Why explain if there is no one to whom we owe an explanation? In a
solipsistic universe, reason and explanation make no sense (at least
because language makes no sense). The solipsist who argues for his
solipsism contradicts that solipsism in making his argument. The solipsist either contradicts himself by issuing self-refuting propositions
or by one aspect of himself contradicting some other aspect of himself
in a ridiculous and pointless merely internal exercise.
If it is true that reason begins in obligation, then what is outside of
reason, making it possible, is essentially not a thing or principle, but
another person. The principle of noncontradiction is necessary to all
reasoning, but its necessity comes not from itself but from the demand
that I give an acceptable explanation to another.44 In Levinas’s terms,
the principles of reason have their origin in the apologetic character
of reason, which is the very basis for my existence as a unique individual.45 He says, “[The singularity of my existence] is at the very level
of its reason; it is apology, that is, personal discourse, from me to the
43. See, for example, Totality and Infinity, 201.
44. It is important to realize that this demand is not necessarily either explicit or conscious. The point is not that a person says, “I demand this of you,” but that the person’s
existence before me requires me to do and say things, regardless of what the person says.
The demands of a person’s existence before us may even contradict his or her spoken
demands, as they often do when our young children demand things of us—things that
we know we ought not to give them, things which their being-before-us not only does not
demand, but demands that we refuse.
45. Besides the quotation that follows, see Totality and Infinity, 252–53; see also 40,
219, 240–46, 284, 293, and 301.
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others.”46 With an argument that I can only allude to here, Levinas
argues that the other person is, ultimately, God.47
Although she does not deal directly with Levinas, the contemporary philosopher Marlène Zarader helps us understand Levinas’s recourse to God by pointing out that in the Jewish tradition (she points
explicitly to the medieval commentator on the Torah, Nachmanides),
language, and therefore reason, is, in its essence, a response to God.48
The Bible understands language to be a matter of experience, the experience of hearing a call and responding. When God speaks, he does
not reveal himself in the hurricane or the fire, but in a voice that addresses us.49 Zarader takes prophetic speech to be paradigmatic of
all speech and says: “The prophet speaks to the people and can be
46. Totality and Infinity, 253. It is important to remember that for Levinas apology is
a term of art. It has the meaning of its Greek roots: “explanation to” rather than “excuse.”
Note that I have spoken of the origin that is outside of any chain of reasons. Levinas
speaks of the idea that overflows the one who thinks it (e.g., Totality and Infinity, 20–21).
These are two ways of making the same point.
47. See, for example, Totality and Infinity, 77–79. Whether Levinas speaks of God is
a complicated matter. As Westphal points out, Levinas says, “It is our relations with men
. . . that give to theological concepts the sole signification they admit of. . . . Everything
that cannot be reduced to an interhuman relation represents not the superior form but
the forever primitive form of religion” (Totality and Infinity, 79; cited in Westphal, 27).
Some will note, however, that Levinas also speaks of the necessity of atheism (Totality
and Infinity, 77). Quite surprisingly, however, he does so in the same place where he says
that atheism is necessary to a relation to God. His point is that a true relation with God
requires that we separate ourselves from the god of superstitious worship. See also Paul
Ricoeur on this theme: “Reason, Atheism, and Faith,” in Alistair MacIntyre and Paul
Ricoeur, The Religious Significance of Atheism (New York: Columbia University Press,
1969), 58–98. (Ricoeur was a French philosopher of the last half of the twentieth century
who also taught in the United States.) Although I have doubts about the clarity of the
dichotomy which Ricoeur makes between proper worship and superstition, I think it is
clear that Levinas does believe that what we could call his “fundamental ethics,” the relation to others that grounds reason, points us toward God. It is also important to note that
Levinas’s notion of atheism is a notion of something prior to any affirmation or negation
of the divine. (See Totality and Infinity, 56.) Indeed, as Brant Bishop points out to me, his
account of “atheism” is very similar to D&C 93’s discussion of agency.
48. Marlène Zarader, La dette impensée. Heidegger et l’héritage hébraïque (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1990), 62; The Unthought Debt: Heidegger and the Hebraic Heritage, trans.
Bettina Bergo (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 49–50.
49. Recall 1 Kings 19:11–13.
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understood by them because his speaking remains ordained by a call
that preceded it.”50
To Levinas’s argument that obligation to God and fidelity to him
is the archē of reason, I would add at least one thing, also at least partly
a matter of faith. But adding this additional point will return at least
some of what I suggested could be taken away when I suggested that
nonobligational reason may be parasitic on obligational reason. In addition, what I say will question whether God is the only origin, or
supplement, of reason.
I am interested in what has sometimes been called Heidegger’s
paganism, a description of his work used to denote the fact that Heidegger does not consider the world simply as something created ex
nihilo, but as something that has its own existence and, therefore, its
own power to appear to us and to demand our attention, a power that
cannot be completely attributed to God’s creative act. For Heidegger
the power of the world to reveal itself not only cannot be reduced to
Divine fiat, it also cannot be reduced either to our subjective wills or
to the objects of rational research.51 The world itself has the power to
ground our conclusions.
50. Zarader, La dette impensée. The discussion that my paragraph précises is centered on
pages 61–64. English translation, 48–51. In criticizing Heidegger, Zarader argues that, as the
Bible has been read in the Jewish tradition, it offers an alternative to our usual understanding of language and philosophy—an alternative that has many things in common with the
alternative we find in Heidegger’s work but which does not insist on only the Greek origins of
that alternative and that escapes some of the problems that Heidegger’s thinking encounters.
51. One reason that the world and its power to reveal itself cannot be reduced to the
objects of rational research is that the object of rational or scientific research is not the
thing that we encounter. (See note 14.) Instead, the object of scientific research is a conceptual relative of that thing, a relative created by adumbrating a set of conditions and
assumptions that define the ways in which we will take up and examine the thing in
question. In other words, the scientific object is not the thing itself, but an object created
by the methods of science and the background assumptions of those methods. As a result,
strictly speaking, the object of research is a product of the subject, not an independent
thing that demands our attention. This does not, as many may worry, imply that Heidegger is arguing that scientific conclusions are merely subjective. Quite the contrary.
His point is that the very possibility of doing science requires that we deal with things
as objects and that objects are, by definition, one end of an intentional ray that has a
subject at the other end and a particular context that makes it possible as the object that
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Levinas’s understanding of matters is more in line with traditional
theology and its supposition of the creation of the world from nothing.52 The consequence of such an understanding is that the world
itself and things in the world do not have their own existence, so they
do not have their own power to show themselves to us, to reveal something. If the world is created ex nihilo, then revelation comes from
God in toto and, ultimately, he is the only supplement of reason. But
Latter-day Saint belief rejects the notion of ex nihilo creation and, so,
implicitly includes the idea that the things of the world have power
of their own to reveal themselves. Though all things are dependent
on God for their existence in the organized world as what they are
and, so, all things point to his existence (Alma 30:44), each thing also
has an aspect of independent existence and, so, the power to show
itself (D&C 93:30). The appearing of the world is not reducible to will,
neither to that of the Divine nor to that of human beings. Heidegger’s
so-called pagan understanding of the world as existing, in some sense,
in itself, is more useful to Latter-day Saint thinkers than is Levinas’s,
though the latter does much to help us understand reason as response.
Heidegger also speaks of our relation to and understanding of
the world in terms of two registers or orders of thinking.53 Though
it is (in the case of science, its methods and background assumptions). For more on this
point, see Martin Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” in The Question Concerning
Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper Colophon, 1977),
115–54. See also E. A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science
(Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities, 1980, rpt. 1932), especially pp. 298–99.
52. It is important to point out that Levinas explicitly gives another meaning to the
term ex nihilo than that we find in the theological tradition. He says that creation ex
nihilo means that the created being is completely different from and separate from the
Creator, that he or she is not reducible to a part or affect of the Creator. (See Totality and
Infinity, 63.) Given this understanding there is a sense in which a Latter-day Saint could
subscribe to the idea of creation ex nihilo, though that notion would be an idiosyncratic
one. But since in Levinas, things of the world do not have their own existence, I take it
that he subscribes not only to this weaker idea of creation ex nihilo, but also to the stronger form of the theological tradition. As a result, I use the term ex nihilo with its standard
meaning even when talking about Levinas.
53. See Martin Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking (New York: Harper & Row, 1968),
for one of the central locations of this discussion. See also Heidegger, The Principle of
Reason, 39–40.
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Heidegger uses the word reason for only one of those registers, I think
that is a mistake; there is no reason not to speak of each as reason.
One of the registers of thought is what we usually think of when we
think of reason, a thinking determined by logic. That is a register
that we cannot do without. If thinking is to be at all useful, it must
include logic.
Nevertheless, the logical register of thought requires another, the
register of faithfulness, memory, and recognition. In other words,
logic requires the relation to a supplement that makes it possible and
meaningful. Without the relation to a supplement, the first register remains free-floating and, so, pointless. But unlike Levinas, Heidegger
believes that it is as possible to be faithful to the things in the world
that come to us, to be called by the things we encounter and to hearken to that call, as it is to be called by another person and to hearken
to her.54 For Heidegger, faithfulness to the world is as possible as is
faithfulness to another person, and I believe that Heidegger has much
for Latter-day Saints to think about in this regard.
Reason in the fundamental sense is the welcoming, remembering,
recognizing response to a call from someone or something. Fundamental reason is a response that makes possible reason in the second,
narrower sense.55 As Otto Pöggeler points out, for Heidegger the essence of thought is not questioning, though the thinker must question. The essence of thought is not questioning because questioning
relies on already finding oneself called by something and submitting
oneself to it.56 One cannot question unless one is already in a world
54. Nevertheless, relation to the other person remains fundamental, for it is in relationships with others that we learn language. Others, in particular God, give us the tools
we need to respond to be faithful to the things we encounter in the world.
55. Of course, to designate one fundamental or primary and the other secondary or
narrower is not to demean the second. The first is the relation to the archē that makes the
second possible, but the first without the second is incomplete.
56. Otto Pöggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers (Pfullingen: Neske, 1963), 268–
80; Martin Heidegger’s Path of Thinking, trans. Daniel Magurshak and Sigmund Barber
(Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1987), 233. See also Jacques
Derrida’s discussion of this in De l’Esprit. Heidegger et la question (Paris: Galilee, 1987);
Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby
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that reveals itself and makes demands. In other words, the essence of
thinking—of reason—is response, and very like the response of religious faith, even when it is a response to something other than God.57
As Zarader explains, the idea that reason is a matter of response
is not new. In fact, in discussions of how knowledge is understood
in the Bible it is almost a commonplace that Hebrew thought takes
knowledge to be a matter of hearing, acquaintance, and obedience,
and Greek thought (which gave us philosophy and, so, the primary
way in which we think about thinking and reason) takes it to be a
matter of sight, possession, and control. Too simply put (but perhaps
good enough for our purposes here), for the biblical prophet, to know
the truth is to be called and to obey that which calls one. For the Greek
philosopher, to know the truth is to see something and to grasp what
one sees.58 We ask someone “Did you get it? Did you grasp it?” But as
David Banon says, for biblical writers, the basic structure of knowledge is not that of “ ‘possession,’ but that of ‘fidelity.’ ”59 Heidegger’s
view has much in common with the biblical view, in spite of the fact
that he not only seems to have been unaware of that fact but took pains
(Chicago: University of Chicago, 1981). Both Pöggeler and Derrida refer specifically to
Martin Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961), 174; “On the Nature
of Language,” On the Way to Language, trans. Peter D. Hertz (New York: Harper & Row,
1971), 68–69. (I am grateful to Marlène Zarader for pointing out this shared reference.
See Dette impensée, 223 n. 36; English translation, 217 n. 37.)
57. Zarader gives an excellent overview of Heidegger’s understanding of thought. See
Dette impensée, especially pp. 92–100 and 112–23; Unthought Debt, 80–85, 100–112.
58. Fuller discussions of this notion are available in any number of places. For a
detailed linguistic discussion of the Old Testament understanding and its relation
to the Greek and New Testament understandings, see Gerhard Kittel, ed., Theological
Dictionary of the New Testament, trans. G. W. Bromily (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans,
1964–74), s.v. γινώσκω, γνσις, πιγινώσκω, πγνωσις, καταγιώσκω, κατγνωστος,
προγινώσκω, πργνωσις, συγνώμη, γνμη, γνωρίζω, γνωστς (Rudolf Bultmann). For
broader discussions, see Thorlief Boman, Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek (New
York: W. W. Norton, 1970); my “Greek and Hebrew Thinking,” Tools for Scripture Study
(Provo, UT: FARMS, 1999), 135–53, which relies heavily on Bowman; or David Banon, La
Lecture infinie: Les voies de l’interprétation midrachique (Paris: Seuil, 1987).
59. Banon, Lecture infinie, 173. As does Banon, many discussions of this difference
note that in Genesis 4:1, “And Adam knew Eve his wife,” the use of the Hebrew word for
knowledge (ya’da;  )ידעas a term for sexual relations is not a euphemism. From an Old
Testament point of view, knowledge is a matter of intimacy rather than possession.
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to insist that faith and “thinking” (his term for philosophy from this
broader perspective) were separate matters.60
Given the similarity between Heidegger’s understanding of knowledge and the biblical understanding, it may see strange when Levinas
worries that Heidegger’s paganism opens the door to idolatry. Nevertheless, it is well that he should worry. In the first place, idolatry succeeds best when it imitates the truth.61 In the second place, Heidegger’s
biography shows why we should worry.62 But the door that opens to
idolatry also opens to God. Because false worship is an imitation of
true worship, what leads to one can also lead to the other.63 Though
Levinas is unwilling to allow the irony of Heidegger’s understanding of
60. Zarader, Dette impensee, convincingly demonstrates both the similarity of Heidegger’s thought to biblical thought and his denial of that similarity. Of course the traditional interpretation of the Old Testament would have it, as Levinas does, that knowledge
as it is understood in the Old Testament comes ultimately from the demands of God and
would not leave room for the demands of things. It remains a fact, however, that Heidegger’s understanding of knowledge and the Bible’s have a great deal in common, and
I suspect that Latter-day Saints will generally have no trouble with the idea that things
have some kind of existence beside the existence that God gives them, though no thing
exists completely independent of God.
61. Jean-Luc Marion’s L’idol et la distance (Paris: Grasset, 1977) says a great deal
about why this is the case. Marion is a contemporary French philosopher.
62. In a part of his life that remains wrapped in difficulty as well as confusion, Heidegger joined the Nazi party in the early 1930s. He supported the Nazi take-over of the
universities in the speech he gave at his installation as rector of the University of Freiburg
im Breisgau, although the Nazis later refused to acknowledge his support or his status as
a Nazi rector.
Heidegger’s relation to Naziism is unfortunate—at best it is ambiguous; at worst it
is collaboration with and denial of evil. There are a good many books on the issue, from
those that smack of yellow journalism, on one hand, to the queasily apologetic, on the
other. For those looking for a readable discussion of Heidegger’s thought that includes a
discussion of his involvement with Naziism, see either George Steiner, Martin Heidegger:
With a New Introduction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989) or Richard F. H.
Polt, Heidegger: An Introduction (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).
63. This has always been the case. See the aforementioned piece by Ricoeur, “Atheism.” See also Marion’s discussion of the relation between worship and idolatry in both
L’idol et la distance and God Without Being, trans. Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1991). Although I do not believe in the absolutely transcendent god whom
Marion discusses, much of his discussion, particularly that of the difference between an
idol and an icon, is illuminating. It can help us think about our own God-talk even if, in
the end, we find Marion’s analysis insufficient.
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the world, we ought to welcome it. Even knowing the dangers that Heidegger’s understanding courts (and nothing of central importance can
avoid danger), we ought to welcome Heidegger’s “pagan” understanding
of the world as a world that gives itself to us and demands our response,
our reason.
There are several reasons why the risk involved is ultimately
worth running. The first is that to call Heidegger a pagan, as Levinas
does, is really only to say that he accepts the world itself as a thing of
value and does not assume that its only value comes either from our
interaction with it or from the fact that it was created by God. In other
words, he is a pagan because he implicitly rejects the idea of ex nihilo
creation. Latter-day Saints should not find that particularly troubling.
The second, more substantial reason for accepting this risk is that
faith requires it. Without risk, there is no faith. Of course that is not to
say that we ought to seek out risks or that the riskier a faith claim the
more likely it is to be true. It is only to say that risk-free knowledge is
not the kind of knowledge we can have of these matters.
Thus, using Heidegger’s thought as a corrective to Levinas’s, I am
willing to say that not only are other persons—ultimately the divine
Person—the archē or supplement that makes reason possible, but so
is the appearing of the world.64 Contrary to the philosophical as well
as the theological tradition, the archē is not singular. The unity of the
archē is in us, in our lives, acts and everyday understanding, rather
than in our wills and theoretical speculations, for the latter are but a
manifestation or representation of the former. That is why, on a daily
basis as well as ultimately, practice must take precedence over theology and speculation. The ultimate unity and, therefore, the ultimate
rationality of our lives is to be found in our acts (including what we say
and think) rather than only in our reflections and theories. The impetus and unity of our lives is practical rather than merely cognitive.
64. Though I now would side with Heidegger’s position more strongly than I did, for
more on this “conflict” between Levinas and Heidegger see my, “The Uncanny Interruption of Ethics: Gift, Interruption, or . . . ,” The Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 20/2
and 21/1 (1998): 233–47.
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Thus, my understanding of the relation of faith and reason is simple: We find ourselves in the world, surrounded by things and people,
both of which lay claim on us, call us, making demands that we respond, that we account for ourselves, that we act. Of course we know
from latter-day revelation that we initially found ourselves before
God, to whom we responded. He is, after all, our Creator, even if that
creation was not ex nihilo. He called us into existence and continues
to call us: “Hear O Israel.”65 But once we were in relation with him,
we also found ourselves in the presence of others and of things, both
of whom call to us, demanding our response by posing problems and
questions, whether explicitly or not. If we take those calls seriously,
being sufficiently faithful to those making demands on us, whether
God, people, or things, that we make an adequate response to their
calls, we act rationally. In its multiplicity, the call is sufficient as an
origin of reason. It is basic; it cannot be reduced to one of my beliefs.
It stands outside of beliefs as their origin, their supplement, initiating
chains of reasons.
Because we exist, we account for ourselves before God, in relation
to others, and in the world. We cannot avoid giving those accounts; we
cannot avoid reason. Reason begins in an act of faith (trust and fidelity), faithful response to those beings who surround and precede us,
whose very existence calls to us, making demands on us that interrupt
our being: first God, then persons, then things. Even defiance, such
as that of Satan, first begins in a response to a call. Even defiance, in
spite of itself, first entails faithfulness and, therefore, contradicts itself.
But not only does reason require faith—faith also requires reason.
Although their relation is asymmetrical, with more area covered by
65. This call to Israel is frequent in the Old Testament, sufficiently frequent that we
may think of it as the essence of the Lord’s demand of Israel. For example, see Deuteronomy 5:1, 6:3–4, 9:1, and 20:3; Psalms 50:7 and 81:8; Isaiah 44:1 and 48:1; Jeremiah 2:4,
10:1, and 42:15; Ezekiel 18:25; Hosea 4:1 and 5:1; Amos 3:1 and 5:1; Micah 3:1 and 3:9. It is
also the way in which the Savior introduces the first great commandment in Mark 12:29,
quoting not only the commandment to love God, but the command to hear. Neither Judaism nor Christianity can conceive of religion without doing so in terms of response to
God’s call.
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faith than reason, either without the other is lame or blind or both.
Faith makes space for us to talk, to reason with God, with each other,
and with the world, By creating the space for reason, faith makes it
possible for us to live responsibly, responsively. That space for response
created by faith and carried out with reason, the room to talk, is the
room into which Truman Madsen invited so many of us to enter, an
invitation for which I thank him.

chapter three

A Mormon View of Theology:
Revelation and Reason
•

T

he contemporary Catholic theologian David Tracy points out that
the difference between philosophy of religion and theology is that
the latter requires “some notion of revelation as well as divinely engifted reception of that revelation called ‘faith’—a knowledge born of
revelation,”1 while the former does not. One can examine religious beliefs philosophically, including a belief in revelation or a claim to faith,
without assuming the reality of either revelation or faith. However, the
consequence of assuming divine revelation and knowledge based on
that revelation is that “theology can neither ignore nor be sublated by
philosophy.”2 It cannot be sublated by philosophy because by beginning
with revelation and knowledge produced by that revelation, it contains
an element that philosophy cannot take into itself. Revelation takes us
further than can reason by itself. Presumably, theology cannot ignore
philosophy because philosophy is that discipline by which we examine
knowledge. However, that it cannot ignore philosophy does not mean
that theology can be reduced to philosophizing about a particular subject matter. In his article Tracy addresses Latter-day Saints, asking how
we understand the relation between philosophy and theology.
The easy answer is that, as he suggests, the situation in Mormonism is similar to that in Catholicism: theology cannot ignore philosophy but is not subsumed by it, and the theology of Latter-day Saints
1. David Tracy, “A Catholic View of Philosophy: Revelation and Reason,” in Mormonism in Dialogue with Contemporary Christian Theologies, ed. David L. Paulsen (Macon, GA: Mercer University, 2007), 449.
2. Tracy, “A Catholic View,” 449.
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most often tends toward one of two forms, rationalism or fideism,
neither of which can be neatly separated from the other. Like Tracy,
Mormons would agree that theology must be grounded in revelation.
However, that agreement is complicated by the fact that Tracy separates revelation and religion, a separation that most Mormons cannot
make and that may be contradicted by Tracy’s turn to hermeneutics,
to a philosophy that takes interpretation to be the basic relation of
human beings to the world. Though Tracy does not explicitly tell us
what he means by “religion,” he seems to mean something like “the
practices and institutions of a particular religious tradition, often carried out in response to revelation.” On that basis, I doubt that many
Latter-day Saints would allow the distinction of revelation from religion since revelation is assumed to be part of our religion’s practices
and institutions and since many of our practices and institutions were
specifically given by revelation. To understand how best to understand
the relation between philosophy and revelation, I will argue that philosophy and theology must understand religion and belief as part of a
way of life. Since that way of life includes revelation, revelation cannot
be neatly tweezed apart from it.
Latter-day Saints are primitivists: we believe that the original
Christian church was restored in 1830 through the Prophet Joseph
Smith. The restoration began in a literal revelation to Smith: Just as
Jesus-God made himself manifest in first-century Palestine, God and
Jesus Christ appeared to Joseph Smith and spoke to him, and they
appeared as physical beings. Later, angels—physically embodied angels with whom one could shake hands—appeared to him and others, speaking with them, relaying divine counsel, and ordaining them
to the priesthood by putting their angelic hands on the mortal heads
of Joseph Smith and Oliver Cowdery. The primary revelation of early
Christianity, the appearance of God as man, repeats itself at the founding of Mormonism. As a result, the events that led to and included the
founding of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints are called,
by Mormons, “The Restoration.”
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Mormon primitivism means that Smith’s encounter with transcendence was not an encounter with a metaphysically transcendent world,
but with a world that most Mormons assume is ontologically like our
own.3 Though few Mormons claim to have had a similar experience (I
have met none), the possibility of that kind of revelation—direct, unmediated, physical encounter—remains permanently open.4 Jesus Christ
is present not only in the “word (proclamation) and sacrament (those
disclosive signs which render present what they signify).”5 It is also always possible that Jesus will be present in physical person. Indeed, we
generally assume that kind of revelation did not cease with Smith, but
continued with some succeeding prophets as well as other people.
Mormons also recognize forms of revelation that are much more
like what other Christians speak of. We assume that revelation most
often comes as inspiration and impression, “the whisperings of the
Spirit,”6 rather than as voice, vision, or visitation. Nevertheless, for
Latter-day Saints, revelation is assumed to be a common as well as a
fundamental religious experience, and it is an experience that has at
its base the possibility of an unmediated encounter with God, an encounter that is ontologically comparable to that of the first Christians.
The Book of Mormon is explicit about the importance of revelation:
And when ye shall receive these things, I would exhort
you that ye would ask God, the Eternal Father, in the name of
Christ, if these things are not true; and if ye shall ask with a
sincere heart, with real intent, having faith in Christ, he will
manifest the truth of it unto you, by the power of the Holy
3. However, see my “Divine Embodiment and Transcendence: Propaedeutic
Thoughts and Questions,” Element: A Journal of LDS Thought 1/1 (2005): 1–14, for a discussion of some of the ways in which the divine world and our world differ and some
theological questions those differences raise.
4. One of many examples: “Revelation may come through dreams or visions, the
visitation of angels, or, on occasion such as with Moses, by face-to-face communication
with the Lord.” Hugh B. Brown, in Conference Report, October 1961, 96.
5. Tracy, “Catholic View,” 457.
6. Teachings of Gordon B. Hinckley (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book, 1997), 364.
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Ghost. And by the power of the Holy Ghost ye may know the
truth of all things. (Moroni 10:4–5)
This passage has become more and more doctrinally important
among Mormons—it is, for example, an important element in the
proselytizing program of the church—and I think we find it implicitly
behind Terryl Givens’s argument that the Mormon understanding of
revelation is unique in that it is “dialogic.” According to Givens, revelation allows Mormons to appeal to God for answers to questions and
problems, without the restraints of a closed canon. The result of that
revelation is often knowledge with a propositional content given directly
to particular individuals by God rather than, but not excluding, revelation as the experience of divine grace, the content of scripture, or the
self-disclosure of God.7 As mentioned, revelation need not come in the
form of propositions literally heard or understood, but one form of revelation, perhaps the form most often referred to when Latter-day Saints
speak of revelation, has a propositional content, though not necessarily
a propositional form. Little scholarly work has been done on what the
term revelation means to Mormons, but there is sufficient discussion
of it in non-scholarly contexts to give us a reasonable idea: it includes
an unmediated response from God in a form that can often be given
a propositional exposition. This understanding of revelation as fundamentally propositional goes a long way toward explaining the dominant Mormon understanding of theology as rational or systematic. It
is natural to assume that if revelation is propositional, then, at least in
principle, those propositions can be organized into a systematic whole.
Nevertheless, Mormons today, intellectuals or otherwise, do not
use the word theology in a consistent way. From the beginning of
the church to the present, Latter-day Saints have often assumed that
7. Terryl L. Givens, “The Book of Mormon and Dialogic Revelation,” Journal of Book
of Mormon Studies 10/2 (2001): 16–27. See also the relevant portions of Givens, By the
Hand of Mormon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). I think it remains a question whether Givens is right that the LDS understanding of revelation as dialogic differs
significantly from the experiences of personal revelation by other Christians, such as
evangelicals.
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theology means “rational or systematic theology.” (By “systematic” I
mean a theology in which the doctrines are assumed to be interrelated
and capable of structured exposition rather than a theology that is
divided into the traditional branches of Christology, pneumatology,
etc.) The nineteenth-century work, The Lectures on Faith,8 arranged in
a catechetical format and, for a while, included in the Latter-day Saint
canon, is an excellent example of a work that makes this assumption. We find another example in the controversial writings of Orson
Pratt, also in the nineteenth century. John A. Widtsoe’s A Rational
Theology,9 first used as a manual in weekly classes for the church’s lay
priesthood and later in adult classes of the church‘s Mutual Improvement Association, is yet another.10 We see contemporary examples in
Bruce R. McConkie’s Mormon Doctrine11 (more of an encyclopedia
than a theology, and self-described as a compendium, but nevertheless
an attempt at systematic exposition) and Blake Ostler’s series Exploring Mormon Thought.12 Thus, when in 1995 Chieko Okazaki equated
the word theology with “theorizing about the gospel,”13 I doubt that
anyone found that usage unusual.
Our widespread understanding of theology as rational theology
seems to spring from our interpretation of claims we find in scripture,
such as “The glory of God is intelligence” (Doctrine and Covenants
8. Traditionally The Lectures on Faith have been attributed to Joseph Smith. However, there is disagreement over its authorship. See Noel B. Reynolds, “The Authorship
Debate Concerning Lectures on Faith: Exhumation and Reburial” in The Disciple as Witness: Essays on Latter-day Saint History and Doctrine in Honor of Richard Lloyd Anderson, ed. Stephen D. Ricks, Donald W. Parry, and Andrew W. Hedges (Provo, UT: FARMS,
2000), 355–82. I suspect Lectures was removed from the canon because its teaching about
the Holy Ghost do not cohere with early twentieth-century proclamations by the church’s
First Presidency.
9. John A. Widtsoe, A Rational Theology; as Taught by the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints (Salt Lake City: Printed by Deseret News, 1915).
10. The Mutual Improvement Association was an organization for young men and
women.
11. Bruce R. McConkie, Mormon Doctrine, 1st ed. (Salt Lake City: Bookcraft, 1958);
2nd ed. (1966).
12. Blake Ostler, Exploring Mormon Thought (Salt Lake City: Kofford Books, 2001,
2005, 2008).
13. Chieko Okazaki, Aloha! (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book, 1995), 54.
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93:6). Widtsoe characterized the Mormon understanding of theology
as rational theology this way:
Whether knowledge be obtained by any or all of the methods
indicated [namely, the senses, inward feeling, transmitted
knowledge], it should be carefully examined in the light of
reason. . . . A man should therefore use his reasoning faculty
in all matters involving truth, and especially as concerning
his religion.14
Brigham Young called theology his favorite study, comparing it to
law, “physic,” and astronomy.15 An impetus for identifying theology
with rational theology can be found in a Mormon belief that truth
is ultimately “one great whole,”16 a whole that has, for historical and
broad cultural reasons, been assumed to be systematically rational.
Surely the fact that, for Mormons, revelation is often, if not exclusively,
propositional is largely responsible for the general understanding of
theology as systematic: reflection on revelation is a matter of making
the propositions of revelation rationally coherent.
However, from early in church history–and still today—the word
theology has also been used more loosely, as a synonym for belief or
teaching. George Q. Cannon, of the Council of Twelve, spoke of his
children’s favorite study as theology.17 Marion D. Hanks, speaking
to Brigham Young University students in 1960, described theology
as “religious doctrine and knowledge.”18 And in 2002 Neal A. Maxwell, another member of the Twelve, speaking in the church’s General
14. Widtsoe, A Rational Theology, 4th ed. (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book, 1937), 8.
15. Brigham Young, in Journal of Discourses, 6:315.
16. See, for example, The Teachings of Howard W. Hunter, ed. Clyde J. Williams (Salt
Lake City: Deseret Book, 1997), 182.
17. Cannon, “Suffering of the Latter-day Saints—Importance of Educating Children—
Importance of Teaching Correct Principles—Need to Donate to Building Schools—Law
of Tithing Still Required,” in Collected Discourses, ed. Brian H. Stuy, 5 vols. (Burbank,
CA: B. H. S. Publishing, 1987–1992), 2:39.
18. Marion D. Hanks, “Steps to Learning,” 4 May 1960, BYU Speeches of the Year,
1959–60 (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University, 1960), 2.
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Conference, equated “the restored gospel” with theology.19 My anecdotal experience is that Mormons seldom distinguish between these
two different meanings: sometimes theology means “what we believe”
or something like that, and sometimes theology includes explaining
what we believe by giving it a rational structure. Often it is not obvious
which of those is intended.
This broadness in the meaning of the word theology is at least
partly the result of the fact that there has not yet been anything like
an official Mormon theology. If theology means “beliefs,” then there
is a widely accepted theology, though there is considerable variability
in even that. However, if theology means formal reflection about religious beliefs and practices, then Mormonism does not even have a
widely accepted theology, much less an official one, though it has and
has had several practitioners.
In spite of the prevalence of equating the terms theology and
beliefs in Mormonism, when I use the term theology in this book, I
will not use it that way. Though I intend to continue to use the word
broadly, whatever else theology is, I assume that it includes a reflective,
explanatory component. It is more than “what most Mormons believe.” When theology is used in the way I propose, we can accurately
say that few Mormons have done it in an academic way.20 We could
describe those who come closest today, such as David Paulsen and
Ostler, as doing either the philosophy of religion or theology, though
19. Neal A. Maxwell, “Encircled in the Arms of His Love,” Ensign, November 2002,
16.
20. There is interest in the philosophy of religion among LDS intellectuals. Paulsen’s
classes at BYU are always full and Ostler’s books sell well. There is an e-mail discussion
group, LDS-Phil, dedicated to discussions of Mormonism and philosophy, which, for obvious reasons, often discusses topics in the philosophy of religion. Clark Goble has a Web
site devoted to his philosophical reflections on that topic: www.libertypages.com/clark
(“Mormon Metaphysics,” 11 July 2006 posting, accessed 1 August 2006 and 3 March
2009). One can find nonacademic discussions of the philosophy of religion fairly regularly on LDS blogs such as the group blog, Times and Seasons (timesandseasons.org for
1 August 2006). But I think few, if any, of these would call what they do theology, and this
constitutes a small group within Mormonism as a whole, even within educated or intellectual Mormons.
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I believe that one hears their work referred to most often as “philosophy of religion.” There are notable exceptions, but Mormons have not
done much theology, and since about the beginning of the twentieth
century, we generally avoid calling what we do theology.
One obvious reason for the relative absence of theology among
Mormons is that the church is still young. A tradition that is not yet
two hundred years old has not had time to develop the kind of theological discussions that one finds in much older Christian traditions,
such as Catholicism. Furthermore, though deciding cause and effect
here is difficult (assuming it is relevant), the absence of theological
work in the Church of Jesus Christ today is also probably related to the
fact that fideism seems to have grown in popularity among contemporary church leaders. For example, speaking of church history and the
origins of Mormonism, Maxwell said, “Reason, the Greek philosophical tradition, dominated, then supplanted, reliance on revelation,” but
with the restoration, “Revelation . . . replaced the long and inordinate
reliance on reason.”21 Though this more fideistic approach has become
increasingly obvious during the last half of the twentieth century, it
is not a completely original development.22 Among other precursors, we find Joseph Smith saying things like, “Without a revelation,
I am not going to give them the knowledge of the God of heaven”23
and, speaking of the rest of Christianity, “[they] are bound apart by
cast-iron creeds, and fastened to set stakes by chain-cables, without
revelation.”24 Revelation trumps reason.
21. Maxwell, “From the Beginning,” Ensign, November 1993, 18. Taking a somewhat ameliorated position, Dallin H. Oaks has said, “The source of the ancient conflict
between (1) reason or intellect and (2) faith or revelation is the professor’s rejection of
revelation, not the prophet’s rejection of reason.” Oaks, The Lord’s Way (Salt Lake City:
Deseret Book, 1991), 50.
22. One would have to do a more thorough study of the documents to decide, in
fact, whether this movement from more focus on rational theology to more focus on
fideism is as pronounced as I take it to be. I have not made that study, so I rely on my
intuition that it is.
23. Discourses of the Prophet Joseph Smith, comp. Alma P. Burton (Salt Lake City:
Deseret Book, 1977), 37.
24. History of the Church, 5:215.
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Let me briefly offer three additional reasons for the dearth of theology among Latter-day Saints: the belief in continuing revelation, the
nature of scripture, and the fact that, like many Jews, Mormons understand their religion primarily in terms of practices and attitudes
rather than in terms of beliefs.25 Of these, of course, perhaps only the
first is unique to Mormons. The other two reasons can also be found
in other religions. Indeed, Tracy argues (and I agree) that the nature
of scripture requires us to rethink theology,26 and he also sees the importance of practice, arguing explicitly that theory and a way of life
ought to join themselves, and recognizing that “such a remarkable
union seems clearly present in Mormon philosophies.”27
Continuing revelation makes theology more challenging—if theology means “rational theology”—because, as Spencer J. Condie says,
“Change is an inevitable consequence of continuous revelation.”28
Two iconic events in Mormon history, the 1890 prohibition of polygamy and the 1978 declaration that all worthy male members of the
church were to be given the priesthood, remind Latter-day Saints of
the fact that a belief in living prophets who give continuing revelation means that, not only is our canon not closed, but what has been
an authoritative teaching can become radically nonauthoritative, even
when the original authority was direct revelation from God. Our religion requires that we always recognize the possibility that we will
have to give up doctrines and practices that we thought central and
authoritative.
The first of the two iconic practices, the practice of polygamy,
was supported by a well-developed theology, a theology based on official teachings, scriptural and prophetic, that made polygamy a religious requirement for some.29 In the second case, though there was
25. See chapters 4 and 5 in this volume for expanded discussions of these three claims.
26. Tracy, “Catholic View,” 452, 457.
27. Tracy, “Catholic View,” 462.
28. Spencer J. Condie, In Perfect Balance (Salt Lake City: Bookcraft, 1993), 106.
29. Perhaps the experience of having a thorough theological justification for the
necessity of polygamy only to have polygamy abandoned is also at the root of less and
less theology in the twentieth century and afterward—not in absolute numbers, but in
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neither authoritative revelation nor explanation for why Blacks were
not ordained, there was a great deal of speculation, speculation that
many Mormons took as quasi-authoritative. The belief that there was a
doctrinal basis for the exclusion of Blacks from the priesthood was so
strong in the church that, even among those Mormons who, prior to
1978, refused to give revealed status to the practice, few thought that
the practice would be discontinued in the foreseeable future. Many
Mormons assumed that the practice could be explained in terms of
authoritative church teachings, even if no one seemed able to say what
that explanation was. However, in spite of their authoritative place
within church belief and theology, revelations from prophets overturned both practices and their associated beliefs and explanations. (In
the first case, the overturning took a while to complete; in the second,
the effect was essentially instantaneous.) In neither case did the church
give a theological explanation of the change—in my eyes, evidence that
the prophets in question did not see their revelations as responses to
questions, but as responses to a divine call. One can ask “Why?” of an
answer to a question, but it does not make sense to ask that of the response to a call. The answer to “Why are you responding that way?” is
quite different than the answer to “Why do you believe that?”
Though not impossible, it is difficult for any rational theology to
contain the proposition, “Important authoritative propositions in this
theology could be authoritatively denied at any moment, requiring
the complete re-rationalization of the propositions that remain.” As
a result, some modes of rational theology have been difficult for Mormons, but we have seldom recognized other kinds of theology, except
theology as a set of beliefs. Those are the only two options most Mormons have considered.
As I pointed out earlier, the second reason that we find little
academic rational theology among Latter-day Saints, the nature of
relation to the membership of the church: there are substantially fewer people doing academic theology as a percentage of church membership than there were in the nineteenth
century prior to polygamy.
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scripture, is not unique to us. My point about the effects of the nature
of scripture on theology of any kind is similar to one that Tracy has
made: We often speak of and use scripture as if it were a set of propositions that are poorly expressed or, at best, “merely” poetic. We then
try to discover the propositional content (doctrine) that we assume is
lurking behind or implicit in those poorly expressed or poetic expressions and to disentangle the relations of those propositions. But that
approach misunderstands scripture. Instead of a poetic expression
of implicit propositional truths, it is an inspired resource that allows
us to question ourselves and our world through reading and reflection. Scripture requires our interpretive, mediated response to its
questions: the appropriation of scripture—in Mormon terminology,
likening it to ourselves—more than its rational exegesis (cf. 1 Nephi
19:23).30 Of course, the appropriation proper to scriptural understanding remains inherently theological—reflection on belief—albeit
not narrowly rational.31
Few Latter-day Saint thinkers, conscious of themselves as doing
theology, have taken up the task of this appropriation, but why? Part
of an answer is, I think, the belief in continuing revelation combined
with the cultural assumption that scripture is to be understood as collected prophetic declarations that set forth a particular, unique set of
propositions, though those propositions are often only implicit. (That is,
of course, not an assumption found only among Mormons.) Whatever
the reason, though we find relatively little systematic theology among
Latter-day Saints, a theology of appropriation fits well with our insistence on continuing revelation. Indeed, though it is not usually done in
a rigorous way, appropriation of scripture is ubiquitous among Latterday Saints. I assume that a more rigorous theology of appropriation
would be a hermeneutic theology—and that it would bring together our
reliance on scripture and our belief in continuing revelation.32
30. See chapter 7 in this volume for a fuller discussion of likening.
31. Cf. David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination (New York: Crossroad, 1981), 104.
32. I assume that what many Latter-day Saints do when they read and talk about
scripture is such an appropriative theology, though a naive one.
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Of the three reasons, however, (continuing revelation, the nature of scripture, and the fact that religion is primarily a matter of
practice rather than propositional belief) the latter seems to be the
most important. To say that Mormons focus primarily on practices
is, of course, not to say that beliefs are irrelevant to Latter-day Saint
religion. Rather, it is to say that they are what they are and have their
importance only in terms of the practices of which they are part. To
use language taken from Martin Heidegger, it is to say that beliefs
have their importance only as they are part of a way of being, and for
Latter-day Saints that way of being is defined by the call of God.33
Latter-day Saints are more concerned with whether they have paid
their tithing, visited an ill fellow congregant, done their home or visiting teaching,34 and performed vicarious ordinances in the temple
than they are with how to explain the grace of God or the Word of
Wisdom.35 (Of course, that one thing is more important than another
does not mean that the second is unimportant.) Perhaps the most important reason that Latter-day Saints have done little toward giving an
intellectual clarification of revelation is that our experience of religion
is fundamentally practical and, so, does not lend itself readily to systematic theological reflection. The faith-knowledge engifted by revelation, perhaps most obviously seen in the faith-knowledge of scripture,
is practical rather than theoretical knowledge, so one theology that
can deal appropriately with that knowledge would be a hermeneutical
theology, a theology of listening for the word of God and saying what
one hears and how one hears it.36 Naturally, this hermeneutic would
33. For more discussion of this point, see chapter 5 in this volume. For more on Martin Heidegger, see chapter 2, note 62.
34. Home and visiting teaching are church programs in which members of the church
are assigned to visit each other each month in pairs—men for home teaching; women for
visiting teaching—to encourage and to watch over the members of the congregation.
35. The Word of Wisdom is a revelation forbidding the use of coffee, tea, and alcoholic
drinks, and urging moderation in eating meat (see Doctrine and Covenants 89).
36. For an excellent philosophical article on what a hermeneutic theology might look
like, see Paul Ricoeur, “Toward a Narrative Theology: Its Necessity, Its Resources, Its
Difficulties,” in Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, and Imagination, ed. Mark I.
Wallace, trans. David Pellauer (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), 249–61.
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be more than a hermeneutic of texts. It would especially be a hermeneutic of relations, practices, and events. Indeed, there is an important
sense in which, without calling it “theology,” Latter-day Saints have
practiced hermeneutic theology since shortly after the founding of the
church. They have been intensely interested in and written much about
church history, understanding Mormon history—the things we have
done and experienced—as the key to understanding what it means to
be a Mormon; understanding the interpretation of Latter-day Saint
history as disciplined reflection on what it means to be a Latter-day
Saint, in other words as quasitheological, even if only implicitly. Perhaps this explains why the Encyclopedia of Mormonism,37 though it
contains articles on traditional theological questions such as God‘s
foreknowledge, devotes proportionally much more space to articles on
church history. It also explains why Latter-day Saint academics and
students, as well as church members outside the academy, often have
an avid interest in Mormon history, even though they are not themselves historians. The fact that the Mormon History Association has
thousands of members while the Society for Mormon Philosophy and
Theology has, at most, hundreds, says something about where Mormons find theology. Finally, understanding Mormons as doing hermeneutical theology by doing history explains why the dispute over
how history should be done—a dispute that was resolved only by the
participants changing topics and, so, a dispute that remains implicit
in much Mormon discussion of our history—was so strong.38
Some Mormons, including Mark Wrathall and myself, have made
the hermeneutical approach more explicit, using philosophical rather
than historical hermeneutics to think about their faith. Though thinkers like Heidegger, the twentieth-century German, Hans-Georg Gadamer (a student of Heidegger), and the twentieth-century French philosopher, Paul Ricoeur (who taught in the United States for some time)
37. Encyclopedia of Mormonism, ed. Daniel H. Ludlow, 4 vols. (New York: Macmillan,
1992).
38. See, for example, the essays in George D. Smith, ed., Faithful History: Essays in
Writing Mormon History (Salt Lake City: Signature Books, 1992).
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are not among the philosophers to whom most Mormons are likely
to refer, that seems to be changing. Of course, hermeneutical theology is not the only Mormon alternative to rational theology and its
offspring. Though less well known than the work in the philosophy of
religion done by Paulsen and Ostler, there are a number of contemporary Mormon thinkers who are exploring alternatives. Kathleen Flake
has taken the Mormon interest in history and used it to think about
Mormon faith through narrative theology, a cousin if not a sibling of
hermeneutical theology.39 Some Mormon thinkers, like Brian Birch
and Keith Lane, use D. Z. Phillips’s Wittgensteinian understanding of
theology as a basis for their reflections. One Latter-day Saint thinker,
Adam Miller, takes his theological cue from the work of Alain Badiou.
All of these alternative approaches, even Miller’s, assume as fundamental that practice, belief, and reflection on practice and belief are
temporal and situated. In that sense they too are hermeneutic.
Thus, the answer to the question, “How do Mormons understand
the relation between philosophy and theology,” turns out to be complicated. Traditionally, we have taken theology to be strongly rationalistic, though there has also been an important and growing fideistic strain in Latter-day Saint thought, a strain that may be a reaction
against rationalist theology more than a positive assertion about the
nature of reason and faith. But, because the practical rather than theoretical understanding of religion is fundamental to Mormonism, perhaps the most important Mormon theological work to date has been
the work of Mormon historians. Though people like Paulsen and Ostler continue to labor for theological understanding in a more systematic fashion, it appears that the theological work traditionally done
by attention to history is beginning to be supplemented by theologies of scriptural appropriation, narrative, Wittgensteinian analysis,
39. Flake, “Translating Time: Joseph Smith’s Translation of the King James Bible,”
unpublished manuscript delivered at “God, Humanity, and Revelation: Perspectives from
Mormon Philosophy and History,” New Haven, Yale University, 24 March 2003. Notice
that history takes the place in the title of the conference where one would expect to find
theology.
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and hermeneutics, theologies that do not take the implicitly objective
view taken by rational theology, and theologies for which continuing
revelation plays a more central role than it does in rational theology.
Mormon theology is beginning to take part in the larger theological
discussion, moving more in the direction of multiple theologies and,
particularly, theologies that, as Tracy so well put it, “accord priority to ‘possibility’ over ‘actuality,’ ” “take history and historicity with
full seriousness,” and recognize truth as manifestation, disclosure, or
disclosure-concealment.40

40. Tracy, “Catholic View,” 460.

chapter four

Myth and Religion:
Theology as a Hermeneutic of
Religious Experience
•

L

angdon Gilkey1 (1919–2004) was a prominent Protestant theologian. Interned in a Japanese camp during World War II—he was
teaching English in China when war broke out—Gilkey’s thinking was
heavily influenced by that internment and by his studies with Reinhold
Niebuhr, one of two or three of the most important Protestant theologians of the twentieth century. Gilkey once said, “I believe in God
because to me history precisely does not represent . . . progress.”2 But
he recognized that he lived in an age when, though there were crises
to which religion was relevant, such as the civil rights movement in
the United States, many could not see how it was. One can understand
much of his work as an attempt to show how the language of religion is
relevant to the secular society in which we live.
Gilkey tells us that theology has moved from the question of the
nature of religious language to the more radical question of the possibility of meaningful religious language. The question is not just, “How
is religious language relevant today?” but “How can religious language
even be meaningful?” He suggests that if religious language is no longer a possible mode of meaningful discourse, it is because religious

1. Though Gary Dorrien is the author of the piece to which this was a response,
Dorrien writes about Langdon Gilkey’s theology. As shorthand, therefore, I will refer to
Gilkey, assuming that Dorrien’s portrayal of Gilkey’s position is correct. Dorrien’s piece
is “Langdon Gilkey’s Myth-Creative Liberal Theology: Synthesizing Tillich, Niebuhr,
Schleiermacher, Ricoeur, Eliade, and Whitehead,” in Mormonism in Dialogue with Contemporary Christian Theologies, ed. David L. Paulsen (Macon, GA: Mercer University
Press, 2007), 385–410.
2. Quoted in Adam Bernstein, “Langdon Gilkey Dies: Theologian, Author, Educator,” Washington Post, 22 November 2004, page B06.
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language is no longer related to experience and life. The undeniable
and irreversible triumph of secularism in the modern world has meant
the loss of religious meaning. In response to that loss, Gilkey proposes
to disclose “the meaning of religious language . . . by developing a hermeneutical phenomenology of experience,”3 and he argues, quite reasonably, that in rejecting the importance and meaningfulness of the
conceptual/symbolic order that religion offers, secularism is unable to
recognize or explain the order that makes secularism itself possible.4
Secularism cannot understand its own possibility, so Gilkey proposes
to give an interpretation of human experience that shows how religion
offers strategies for understanding and coping that we need but do not
have in the merely secular world.
Explaining Gilkey’s thought, Gary Dorrien says the secular
mind “invariably resorts to mythical language in expressing its ‘antimythical’ world view,”5 but it remains tone-deaf to the mythical character of its own language. Examples from secular myth are “the image
of the critical, scientific ‘man of reason’ ”6 and the assumption that “the
realization of freedom is always a moral good.”7 With the triumph
of secularism, the theologian’s job cannot be to cast out secularism.
Rather, says Gilkey, the theologian must give a better interpretation of
myth for secular consciousness. He or she must reawaken secular consciousness to the mythic rather than argue against secularism per se.
Thus, Gilkey’s general strategy is to reinterpret Christian understanding in light of the myth of secularism, but at the same time to show
the inadequacy of the latter. Secularism, for example, cannot deal
adequately with the inevitability of change. That requires reference
3. Dorrien, “Myth-Creative Liberal Theology,” 389.
4. Gilkey collapses the terms myth and symbolic or conceptual order. Though I think
there are not only useful but important distinctions to be made between the two, to make
the connection to Gilkey, I follow him here, using the term myth to refer to both myth
and symbolic/conceptual order. It is important to note that, as used in these kinds of
discussions, myth does not mean “false story.” Instead, it means “an organizing story.”
5. Dorrien, “Myth-Creative Liberal Theology,” 397.
6. Dorrien, “Myth-Creative Liberal Theology,” 94.
7. Dorrien, “Myth-Creative Liberal Theology,” 397.
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to ultimacy, something missing in the secular myth but available in
Christianity.
Following thinkers like Mircea Eliade and Paul Ricoeur, Gilkey
argues that myth shapes human existence by giving us a structure on
which we hang our understanding of society and the world: “The purpose of myth is to organize the total ‘world’ of one’s desire, environment, and social situation into a reflective form that makes sense of the
world.”8 Theology is a response to myth: “The purpose of theology is to
explore reflectively the meaning and validity of mythical discourse”9
in order to “disclose the latent sacral elements of experience.”10
Consider Gilkey’s claim that both myth and theology are reflective. In a broad sense, as a response to the human condition, of course
myth is reflective. However, if by “reflection” we mean “taking up
something as an object of conceptual or intellectual inquiry” (and,
presumably, that is the way theology is reflective), then given Gilkey’s
understanding of myth, it cannot be reflective in the same way that
theology is. To say that both are reflective is to equivocate. As a framework that makes understanding possible, the symbolic realm of myth
and ritual is broader than that of philosophical and theological reflection. Given Gilkey’s view, as a conceptual framework, myth makes
intellectual realms possible and, so, makes intellectual reflection on
myth complicated. We can never have the whole myth before us as
we reflect on it, unless it is not the framework that we use for understanding that upon which we reflect.11 Thus, if myth is an organizing
framework for understanding, it cannot also be the uncomplicated
8. Dorrien, “Myth-Creative Liberal Theology,” 399. Here is a place where I believe
that the distinction between myth and the symbolic order would be useful. The latter is
the structure that organizes our concepts. Myth is the narrative in which we find that
structure displayed.
9. Dorrien, “Myth-Creative Liberal Theology,” 399.
10. Dorrien, “Myth-Creative Liberal Theology,” 391.
11. This point is important to a criticism I make later in the paper. There is another
objection, one that is related to my concern about myth and conceptual or symbolic ordering: If myth is not a conceptual ordering (it could be either a symbolic ordering or,
more likely, a kind of narrative), then it is not the kind of thing that is concerned with
reflection. Reflection involves at least conceptual analysis and myth is not conceptual.
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object of reflection except on the basis of some other myth or through
a work of immanent critique. Gilkey’s criticism of secularism is a form
of such immanent critique, showing that secularism depends on the
very thing it rejects. Presumably theology can also perform such a
critique within a particular religion, but that is not how Gilkey deals
with religion.
Given Gilkey’s position, there can be no standpoint from which
to analyze myth that does not depend on myth, but his assumption
that myth is reflective tempts him to go beyond immanent critique.
Gilkey says:
What makes modern theology distinctive in religious history
is the fact that modern theologians know that their myths are
myths. Theology no longer claims to be able to make indicative
statements about matters of fact. It is only as broken myth that
Christianity’s mythical inheritance can be appropriated.12
Given Gilkey’s understanding of myth, this claim about theology must depend on some conceptual structure. Which one? Is this a
claim made possible by a position within religious myth or by a position within the myth of secularism? The fact that religious myth is
said to be broken is evidence that the claim has its basis in secularism.
Since Gilkey sees secularism as having completely triumphed over
religion that is not surprising. If the world is, indeed, irredeemably
secular, then one can do theology and talk about religious myth only
from a secular framework and one must, as Gilkey proposes to do,
give a new interpretation of religious myth for secular consciousness.
To do so, however, is to undo the mythic function of religion, to
rob it of its status as a way of understanding the world. Consider the
biblical story of creation as an example. It is common to understand
religious creation accounts as reflections on the origin of the cosmos,
answers to the question “Why?” that are in some sense parallel to the
scientific question “Why?” That is a mistake. There may be cases in
12. Dorrien, “Myth-Creative Liberal Theology,” 399.
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which myth functions as a kind of primitive science, but the biblical
story of creation is not one of them.13 Of course, secularists are not
the only ones to assume that the Bible story of creation is a case of
primitive science. Some religious people also make that assumption,
especially those who consider themselves literalists. Ironically, when
people argue for creation science or for what is usually called a literal
reading of the Bible, they are agreeing with the secular understanding of things.14 They use conceptual structures taken from secularism, such as the necessity that explanations have a scientific form, to
try to understand the Bible. Some give up or metaphorize the Bible
when faced with the project of making the Bible and science answer
the same questions, but some keep the Bible and insist that its account
can be brought within the secular myth, though of course they would
not say that is what they are doing. But both those who metaphorize
and those who would make the Bible scientific do essentially the same
thing: they begin from a secular understanding of the Bible. Thus,
Gilkey shares the view of those we often refer to as “biblical literalists.”
Both assume that secularism gives us the basic structure of understanding and that all accounts must be hung on that structure. They
disagree about what conclusions that leads one to, but they agree that
the secular myth is the one that must be used for understanding.
When the Bible tells us how the world was created, however, it
does so with interests, goals, and basic assumptions so different from
those of science that we ought to be suspicious of claims that both are
answers to the same question, “How did the world come to be?” Such
claims equivocate, for the question does not mean the same thing in a
biblical context that it means in a scientific one. The great temptation
13. Those unfamiliar with this view should see, for example, André LaCocque and
Paul Ricoeur, Thinking Biblically (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), and
Northrop Frye, The Great Code: The Bible and Literature (New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1982).
14. I quarrel with the description of “fundamentalist” readings of the Bible as literal
readings. Such readings are exactly not literal—by the letter—readings; they are secularized readings, though in disguise. For more on this, see my “Scripture as Incarnation,”
chapter 8 in this volume.
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is to assume that mythic accounts of creation are cases of primitive
science. Perhaps some are. Surely we do not want to claim that all
myth has the same goals. But it is far from obvious that all creation
myths are primitive science. In fact, in the case of the Bible, those who
take it to be a scientific or quasiscientific account have the considerable burden of proof. The interest of the biblical origin stories is much
more on things like how the human condition came to be what it is,
how evil came into the world, and why the covenant applies to each
person than it is in the physical processes involved in creation. It is
not clear that the biblical stories of origin has any interest in the latter
at all.
The result of this difference between the biblical story of origin
and the scientific story is that comparisons of the two, comparisons
we find made by those who wish to argue for creationism, on the one
hand, or those who wish to treat the biblical story as, at best, metaphor
and poetry, on the other, are problematic.15 It is not a simple matter to
ask which of them is true. In fact, it is generally an impossible matter.
If I assume that the conceptual schema for deciding truth is the scientific, secular one, then I assume that the questions and purposes of
science are the relevant ones. Having done so, if I compare the claim
that God created the heavens and the earth to a secular claim about
the origin of the earth and then ask which is true, I will conclude that
the secular account is true. On the other hand, if I assume that the
relevant schema is that of the scriptural story with its questions and
purposes, then when I compare the two claims about creation, I will
conclude that the scriptural account is true.
But to say that the scriptural account is true is not to say that the
scriptural account is a good scientific account. It is not to assume that
the two accounts are the same kinds of explanation and, therefore,
that the scriptural account is better than the scientific one. Rather, it
is to say that the scientific account doesn’t deal with the questions of
15. For perhaps the best discussion of this issue available, see Peter Winch, Trying to
Make Sense (New York: Blackwell, 1987), 132–39.

Myth and Religion

75

the biblical text in a fashion adequate to the project of the narrative in
Genesis, assuming that the scientific account deals with them at all.
Both accounts claim to tell us how things are, so they both make truth
claims; I am not arguing for a naive relativism. To the degree that the
differing accounts make truth claims about the same things, they are
comparable. It makes no sense to speak of a different kind of truth
in one than in the other (as some, though not Gilkey, are tempted
to do), unless by doing so one is covertly denying the truth of one or
the other, perhaps by metaphorizing it. However, at least for biblical
religions, it is far from obvious that myth and science make claims
about the same things. Therefore, it is far from obvious that we can
compare the truths of the scientific and the biblical accounts in order
to decide which is superior, though Gilkey gives secularism the ability
to decide truth and requires that religious truth find a way to fit within
the secular schema.
Gilkey is willing to cede secularism the authority it demands and,
so, to accept it as the story that determines truth. Thus, he says that
although “myth refers to both the finite and the transcendent . . . its
references to the finite must be understood to have no normative
meaning as historical or scientific information.”16 This can only make
sense if he assumes that religious myth makes claims about matters
of fact that are the same as the fact-claims of modern science. Though
that assumption is common, it is incoherent. Gilkey recognizes the
problem of assuming that myth is a primitive form of science, but he
falls prey to the temptation when he accepts the secular assumption
that the mythic claims of secularism are the ones by which we will
understand all claims to truth, in other words, all facts.
Secularism tries to insist that there is no myth at all. Gilkey shows
that to be self-contradictory. In other words, he shows that, in spite of
what seems to be the case and in spite of the claims of secularism and
its domination of our thought, it has not completely triumphed over
religion because it shares religion’s reference to a background myth.
16. Dorrien, “Myth-Creative Liberal Theology,” 398.
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Why, then, grant the myth of secularism in thinking about religion?
Doing so robs religion of its claims to truth and, so, of its power to
have real effects. It makes religion only metaphorical. If only secularism can yield facts, then religion is an untrue though sometimes
useful fable. Such a position takes the word myth to mean exactly
what Gilkey denies that it means: merely a fable. Thus, the question
is whether Gilkey has not given up too much, continuing Bultmann’s
demythologizing project without intending to. If his critique of secularism’s rejection of myth is valid, as I believe it is, then the revelation
of secularism’s broken, self-contradictory character opens a space in
which religious myth can be considered, not from the secular point of
view, but from out of itself. Within a secular consciousness that considers itself whole, Christianity can be appropriated only as broken
myth. That is at the heart of Gilkey’s thought. But the break in secularism to which Gilkey points opens a space for considering religious
myth differently.17
One way to do so is to show, as Gilkey has tried to do, how the
sacred manifests itself in and through the finite. The problem is how
to deal with a phenomenology of religious experience in a way that
will yield valid claims about divine transcendence. Though Gilkey
has passed over that issue, at least two contemporary philosophers
come to mind who have dealt with it extensively, Jean-Luc Marion
and Michel Henry, the latter a late-twentieth-century French Catholic
thinker, the former a contemporary one. To illustrate what attention
to the issue might allow, let me briefly describe Marion’s work as well
as the criticism of it.18 Then let me suggest an alternative that I believe
takes up the insights of Marion’s project and avoids the criticisms.
17. This possibility is one that might be undertaken in a deconstructive theology,
something that Gilkey has, understandably, been unable to do.
18. Marion has made his case in work after work, from L’idol et la distance (Paris:
Grasset, 1977); The Idol and Distance, trans. Christina Gschwandtner and others (New
York: Fordham University Press, 2001) to Du surcroît (Paris: PUF, 2001); In Excess, trans.
Robyn Horner and Vincent Berraud (New York: Fordham University Press, 2004). For
an excellent version of the argument, see his “The Saturated Phenomenon” in Janicaud
and others, Theological Turn, 176–216. Marion’s primary work on transcendence is Being
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The German thinker Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) is one of the most
important thinkers of Western philosophy. He argued that, because
reason is limited in what it can do, we cannot know about anything
transcendent. As part of making that argument, Kant gave us a rich
and carefully argued account of how our experiences of phenomena are
possible. Edmund Husserl, another German, who lived in the last half
of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth, also gave
a rich and carefully argued account of phenomena. Husserl’s analysis
was based on the observation that consciousness is always intentional—
directed at something—and that the understanding of phenomena
would require an analysis of this directed consciousness rather than a
pure consciousness existing independent of the world.
For both Kant and Husserl, a phenomenon must be understood
within a horizon and according to an I. In other words, there are
bounds within which the phenomena appear and they always appear
to someone. My desk is here in my office when no person is, but it
is not appearing, “showing itself,” unless there is someone to whom
it appears. All phenomena are, therefore, conditioned by the horizon
within which they appear and the person to whom they appear. The
impossibility of an unconditioned phenomenon, the impossibility
of a pure experience of transcendence, results from this fact about
phenomena.
The problem, as Kant’s first critique argues, is that to the degree
that we deal only with conditioned phenomena we do not deal with
what is transcendent. That is, in a nutshell, Kant’s argument: we cannot deal with what is transcendent because to do so we would have
to experience an unconditioned phenomenon, and that is impossible.
Marion’s response is to argue that an unconditioned phenomenon is
Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness, trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2002). Someone with little background in phenomenology would do
well to begin with a secondary source, such as Christina M. Gschwandtner, Reading JeanLuc Marion: Exceeding Metaphysics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007).
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possible.19 His strategy is to argue for “saturated phenomena” (phenomena of which we have an intuition but that are not constituted by
the horizon and the ego) rather than the “impoverished phenomena”
of Kant and Husserl—impoverished because they are constituted by
their horizon and subject, with little or nothing given by intuition.20
Marion points out that his suggestion of this possibility is not as wild
as it may seem at first glance. After all, we find something like this in
Kant’s aesthetic, in which the aesthetic idea is an intuition for which
no adequate concept can be formed. The fact that there is no adequate
concept of the aesthetic idea means that it is not constituted.
In Kant’s aesthetic, the concept is impoverished (limited) not the
intuition (raw experience) for the intuition gives more than we can
conceptualize. Kant says this excessiveness of intuition is inexposable;
Marion uses, instead, the word invisible. The invisible phenomenon is
“invisible, not by lack of light, but by excess of light.”21 The saturated
phenomenon is invisible to the categories of understanding because it
exceeds them. We don’t have to think that excess in terms of enormity.
All that is necessary is that it be impossible to apply a successive (in
other words, additive) synthesis (of the elements of our intuition) to
the phenomenon in order to gather those elements together as a conceptual whole. The invisible is excessive of understanding because no
successive synthesis is possible.
Marion argues, however, that in spite of the impossibility of performing a successive synthesis and, thereby, coming to a knowledge
of the whole, it is possible to have an instantaneous synthesis of the
saturated phenomenon. Amazement and bedazzlement are examples
of such instantaneous syntheses. We look toward something when we
are amazed or bedazzled, but it exceeds our understanding. What I
19. Marion makes this argument in various ways in the body of his work, but for our
purposes, I will refer to the short essay mentioned earlier, “The Saturated Phenomenon.”
It is perhaps the best abbreviated version of his argument.
20. In philosophy, the word intuition refers to immediate knowledge of any kind. Perhaps the most common example is sense perception: under normal conditions, I know
that I feel something cold immediately on touching it.
21. Marion, “Saturated Phenomenon,” 197.
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see in the vision of the saturated phenomenon is not darkness, but
something so bright that it blurs my vision, something I cannot see
clearly: “Because the saturated phenomenon, due to the excess of intuition in it, cannot be borne by any gaze that would measure up to it
‘objectively,’ it is perceived ‘subjectively’ by the gaze only in the negative mode of an impossible perception, the mode of bedazzlement.”22
For Marion, we do not find amazement and bedazzlement only
in the exceptional case. With Martin Heidegger, Marion believes that
such experiences are the fundamental modes of our experience with
the world and, so, determinative of phenomena. We can—indeed,
must—“cover over” our amazement at and bedazzlement with things
in order to get on in the world. I live most of my life as “one” lives
life,23 seeing what others see and speaking of those things as they do.
I do not see each thing in its uniqueness. Instead, I see each thing as
a member of a class of things. This thing on which my fingers are tapping is a keyboard, like many other keyboards, not a thing unique in
itself. The person who brings me my dinner at a restaurant is a server.
Even if he tells me his name I do not treat him as someone absolutely
unique. Rather, we interact as customer and server interact, according
to moral and social codes that dictate what each is to do. We live by
general rules for behavior with regard to things and persons rather
than taking each thing or person up as a new and unique entity.
Heidegger calls this way of living inauthenticity, literally “nonindividuality” (Uneigentlichkeit) because in ordinary life I cannot
treat each entity I encounter as new and unique. To try to do so would
be madness, for it would be completely disordered. When we behave
authentically, we cover over the world’s uniqueness; we each behave
in the same way—according to social and moral norms. This covering
22. Marion, “Saturated Phenomenon,” 201. Note that the words objectively and subjectively are between quotation marks in the quotation because bedazzlement is exactly
not something constituted by the subject; in other words, not an object of a subject. Thus,
the language of subjectivity and objectivity is inadequate.
23. Cf. Heidegger’s discussion of “the they” in Being and Time, trans. John McQuarrie
and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), §§26–27.
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over is a way of proceeding that is not mine, that I have been given by
my history, culture, and context, and it is necessary to my existence
as a person among other persons. Inauthentic behavior is not necessarily wrong and is often absolutely right.24 Nevertheless, the covering
over of ordinary life and experience is possible only on the basis of
a “prior” encounter with things in which amazement and bedazzlement are essential. Marion’s way of saying this is to say that because
the saturated phenomenon is always “disfigured” by the horizon(s) in
which it appears and the knowing subject who apprehends it, it is not
recognized as what it is. Nevertheless, even this disfiguring (in other
words, inauthentic apprehension) is a manifestation of the thing itself.
Marion argues that because the experience of the saturated phenomenon is an experience of what I do not and cannot constitute, of
what is excessive of understanding, it is an experience of my finitude
and impotence. It is an experience in which I find myself constituted
rather than constituting because I no longer have a dominant point
of view over that which is intuited. Instead the intuition overwhelms
me: “The I loses its anteriority and finds itself, so to speak, deprived
(destitué) of the duties of constitution, and is thus itself constituted: it
becomes me rather than I.”25 In the experience of the saturated phenomenon—of transcendence—I become a witness rather than a subject. Pointedly, Marion calls this event, in which I become a witness of
what overpowers me, “revelation.”26
For Marion’s critics, this is where the problem arises. According
to Marion, since the intuition of a saturated phenomenon is an intuition in which the I is constituted as me, that intuition is a pure
24. See Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. McQuarrie and Robinson, §27. Note that
he says: “The ‘one’ is an existential and belongs as a primordial phenomenon to the positive
constitution of Dasein” (p. 121; emphasis in original, translation modified).
25. Marion, “Saturated Phenomenon,” 211.
26. It is important to note that revelation is not the only kind of saturated phenomenon and that revelation is not only the revelation of the Divine. Historical events
are also saturated phenomena and revelation includes the picture as spectacle (the “idol”)
and the particular face that bedazzles me (the “icon”), as well as the intuition of a gaze
that envisages me and loves me (theophany). Marion, “Saturated Phenomenon,” 214–15.
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intuition of transcendence, one unmediated by concepts and without
structure.27 But a pure intuition is, arguably, impossible. The idea of a
pure intuition is the idea of an intuition with no content whatsoever
because there is neither horizon within which it can gain meaning
relative to other things nor ego to which it can be meaningful; it is
the idea of an experience to which no thought at all is attached, not
just the experience of the overflow or excess of one’s concepts but an
experience in which all concepts are absent. As thought-provoking as
Marion’s analysis is, the argument is that it goes too far. Quoting Marion, Dominique Janicaud asks, “What remains phenomenological in a
reduction that, ‘properly speaking, is not,’ and refers back to a ‘point of
reference [that is] all the more original and unconditioned as it is more
restricted’?”28 Janicaud’s answer is pointed: nothing. A phenomenon
requires that which makes it a phenomenon. It requires the I. A pure
phenomenon is unintelligible.29
But Marion’s case is not as difficult as Janicaud’s criticism makes it
seem. In “The Event, the Phenomenon, and the Revealed,”30 Marion addresses the question directly, arguing that the pure phenomenon is an
analytic concept derived by a phenomenological reduction of the event
in which something is given to intuition. In point of fact, the given never
occurs apart from a given-to, a me. Marion says, “One can take the risk
of saying that the given . . . projects itself onto the given-to (consciousness, if one prefers) as onto a screen; . . . immediately provoking a double
27. For examples of criticisms that focus on this point, see the piece by Janicaud in
Theological Turn and his later work, La phénoménologie éclatée (Paris: L’Eclat, 1998). See
also Marlène Zarader’s “Phenomenology and Transcendence,” 106–19, as well as Beatrice Han’s “Transcendence and the Hermeneutic Circle: Some Thoughts on Marion and
Heidegger,” 120–44, both in James E. Faulconer, ed., Transcendence in Philosophy and
Religion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003).
28. Janicaud, Theological Turn, 62.
29. Zarader’s piece in Transcendence in Philosophy and Religion, 106–19, makes this
point very clearly.
30. Marion, “The Event, the Phenomenon, and the Revealed,” in Faulconer, ed., Transcendence in Philosophy and Religion, 97–105.
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visibility,”31 namely the visibility of the phenomenon giving itself and
the visibility of the me receiving it. But we cannot analyze this event of
given-and-given-to using its two terms, given and given-to. That division allows us to speak of the given, a pure intuition of transcendence,
apart from the given-to.
Nevertheless, even if Janicaud’s criticism holds—that there is no
pure intuition of transcendence—that does not mean, as Kant and
Husserl argue, that every reference to transcendence remains trapped
within the world of subject and object, remains constituted and, so,
does not at all refer to transcendence. To deny that there are unconditioned phenomena is not to assert that there is never anything of
the unconditioned in phenomena. Intuition does not disappear. We
experience the overflow of our concepts, the excess of intuition. As
mentioned, without reducing transcendence to a phenomenon and
without arguing for pure intuition, Heidegger has already shown that
transcendence is revealed in immanence. For example, he argues that
the work of art reveals transcendence in immanence, revealing more
than itself.
Of course, Heidegger is hardly the only philosopher to have dealt
with this problem or to have argued that we experience transcendence
in immanence. The problem is how to talk about those experiences,
for, at first glance, we seem unable to speak without speaking merely
immanently and categorically. Our concepts are concepts of the phenomenal. How, then, can we use them to speak of what transcends
the phenomenal, of overflow and excess, the unconditioned aspect
of experience? This problem is an ancient one. Pseudo-Dionysius responds with negative theology. Plotinus speaks of the trace, a term
that has been picked up and used in contemporary work, such as
that of Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida. Heidegger uses a
variety of terms, among them words clustered around the word Riß:
rift, tear, and as a root in words meaning “sketch,” “design,” “outline,”
31. Marion, “The Event, the Phenomenon, and the Revealed,” in Faulconer, ed., Transcendence in Philosophy and Religion, 101–2.
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“boundary.”32 Those in literature, such as Roland Barthes, speak of
subversion, a term that Marlène Zarader borrows. Finding a way to
allow the subversion, interruption, supplementation, or tracing of the
unconditioned to show itself in what we say is the “solution” to the
problem of whether Marion is ultimately right or wrong.33 Though
there are interesting and important differences between these thinkers of interruption and subversion, one can make the general observation that all such talk points to the fact that we always find ourselves
in a world that we constitute and, at the same time, we find that something unconstituted disturbs the horizon (context) and the I (consciousness), which implicitly claim to account completely for things
and the world.
Heidegger’s discussion of the work of art and his frequent references to poetry are one way to understand such speaking: art and
language cannot be reduced to their categorical content, and phenomenological analysis shows that. Marion has also used phenomenological analyses of the work of art to talk about our experience and
communication of transcendence.34 However, given that the experience of transcendence is not necessarily the experience of divine transcendence, being able to talk about transcendence is not enough. The
work of art reveals what we might call the transcendence of things, but
that is not necessarily the same as divine transcendence. In what do
we find divine transcendence?
Like many, perhaps even all religions, biblical religions call us to
live in a certain way.35 They may do so conceptually, but they need not.
32. See, for example, Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” 188.
33. This solution has much to do with the difficulty we find in reading such thinkers
as Levinas and Derrida, though it is not the only explanation.
34. See, for example, Marion, La croisée du visible (Paris: PUF, 1996); The Crossing
of the Visible, trans. James K. A. Smith (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004).
Also, Marion, Du surcroît (Paris: PUF, 2001); Marion, In Excess: Studies of Saturated Phenomena, trans. Robyn Horner and Vincent Berraud (New York: Fordham, 2003).
35. There is considerable discussion of biblical religion as response and call. See, for
example, Ricoeur, “Experience and Language in Religious Discourse,” in Theological
Turn, 127–46; and especially Marlène Zarader, La dette impensée, Heidegger et l’héritage
hébraïque (Paris: Seuil, 1990), 56–69; Zarader, The Unthought Debt: Heidegger and the
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They can also do so by means of scripture and ritual and, especially, in
their practices. As Kierkegaard points out, “The Christian thesis goes
not: intelligere ut credam [Think in order to believe], nor credere ut
intelligam [Believe in order to think]. No it goes: Act according to the
commands and orders of Christ; do the Father’s will—and you will
become a believing-one.”36 On this view, the religious experience of
transcendence is to be found in acts more than in concepts, whether
those concepts are mythic or rational. Just as works of art testify of
the disruption of the ordinary world by transcendence, the acts, rituals, and scriptures of the religious testify of the disruption by divine
transcendence. They testify of a call from beyond themselves and
their horizon that the religious are bound to hear and obey.37 Because it accepts the secularization’s triumph over religious language,
Gilkey’s understanding of religion seems to leave no room for such
a call, for being called or chosen rather than choosing. But if there
is no room for the call, then there seems to be no room either for
testimony and witness.
The theologian is the person who responds to religious testimony
reflectively. The materials for that reflection are the revelations of divine transcendence in religious immanence, namely acts, rituals, and
scriptures. And the method of that reflection must be hermeneutic. As
Ricoeur says, in the presence of revelation and the absence of universal
religious phenomena we are left “to run the gauntlet of a hermeneutic
and more precisely of a textual or scriptural hermeneutic.”38 Unlike
Ricoeur, I include religious ritual and practice among the things to be
examined hermeneutically, but I do not think my inclusion changes
Hebraic Heritage, trans. Bettina Bergo (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006).
Zarader’s discussion is replete with references both to biblical texts and to other authors.
36. Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and
Edna H. Hong (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975), 3:363. I am grateful to
Keith Lane for this reference.
37. Of course, false and misleading or misunderstood testimony is always possible.
That religious experience testifies of the divine is no proof of the divine. Neither does it
follow that all testimony is of equal worth.
38. Ricoeur, “Experience and Language in Religious Discourse,” in Theological Turn,
130.
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Ricoeur’s point much. A hermeneutic of these texts and practices can
awaken us again to the witness they offer, the witness of a divine call.39
Thus, faced with the “triumph” of secularism, the theologian can
stand in the break opened in secularism by Gilkey’s critique and read
the rituals, practices, and scriptures of his or her religion reflectively,
testifying hermeneutically of the divine transcendence witnessed in
those texts, of the disruption of secular reality that they demonstrate.
Testimony makes it possible for the secularist to hear something of
the call to which the religious respond.
An understanding of theology as a hermeneutic of texts and practices is particularly appropriate in biblical religions, religions in which
response and call rather than doctrine and dogma are fundamental. A
theology that offers a hermeneutic analysis of the scriptural call that
initiates religious practices, and of the practices themselves, not only
analyzes the texts and practices to which it attends—its analysis also
testifies of the call of the Divine heard in those texts and practices.
Hermeneutic theology is, therefore, among the acts appropriate to religious life. It is testimony. The testimony of the hermeneutic theologian is a second-order testimony, for it testifies of the bedazzlement
of the divine transcendence that reveals itself in religious life. Theological testimony can be meaningful in a secular world, as Gilkey’s
critique of secularism shows. Hermeneutic theology cannot serve as
the proof for God’s existence that some may demand. Neither will it
make biblical religion fit comfortably into a secular understanding of
the world nor make it obvious to the secularist that religious language
is meaningful. We do not escape the difficulty of being religious (and
Kierkegaard is right that we should not). Nevertheless, a hermeneutic theology can speak in the space of secularism’s self-contradiction.
Testimony and attestation of religious experience, of the experience of
39. Paul Moyaert’s “The Sense of Symbols as the Core of Religion: A Philosophical
Approach to a Theological Debate,” in Transcendence in Philosophy and Religion, 53–69,
is an excellent example of such a hermeneutic. In that essay the Catholic understanding
of the sacrament of the Eucharist is the object of his analysis. Moyaert’s argument is important to chapter 1 as well as to chapter 8 in this volume.
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divine transcendence, calls both to those who are presently religious,
helping them hear the divine call again, and to those who are not religious, seeking to open their ears to the call of the divine. Like quotidian life, secularism washes everything in gray. Like art, hermeneutic
theology can remove some of that gray, perhaps allowing light to shine
through once again.

chapter five

Why a Mormon Won’t Drink Coffee
but Might Have a Coke:
The Atheological Character of
the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints
•

I

t is a matter of curiosity to many and an annoyance to a few that it
is sometimes difficult to get definitive answers from members of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints to what seem like straightforward questions—questions of the form “Why do you believe or do
x?”1 Latter-day Saints subscribe to a few basic doctrines, most of which
they share with other Christians (such as that Jesus is divine) and some
of which differentiate them (such as the teaching that Joseph Smith
was a prophet of God). They also accept general moral teachings, the
kinds of things believed by both the religious and the nonreligious.
Apart from those, seldom can one say without preface or explanation
what Latter-day Saints believe.
I will argue that this apparently curious situation is a result of the
fact that, like many, probably most, other religious people (including
many Hindus and Jews), Latter-day Saints are atheological.2 In other
words, they are without an official or even semi-official philosophy that
explains and gives rational support to their beliefs and teachings. To
make that argument, I will argue that what we say about being Latterday Saints is an expression of what it means to be Latter-day Saints,
1. Occasionally that annoyance becomes a charge of duplicity or of an esoteric doctrine. Though I think the charge is seldom justifiable, I understand its origin and have
some understanding of why some people make it.
2. I agree with Rémi Brague, who says “The project of a rational elucidation of divinity . . . is specific to Christianity.” Brague, The Law of God: The Philosophical History
of an Idea (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 6.
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but being Latter-day Saints is irreducible to a set of propositions.3 As I
use the word theology here, it begins with belief and uses the methods
of rational philosophy to give support to that belief: I mean dogmatic,
systematic, or rational theology. I recognize that, especially to someone who is not a member of the Church of Jesus Christ, it may seem
a bit outdated to criticize rational theology since there are also other
kinds of theology such as narrative, liberation, liturgical, and feminist
theologies. Nevertheless, since rational theology is what most Latterday Saints first think of when they think of theology, since dogmatic
(in other words, church-sanctioned) theologies are rational, and since
I think at least some of what I say of rational or systematic theology
may also apply to other theologies, I think it reasonable to focus on
rational theology.
In describing the Church of Jesus Christ as atheological I intend
to explain why the church neither has an official theology, explicit or
implicit, nor encourages theological speculation. My explanation will
be that the absence of theology reflects the Latter-day Saint understanding of religion as a set of practices, beliefs, and attitudes and that
such an understanding is fundamental to Latter-day Saint religion.
Of course, the absence of theology is also characteristic of many
noncreedal denominations (and of many theologians). And, of course,
some Latter-day Saint leaders and thinkers have devoted considerable
energy to formulating theologies of various kinds. Nevertheless, none
of those efforts have come to fruition (none has been accepted as official by the church, and none has articulated a theology exclusively accepted or adopted by authorities or members), and I think none will.
To argue that the Latter-day Saint religion is atheological I will
look at what seems to be accepted, established practices among
3. For purposes of my argument, I distinguish, roughly, between a provisional account (one that is adequate for its purposes, but provisional) and an adequate account
(an account that can be submitted to the critical demands of reason without remainder).
I deny Latter-day Saint theologies that claim (usually implicitly rather than explicitly)
to be adequate rather than provisional, though that may be to deny the exception rather
than the rule.
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Latter-day Saints, and I will use the Word of Wisdom as my basic
example. I think it will give us a foothold on which to rest a discussion of the place of theology in Mormon belief and practice. In February of 1833, Joseph Smith received a revelation that said, among other
things: “Strong drinks are not for the belly. . . . And again, hot drinks
are not for the body or belly” (Doctrine and Covenants 89:5–9). His
brother and Assistant President of the church, Hyrum Smith, later
clarified that “hot drinks” meant coffee and tea.4
Latter-day Saints often speak of the Word of Wisdom as a health
law, and there is evidence for that way of understanding it. Nevertheless,
there is no official explanation of its prohibitions and there is anything
but a universal practice, especially regarding, for example, the consumption of caffeine. There is little consistency among Latter-day Saint
practices regarding caffeinated drinks and no more consistency regarding the explanations of those practices. Consider that many Latter-day
Saints abstain from all caffeinated drinks, presumably believing that
it is the caffeine in coffee that makes it forbidden; and thus that other
drinks with caffeine are also forbidden. However, only a few of those
who abstain from caffeinated drinks in general will drink decaffeinated
coffee, though consistency would dictate that decaffeinated coffee is not
prohibited. The permutations are many: most who would drink neither
a decaffeinated coffee nor caffeinated sodas might eat a chocolate bar,
though its caffeine levels are on a par with those in decaffeinated coffee. Few would drink tea who do not feel obliged to abstain from sodas
with caffeine. And so on. Just as it is possible to draw a line representing
some equation through any set of points on a two-dimensional plane,
it is perhaps possible to find some rule that will explain these variations
in orthodox Mormon practice. But it will not be easy to do so, and it is
doubtful that the resulting rule will be useable.
4. Joseph Lynn Lyon, “Coffee,” in Encyclopedia of Mormonism, 1:289. Latter-day
Saints have not always taken the Word of Wisdom to be binding on them as a commandment. Indeed, the revelation was originally given “not by commandment or constraint”
(D&C 89:2). Now, however, it has become a requirement for members in good standing.
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The difficulties we encounter in explaining the ways in which
Latter-day Saints practice the Word of Wisdom are illustrative of
the difficulties we encounter with other Latter-day Saint beliefs and
practices. There are few explanations of such things on which all
Latter-day Saints in good standing agree.5 As mentioned, there are
basic beliefs, doctrines, and practices about which there is widespread and even universal agreement. Among these is the central
doctrine that Jesus is the Messiah—that his life, suffering, death,
and resurrection were literal. Other teachings include that Joseph
Smith was the prophet through whom Jesus worked the restoration
of his ancient gospel, that the Book of Mormon is a historical record
of an ancient people, and that all human beings must be baptized.
It is difficult, to the point of being inconceivable, to imagine the
Church of Jesus Christ abandoning these. Nevertheless, though it is
clear that such foundational beliefs and teachings exist, there is no
official list of them.
Though it is easy to say that there must be foundational beliefs and
it is easy to point to beliefs that appear to be among them, if we look
closely at any particular belief, it isn’t difficult to imagine changes in
that belief that could come through the prophet and result in quite
different practices and beliefs. Beyond whatever foundational beliefs
Latter-day Saints hold, there are many other beliefs that are generally
though not universally held, such as belief in the doctrine of eternal
progression;6 and there is considerable disagreement among those
who do hold such beliefs as to what they mean or imply. Further,
5. I say “few” to be safe. I can think of none.
6. The belief is that we continue to progress after this life until, eventually, we are
deified. Early Latter-day Saints were more clear about what deification means than are
contemporary members of the church. For those mid- to late-nineteenth-century Latterday Saints who considered the topic, it was clear that deification meant becoming like
God the Father and creating worlds of one’s own. Many Latter-day Saints continue to
believe that, but there is also a number for whom the concept of deification is more ambiguous (see, for example, David Van Biema, S. C. Gwynne, and Richard N. Ostling,
“Kingdom Come,” Time, 4 August 1997, 56) or more in line with standard Christian
doctrines of theosis. And, though they are a small minority, there are Latter-day Saints in
good standing who do not at all believe in progression to deification.
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whether we are talking about foundational or other beliefs, there is
little thought about how to make those beliefs and practices a rational
whole and even less agreement about whether to do so.
Thus, relatively few of what are often described as the beliefs and
teachings of the Church of Jesus Christ are required of its members,
and even fewer beliefs have a generally agreed-upon rational explanation or description. Yet most Latter-day Saints are not bothered by the
absence of official theology—and the leadership of the church seems
not to be looking to fill in that absence.
Joseph Smith’s anticreedal feelings may be the origin of the continuing Latter-day Saint suspicion of theology. He said, “The Latterday Saints have no creed, but are ready to believe all true principles
that exist, as they are made manifest from time to time,”7 and “the
truth of the system, and power of God” had been “bound apart by
cast-iron creeds, and fastened to set stakes by chain-cables, without
revelation.”8 Though creed and theology are not the same, it is easy
to see that someone opposed to the first might also be opposed to
the second.
The absence of official explanations and rational descriptions of
beliefs and practices, and of differing and inconsistent explanations
and descriptions within the membership of the church, is what I will
try to “explain.” I will offer three possible responses to the question of
Latter-day Saint atheology (only one of which is unique to Latter-day
Saints). My responses will focus on prophets, practice, and scripture.9
7. History of the Church, 5:215. In spite of this antipathy toward creeds, as Daniel
Graham has pointed out, not only do we have something very like a creed in the Articles
of Faith, we find something even more like one in D&C 20:17–28.
8. History of the Church, 6:75.
9. I recognize that theologians and philosophers of religion are likely to find nothing new in what I say and to know of more nuanced and informed discussions of these
matters in other places. Given my lack of training in either area, that is not surprising.
Nevertheless, I believe that what I say here gives reasonable explanations for the absence
of theology among Latter-day Saints. It is at least a place from which one could begin
talking about that absence.
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Prophets
My first response to the question of why Latter-day Saints are fundamentally atheological is that of my hairstylist, Geoffrey Huntington, who has not only the interest in philosophy common to those of
his profession, but also some academic training in philosophy. When
I asked him why we believe and do what we do, his answer was, “Because the prophet said so.” At first glance, this may seem to be a remark about obedience. But I think that Huntington’s response is not
so much about obedience as it is about continuing revelation: if we
take the idea of continuing revelation seriously, then anything we believe or do happens “under erasure,” and that is especially true of any
explanation of what we believe or do. As individuals, we may find a
theology helpful to our understanding, but no explanation or system
of ideas will be adequate to tell us what it means to be a Latter-day
Saint. For a Latter-day Saint, a theology is always in danger of becoming meaningless because it can always be undone by new revelation.
My point is a logical one: To believe in continuing revelation, to
believe that God can do what he did when he commanded Abraham
to go to Moriah, when he challenged Peter’s understanding of clean
and unclean, when he ordained and then ended the practice of plural
marriage, and when he told President Kimball that we should begin
ordaining all worthy male members of the church is to believe that
any account of our beliefs is, logically, in danger of being undone by
new revelation. But we can go beyond the logical point: To believe
in continuing revelation is more than to believe, as most Christians
do, that no human-made theology will be adequate to God’s divine
theology, and, therefore, require revision. It is to believe, though often
only implicitly, that that-which-is may not be static, so there may be
no final, atemporal rational understanding of the totality of things, no
ultimate rational theology toward which our human theologies could
strive but never reach.10
10. The absence of a final, atemporal account of everything is frightening only if we
assume that divine knowledge requires such an understanding. However, unlike the
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The word theology comes from the Greek words theos (“God”) and
logos (“reason” or “account”). Plato uses it in the Republic, where it
means the account of divine things.11 Nevertheless, except for scripture and what the prophet reveals, there is no authoritative logos of
the theos for Latter-day Saints, and given that the prophet can and
does continue to reveal things, there is no logos of what he reveals
except the record of those revelations, scripture that remains an open
canon.12 For Latter-day Saints, the logos is both in principle and in
practice always changing. Continuing revelation precludes an account
of revelation as a whole. Thus, finally our only recourse is to the current revelations of the prophet since, speaking for God, he can explain, qualify, alter, or revoke any particular belief or practice at any
moment, or he can institute a new one, and he can do those things
with no concern for how to make his pronouncement rationally coherent with previous pronouncements or practices.
The Word of Wisdom illustrates this possibility of change that
may have a historical explanation but has no systematically rational
one. Its text says that it is given “not by commandment or constraint”
(D&C 89:1). But in the early twentieth century, it became a commandment, and it is now expected that members of the church will abide by
at least its most obvious parts. I know of no theological explanation of
the Word of Wisdom that explains this shift in the status of the Word
of Wisdom, from advice to commandment.
classical God, if God is within the universe rather than outside it (as Joseph’s revelation
of God’s embodiment strongly suggests—see D&C 130:22), and if he interacts with others
like ourselves who have agency, then though he must know—be intimately acquainted
with—all the things there are, he does not need to have the kind of omniscience that the
classical God has; a knowledge of all past, present, and future facts (assuming that the
phrase “future facts” has any meaning at all). As long as God knows all that there is and
has the power to adjust his own behavior to the behaviors of others in such a way that he
will not be overcome by them in some way, then he has both all-knowledge and all-power,
without having the kind of knowledge that we attribute to a Platonic or Aristotelian god.
11. Republic, book 2.
12. I think the openness of the canon, and the resulting need for keeping a record of
what the prophets have said, helps explain the unusual interest in history among Latterday Saints.
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Polygamy illustrates the difficulty of systematic theology even
better. Instituted by Joseph Smith, the practice of polygamy was revoked by Wilford Woodruff, the fourth prophet. Church intellectuals, some of them also prominent ecclesiastical leaders, had produced
any number of theologies in which polygamy figured prominently and
even centrally,13 but with Woodruff’s manifesto,14 those theologies
became incoherent, as Bruce R. McConkie so pointedly illustrated,
having firmly held a theological belief that the priesthood would
not be extended to black men in mortality and then, almost immediately after the revelation, recanting that belief, seemingly without
embarrassment.15
Of course, Latter-day Saints offer explanations for such changes
in practice, and many of those explanations are quasi-theological. But
there is no more reason to think that those explanations are definitive
than there was to think that the explanations given before the cessation of the practice were definitive. Latter-day Saint theological explanations are provisional and, in principle, personal (even when widely
shared). Thus, one reason that Latter-day Saints are generally atheological is that theology serves little purpose in the way that doctrines
and practices are decided. As Latter-day Saints understand continuing revelation, it always trumps theology.
Let me end my first argument with a syllogism that will perhaps
serve as a summary:
1. Theology assumes the existence of an immutable set of beliefs
that, in principle, shows to be rational and coherent.
2. Continuing revelation reserves the right to radically restructure
Latter-day Saint beliefs.
13. For a representative claim, see Joseph F. Smith’s statement that plural wives are
necessary for a fullness of glory and joy in the celestial kingdom in Journal of Discourses
20:28–31, especially p. 30.
14. See Official Declaration 1 in the Doctrine and Covenants for the announcement
of the prohibition of polygamy.
15. See, for example, Bruce R. McConkie, “All Are Alike unto God,” CES Religious
Educators Symposium, 18 August 1978.
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3. So, an adequate theology and continuing revelation are at odds
with one another.
4. Thus, since Latter-day Saints insist on continuing revelation, they
cannot have an adequate theology.
Practice
We can also explain the absence of a theology in the Church of
Jesus Christ by arguing that practice rather than belief is central to
Latter-day Saint religion. It is not uncommon to understand religion
as essentially a belief content: to be a Latter-day Saint is to believe that
x, y, and z are true. If that is the case, then the content of those beliefs
can be expressed in rational terms and related to each other by reason.
In other words, they can be loosed from their connection to ritual, ordinance, history, etc., and then examined without losing any meaning
in the process. On this assumption, a fully developed and relatively
complete theology is in principle possible.
In spite of the commonness of thinking of religion as belief, particularly in Protestantism, I doubt that many would find that understanding of religion philosophically satisfactory. There are at least two
problems with it. First, it doesn’t accurately describe religious belief.
As Paul Moyaert says, “One could not say . . . that someone is a good
scientist if he does not know the basic principles of science, whereas
a person who is unable to accurately explain the basic tenets of his or
her religion can still be an exemplary and pious believer.”16 The proverbial farmer in Santaquin need not be able to give a proper theological account of his or her beliefs to be a good member of the church.
Indeed, that farmer need not even have a coherent set of beliefs nor
must all of his or her beliefs be coherent with the beliefs of most other
Latter-day Saints. A person can be a good Mormon, whether a stake
president or a Primary teacher, without having a good theology or
much of a theology at all.
16. Paul Moyaert, “The Sense of Symbols as the Core of Religion: A Philosophical
Approach to a Theological Debate,” in Transcendence in Philosophy and Religion, ed.
James E. Faulconer (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2003), 54–55.
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The gospel is a divine activity, the saving activity of God. It is not
the belief content associated with that activity, even though the activity
of the gospel necessarily has belief content. To be a believer is to accept
the gospel: it is to believe that God can save, but not merely to believe
(since mere belief would not be religious belief). To be a believer is to
respond to God’s saving activity with repentance and in rebirth and
with tokens that testify of God’s saving power. One can do that and,
at the same time, have some, perhaps many, false beliefs. But if the exemplary pious person can have false beliefs about his or her religion,17
then belief cannot define what it means to be religious. The locus of religion is practice rather than belief, though particular beliefs are often
inseparable from practices. The practice of baptism cannot be the practice that it is without the beliefs that accompany it.
Further, Latter-day Saints understand much religious practice in
terms of covenant and priesthood, as in Exodus 19:5–6: “Now therefore,
if ye will obey my voice indeed, and keep my covenant, then ye shall be
a peculiar treasure unto me above all people: for all the earth is mine:
And ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests, and an holy nation.” Perhaps referring to that passage, Latter-day Saint revelation says:
In the ordinances [of the priesthood], the power of godliness is
manifest. And without the ordinances thereof, and the authority
of the priesthood, the power of godliness is not manifest unto
men in the flesh; for without this no man can see the face of
God, even the Father, and live. Now this Moses plainly taught
to the children of Israel in the wilderness. (D&C 84:19–24)
To be a Latter-day Saint is not merely to be a member of a particular community, sometimes identifiable by common beliefs or by
particular habits or speech patterns or ways of organizing socially.
17. Defending an older man who had been accused of preaching false doctrine, Joseph Smith said, “It dont prove that a man is not a good man, because he errs in doctrine,”
The Words of Joseph Smith: The Contemporary Accounts of the Nauvoo Discourses of the
Prophet Joseph Smith, ed. Andrew F. Ehat and Lyndon W. Cook (Orem, UT: Grandin,
1994), 184, original spelling retained.
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Fundamentally to be a Latter-day Saint is to be one of the children
of God and to serve him in formal practices, including ordinances.18
It is arguable that even if there were a rational account of Latter-day
Saint beliefs in their relation to each other, it would not be—and could
not be, not even in principle—an adequate account of Latter-day Saint
formal practices, and thus it neither would nor could be an adequate
account of Latter-day Saint religion.19 This is because arguably there is
no adequate account of practices in general, and thus, no adequate account of Latter-day Saint formal practices. To show that there can be
no adequate account of practices one would have to show that practices exceed the possibility of giving a fully adequate account of them.
One could do that by showing that it is impossible to apply a successive
synthesis20 to the phenomenon of practice in general, that it is impossible to take up and link its parts into a conceptual whole—even though
a synthesis (an instantaneous rather than successive synthesis, and so
knowledge though not conceptual knowledge) is possible. I take JeanLuc Marion’s arguments in “The Saturated Phenomenon” and in “The
Event, the Phenomenon, and the Revealed,”21 among other works, to
straightforwardly imp1y22 that there can be no successive synthesis of
18. Scholars speak of these as “cultic practices.” However, given the abuse that the
word cult has taken and the misunderstandings it may engender among some readers, I
prefer to speak of the formal practices of a religion. I do not think that all formal practices
are ordinances. The Word of Wisdom is a formal practice that is not an ordinance. I mention ordinances particularly because they are unambiguously formal practices.
19. It is important to remember that “adequate account” means “an account that can
be submitted to the critical demands of reason without remainder.”
20. Kant uses the term synthesis to mean what, following Jean-Luc Marion (“The Saturated Phenomenon,” in Dominique Janicaud and others, Phenomenology and the “Theological Turn”: The French Debate [New York: Fordham University Press, 2000], 199), I am
calling a “successive synthesis”: “But if this manifold [of space and time] is to be known,
the spontaneity of our thought requires that it be gone through in a certain way, taken
up, and connected. This act I name synthesis,” Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason,
trans. Norman K. Smith (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1929), A77.
21. Marion, “The Event, the Phenomenon, and the Revealed,” in Faulconer, Transcendence in Philosophy and Religion, 87–105. For an overview of Marion’s thinking, see the
earlier discussion in chapter 4 in this volume.
22. In the first of these, Marion argues that there are phenomena, which he refers to
as “saturated,” for which there can be no successive synthesis. In the second, he argues,
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practice. If so, then practice is excessive of conceptual understanding
because no successive synthesis is possible, though such a synthesis is
requisite for conceptual understanding.23 Religious knowledge and understanding are possible, but to the degree that religious knowledge is
the knowledge inherent in practices, it need not be able to give a conceptual account of itself. It need be neither conceptual nor propositional.
Marion’s argument excludes the possibility of an adequate, rational
account of practice in general, though it leaves open the possibility of
provisional accounts that are not harbingers of some as-yet-to-come ade
quate account.
However, rational theologies are not just unneeded, they are dangerous. I have no quarrel with someone who seeks a rational understanding of his or her Mormon faith—if that seeking doesn’t involve
the false assumption that such an understanding is necessary to genuine, meaningful participation in Latter-day Saint religion. Nevertheless, I wonder about those, like myself, who have the need for such
seeking. My wonder is Nietzschean: “What motivates that search?”
My suspicion is that we implicitly make the professor’s assumption
that understanding requires reasoning, concepts, and propositions.
The atheological character of Latter-day Saint religion questions that
implicit assumption, putting revelation, ordinance, scripture, history,
and practice at the heart of religious understanding rather than reason and conception. That is not to say that rational understanding has
no place in religion. Humans are rational beings, so religion must also
address their rationality. But rationality, particularly in its narrow
sense, is not the be-all and end-all of human being.
Several twentieth-century and contemporary thinkers have explicitly questioned the assumption that all understanding requires
concepts.24 The contemporary French philosopher and historian,
among other things, that events are saturated phenomena. It requires almost nothing to
expand that argument so that it applies also to practices.
23. See Marion, “Saturated Phenomenon,” 176–216.
24. See, for example, Michael Polanyi’s The Tact Dimension (Garden City, NY:
Doubleday, 1966) as well as Hubert Dreyfus, “Understanding,” in Being-in-the-World
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Rémi Brague, argues that the demand for rational explanation is a result of movements in the early stages of European history, movements
that take place within the novel Greek idea that one could conceive
the physical world as something in itself and present before human
beings for investigation: “It was there [in Greece] and there alone, that
that ‘distanced’ position would appear, that ‘Archimedean point’ from
which human beings, ‘conscious of being a subject (subjektbewußt),’
would be able to submit nature to objective research.”25 Though the
idea that the world is an object apart from us, lying before us for our
conceptual investigation, seems intuitively obvious to us, Brague argues that it was new, created by the Greeks, and that there are both
consequences to accepting that idea and alternatives to it.26 Seeing the
world as something in itself, something to be investigated as an object,
eventually leads to an understanding of wisdom as the exercise of a
power (that of critical investigation and theorizing) over an object.
The idea of an adequate model of the world by means of which one can
investigate and dominate that world symbolically is necessary to every rational, in other words, conceptual, description of the world. The
idea of a world-model is at the heart of all science in the widest sense
of that term—as it ought to be. This means, however, that, regardless
of the motives and intentions of individual theologians, by presuming that there is, in principle, an adequate rational—in other words
scientific—understanding of God and his relation to the world and
human beings, we presume also that he can be understood as part of
Commentary on Heidegger’s ‘Being and Time,’ Division I (Cambridge: MIT, 2001),
184–214.
25. The Wisdom of the World: The Human Experience of the Universe in Western
Thought, trans. Tersa L. Fagan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 14. Translation modified.
26. The assumption that there is some final and adequate divine rational theology toward which human rational theologies strive is a consequence of assuming that God has
the relation of a subject to a world that lies outside and apart from him. The assumption
is that the world is known by God objectively—as an object—rather than as something in
which he participates. (See note 10.)
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a world-model or he cannot be understood at all.27 The problem is not
science. It is the assumption that all true understanding is ultimately
scientific understanding.
Brague argues that intellectual, conceptual description of the
world-model turns out to be, in principle, inseparable from intellectual domination, and I think his argument is cogent, though there
is not room here to reproduce it. But if he is right, then when the rational theologian gives an account of that model, he or she implicitly
presumes that the theologian can intellectually dominate the religion
of which he or she speaks. If to be religious means to be mastered by
something, to be awed by it, then neither religion nor that to which
religion is a response can be something over which one has mastery.
The conflict between religion and rational theology is the conflict between the willingness to submit and the desire to master. Sometimes
that will to mastery shows itself in attempts to master others, as in a
man who thinks that his priesthood has given him some power over
his wife and children. Sometimes, however, it shows itself in subtler
ways, as when a person insists on his own autonomy, cloaking the will
to mastery in the guise of intellectual maturity.
In scripture and prophetic teaching, the question is not “What
can I know?” and, so, “What can I master?” but “How should I be?”
and “What should master me?” In them, knowledge means being related to others and the world, in experience and acquaintance, in the
right way. But, since we believe that our relation to God defines what it
means to be related to others and to the world in the right way, it follows that knowledge is ultimately a religious matter, a matter of one’s
relation with God. For the inheritors of the Hebrew tradition, knowledge is inseparable from experience and practice. To have those experiences and to engage in those practices is to know God, and to speak
of that experience and to practice is to testify of one’s relation to God.
27. One need not assume the classical understanding that God is outside of what-is
in order to doubt that he can be understood as part of a world-model. It is enough that he
is a person to make that assumption dubious. Christianity, Judaism, and Islam all claim
that he is a person.
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It is not to give a list of beliefs.28 The danger of theology, any theology,
is the temptation to valorize the intellect and its understanding, and
to allow mere belief to displace Christian practice and testimony.
Thus I think that we can understand the Latter-day Saint avoidance of theology as an insistence on practice, an effort to avoid the
temptation of the intellect in its relation to God.
I offer this syllogism to summarize my second argument:
1. Religion is essentially a matter of practice rather than belief; for
Latter-day Saints, among the essential practices are ordinances.
2. Theology cannot capture the practices of religion (because practices per se cannot be captured philosophically and rationally;
something about them is always missed).
3. So, theology is either irrelevant, sometimes comforting, or useful
in apologetics, but by focusing on belief rather than practice, it
poses a danger to religion.
Scripture
My third explanation of the atheological character of Latter-day
Saint religion is related to my second. As I understand scriptural texts
and therefore also revelation, they are not rational, conceptual texts and
cannot be turned into that without changing them drastically.29 If we
read the scriptures looking for a rational justification of something, including the teachings of scripture, then we read them at cross-purposes
to their intentions. We can read them for conceptual understanding, in
28. Ricoeur reminds us that testimony is “an assurance always bound to acts” rather
than beliefs. Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, and Imagination, ed. Mark I. Wallace, trans. David Pellauer (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995), 117.
29. Ricoeur has discussions of the issue in several places; for example, it appears in
general terms in Time and Narrative, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer,
3 vols. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1984, 1985, 1988); and it is more clearly religious in his essays on the Bible, written with LaCocque (André LaCocque and Paul
Ricoeur, Thinking Biblically, trans. David Pellauer [Chicago: Chicago University Press,
1998]), and in his essay in Phenomenology and the “Theological” Turn. Alain Badiou has
argued that at least some scriptural texts, specifically Paul’s letters, are antiphilosophical
(and, so, antitheological) as well as antirhetorical. Alain Badiou, Saint Paul, La fondation
de l’universalism (Paris: PUF, 1997).
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other words, as quasi-philosophical texts, but when we do, we do not
read them as scripture.
I believe that the message of scripture can be summed up in
Deuteronomy 6:4–7: “Hear O Israel: The Lord our God is one Lord:
And thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all
thy soul, and with all thy might. And these words, which I command
thee this day, shall be in thine heart.” The scriptures, revelations, and
ordinances call us to hear, to hearken—not to understand, at least not
if the word understand is taken to mean “understand conceptually.”30
Of course, scripture does not preclude understanding. Neither do
scripture, ordinance, and revelation forbid our conceptual understanding. But, for the most part conceptual understanding is irrelevant to their purposes.31 Like the prophets, the scriptures call to us,
asking us to listen, bearing witness of who we are and who we ought to
be, bearing witness of our separation from God and his ability to overcome that separation. The scriptures seldom explain to us. Instead,
they testify and ask us also to testify with our lives. To be religious is
to hearken to that testimony and to respond.
The command to hearken implies that I have not yet heard, so
if I take that command seriously, then I must continue to wonder
whether I have heard as I should: at the heart of the religious experience of reading scripture is the experience of being questioned, of being brought up short by something rather than explaining it.32 Philosophical/theological questions like “Why does God allow evil?” can
be interesting and they have their place, both in apologetics and in
30. Notice that the first section of the Doctrine and Covenants, written in 1831 as a
preface to the book as a whole, begins with the word “hearken”: “Hearken, O ye people of
my church, saith the voice of him who dwells on high and whose eyes are upon all men;
yea, verily I say: Hearken ye people from afar; and ye that are upon the islands of the sea,
listen together.”
31. To point out something in scripture that we cannot make rational sense of may
only be to point out that it does not serve the same purposes as do texts meant to give
rational understanding.
32. Of course, scripture reading is not the only religious experience where we find
ourselves brought up short. It occurs in other ordinances, in the temple, in Sunday meetings, in living with each other.
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strengthening faith.33 Nevertheless, they also may interfere with understanding scripture as divine call, in this case the call to avoid doing
evil and to ameliorate its effects in the world. Philosophical and theological reflection seeks for intellectual understanding and, thus, they
run the risk of turning the scriptures into resources for conceptualizing. But the scriptures do not ask for our intellectual understanding;
they ask for our repentance.
As a result, I believe that, whatever the arguments for or against
theology, for many religious people, including the Latter-day Saints,
ultimately the only possible logos of the theos is that which occurs in
response to revelation and scripture. That logos is produced in welcome and response, in repentance and rebirth, and in testimonies of
that repentance and rebirth, rather than in sets of beliefs or intellectual distancing and questioning.
Thus, a final summarizing syllogism:
1. We encounter the essence of religious faith in scripture and prophetic revelation, but that essence is not a set of propositional beliefs, it is a testimony and a questioning that calls us to new life
through repentance.
2. Theology aims to understand propositional beliefs and their ordered relations.
3. Therefore, theology does not deal with what is essential to religious faith.
What Will Become of Me?
Given these points about prophets, practices, and scripture, what
will become of me? If I have successfully explained why Latter-day
Saint religion is essentially atheological, I have also raised questions
for people like myself who have an inclination toward theology. Given
the difficulties to which I have pointed, one can reasonably ask what
kinds of provisional accounts are possible.
33. For an excellent example of a religious and philosophical response to this question,
see Ricoeur, “Evil, A Challenge to Philosophy and Theology,” in Figuring the Sacred, 249–61.
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First note that reasons why the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints has neither a dogmatic theology nor an informal theology—and
is unlikely to—are not reasons for avoiding theology. That it is not necessary does not mean that it is something to be avoided. Nor does my
argument imply that Mormons ought never to do systematic theology.
Nevertheless, I believe my arguments suggest that some kinds of theology are more useful for Latter-day Saints than are others.
The parallel between religious knowledge and ethico-political
knowledge suggests that Aristotle provides a clue for one way to do
theology, one way that allows the door to remain open and more easily
avoids the danger of theology. Presumably there are also others.34 Aristotle distinguishes between the kinds of things we know epistemically and the kinds of things we know in ethics and politics and, at
least in the early part of Nicomachean Ethics, he argues that the latter
are not reducible to the former. Scripture treats religious matters as
Aristotle treats ethical matters, as things known in experience with
them and, so, as things that Aristotle argues are not knowable epistemically. In Marion’s terms, scripture deals with matters known in
an instantaneous synthesis, rather than as the objects of an epistemic
intention requiring a successive synthesis. So when philosophy makes
religion its object, it may find a model in the way that Aristotle deals
with ethics and politics, rather than in his metaphysics: phronēsis
rather than conceptual intellection would be our goal.
34. For example, “radical orthodoxy” may offer another alternative. See John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward, Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology
(London: Routledge, 1999). The work of Marion, to which I referred earlier, may also.
Both ask about transcendence, the latter by arguing that it makes itself known in phenomena, the former by arguing that it makes itself known in Platonic participation.
Though there is considerable overlap between these two views, they are not the same. Of
the two, I prefer Marion’s approach because it does not require creation ex nihilo (though
I am sure he accepts that orthodox Roman Catholic teaching), and I think his approach
is compatible with what I will describe.
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Several contemporary philosophers, such as Hans-Georg Gadamer
and Paul Ricoeur, follow up on Aristotle’s insight and provide possibilities for a theology on that model. These philosophers argue that
human understanding is fundamentally hermeneutic. It is fundamentally a matter of interpreting our place in the world in relation to others
and to our history. Rational, conceptual knowledge is an outgrowth
from and abstraction of hermeneutic understanding. But because it
is interpretive rather than rational, a hermeneutic theology would
necessarily be provisional, escaping one danger of rational theology.
Historical narrative shows the advantage of a hermeneutic
approach. Historical narratives are essential to Christianity because Christianity is revealed in those narratives. Without Jesus in
history—God incarnate in the world—Christianity itself evaporates.
Latter-day Saints recognize this by insisting not only on the historicity of the Bible, but also on the historicity of Joseph Smith’s first
vision and the historicity of the Book of Mormon. History shows us
the sense in which God’s plan inextricably requires working through
history, through the choosing, scattering, and gathering of his people.
This insistence on historicity goes against a common understanding of truth. We commonly assume that a narrative can be an important illustration of a truth, but not its essential revelation. That is
because truth is commonly assumed to have a universality that can
be illustrated by the particularity of a historical narrative but cannot be equal to that particularity. On this view, truth—as universal—
necessarily remains above, beyond, or other than, the particularity
of history. Thus, since theological truth, like its sister philosophical
truth, requires universality, it follows that theological truth is fundamentally incompatible with scriptural truth, with truth that reveals
itself in the particularity of history35—unless scriptural truth is reduced to allegory or illustration, ways that philosophers have often
35. It is important to note that by “history” I do not mean “historiography.” For an
explication of this difference and my understanding of how it applies to scripture, see
chapter 8 in this volume.
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dealt with scripture. Particularity is a scandal to conceptual thought,
but Judeo-Christian religion (at least) never gets away from the particular, whether the particularity of its narratives, the particularity of
its associations and habits, the particularity of its formal practices, or
the particularity of the incarnation of Jesus and his life at one moment
of time rather than another, in a physical, particular body.36 There is
a fundamental incompatibility between the particularity of religion
and the aim for universality that we find in any philosophical discipline like theology.37 The incompatibility is not insurmountable, but
it must be addressed.
Hermeneutics shows a way out of this problem: it does not require that we reduce the truth of religion to metaphor or example. If
it thinks hermeneutically, philosophy can think the particularity of
historical phenomena, like religion, religious experience, and scripture, and avoid the scandal of particularity by not being scandalized.
Hermeneutics is one of perhaps several ways that we could do provisional theology more adequately.
In the end, however, any theology worth its salt, whether hermeneutic or not, must remember that testimony is central to both religious speech and religious ritual. Both testify of that which exceeds
one’s conceptual grasp but is nevertheless known. Theology can use
the tools of philosophy to reflect on the claims and practices of religion, but if it is true to the object of its reflection, it will conduct its
reflection in a way that continues to testify. To the degree that a theology does not testify, it divorces itself from that which it purports to
explain, and I think that systematic theology is more likely to make
this divorce than are some of the alternatives.
36. Latter-day Saint belief puts particularity at the core of what-is by insisting that
even God is embodied: nothing breaks free from particularity, so the conceptual is always
an abstraction in the root sense of that term, “something that pulls away.”
37. As Nietzsche says: “A historical phenomenon, known clearly and completely and
resolved into a phenomenon of knowledge, is, for him who has perceived it, dead.” Untimely Meditations, ed. Daniel Breazeale, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997), 67. Christianity in general and Mormonism in particular are
living historical phenomena.
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To conclude by returning to the example of the Word of Wisdom: There is no rational account of the Word of Wisdom; no systematic theology will explain it adequately, neither its origin nor its
practice. I might offer a provisional, rational explanation of why and
how I observe that commandment, and my explanation could serve
an apologetic or heuristic purpose, but that is the most that it could
do. For example, I could say that, though the Word of Wisdom is not
an ordinance, it is a formal practice of Latter-day Saints, a sign and
reminder of my membership in the church. Since the scriptural text
that establishes the Word of Wisdom says nothing about caffeine nor
has the prophet made a declaration against caffeine, I can have a Coke
if I wish, though coffee is forbidden. But the prophet could declare caffeine forbidden tomorrow. Even if he does not, I have no grounds for
believing that my explanation of the commandment and my observation of it does any more than give me a way, for now, of understanding
my own practice, a practice whose primary function is to testify of my
being in the church, of my relation to God, to the church, and to fellow
Latter-day Saints.
If I wish to explain the Word of Wisdom theologically, no way of
doing theology is excluded, but some may be more useful than others.
In particular, historical, narrative, and other hermeneutical theologies stand out as possibilities. But whatever theology I take up, like
that which it seeks to explain, my theology must testify of Christ. The
testimony inhering in revelation, Latter-day Saint practices and ordinances, and scripture must be part of any explanations of those revelations, practices, or scriptures or it will be untrue to them.

chapter six

Rethinking Theology:
The Shadow of the Apocalypse
•

A

ccording to the Gospels, one of the most frequently repeated of
Jesus’s messages during his earthly ministry was “The kingdom
of God [or heaven] is at hand.”1 Indeed, early in his ministry Jesus
describes preaching the kingdom of God, the reign of God, as his very
message.2 He does not announce that the kingdom will come near, but
that it has already done so. As odd as it may sound to our ears, in the
New Testament to preach the gospel is to preach the present nearness
of the kingdom of God.
But the Lord does not only announce the nearness of his kingdom
in the New Testament. He also announces it, indeed insists on it, in
the Doctrine and Covenants, which opens with a call to all the world
to hear his voice and a warning of destruction for those who do not
(D&C 1:1, 4, 11–13). The second coming, the Apocalypse, begins with
the restoration and it is figured in the lives of all who hearken to its
call: “the Lord is nigh” (D&C 1:12; see also verses 35–36). To hear the
gospel preached is to experience the nearness, both temporally and
spatially, of the kingdom. It is to have an experience figured by the
Apocalypse, the revelation of God’s kingdom; the revelation of the
kingdom of God to a person is figured by, is a type of, the revelation of

1. See, for example, Mark 1:15 and Matthew 10:7. The verb translated “is nigh”
means, literally, “has come near”: γγίζω: to draw near in space or time. Walter Bauer,
Frederick William Danker, W. F. Arndt, and F. W. Gingrich. A Greek-English Dictionary
of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature, 3rd ed. (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 2000).
2. Luke 4:43: “I must preach the kingdom of God to other cities also: for therefore
am I sent.”
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his kingdom that will happen at the last day.3 Thus, the revelation of
the reign of God is not only something far away in time, something to
be awaited, but something here and now. It happens in our lives when
we become part of the kingdom of God. When that happens, the reign
of God—his rule over us—has begun, a fact we signify when we agree
to take his name on us (Moroni 4:3). In such an experience the Apocalypse does not so much refer to the end of the world, though it also
refers to that, as it refers to the moment when the nearness of the kingdom of God is revealed to the believer and the believer’s life is oriented
by that kingdom rather than by the world. To hear the gospel preached
is to experience a type or shadow of the Apocalypse, to “stand before
the judgment seat of Christ” (Romans 14:10), not as a criminal, but as
one freed. So the Apocalypse as the revelation of God’s kingdom is not
something to be feared, but to be hoped for, longed for.
The Book of Mormon uses the terms type and shadow as equivalents (Mosiah 13:10). We sometimes speak of figures and mean the
same thing. Types, shadows, and figures are the things in the world
by means of which we see the things of God. The various meanings
of type (including a small block with a raised, reversed letter on it for
printing; a kind; an exemplar, and a symbol) result from the fact that
they share the same etymological origin: in Greek a typos is the mark
of a blow or a stamp, an imprint.4 If we see the world through religious
eyes, we see the imprint of God’s work in everything, as Paul sees
Christ in Adam (Romans 5:14). And some things particularly bear
that imprint. When I see my relation to my children as something
to be shaped by the relation I have to my Father in Heaven, I see my
fatherly work as a type of the work of the Father, as if what I do is a
shadow cast by his work, as something figured or formed by him and
what he does. So, when I understand what it means to be a father, I
have a better understanding of who the Father is and what he does.
3. I rely here on the fact that the Greek word ποκαλύπτω, the root of apocalypse,
means “to uncover, to disclose, or to reveal.” Bauer and others, A Greek-English Dictionary, s.v. ποκαλύπτω.
4. Bauer and others, A Greek-English Dictionary, s.v. τύπος.
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I see him through the things in the world because those things are
“stamped,” or figured by him. I know of no Book of Mormon term
for what shows itself in the type or shadow, but the technical term
is antitype, though I prefer the less common noun, prefigure.5 When
Christ’s second coming, the prefigure, is fully revealed, the old world
will end, the new reign of God will begin, and no one will be able
to resist (Mosiah 27:31). The individual’s encounter with the risen
Lord is a figure of that second coming, for in each event the old world
ends and a new world begins. Like Christ himself, whose beauty is
not apparent, so that people do not see his desirability (Isaiah 53:2),
the prefigure of his second coming remains invisible to most because
they cannot see its figuration in the world. It remains invisible to all
who have not encountered the Lord, whose experience of the world is
not a figure, type, or shadow of his coming. Without the orientation
to time and the world that is provided by entry into the kingdom one
cannot see the things of the kingdom. Thus, seeing and hearing the
announcement of Christ’s coming and the nearness of his kingdom
does not require that we acknowledge this, that, or another fact, but
that we experience the world as God’s kingdom. The experience of the
nearness of the Apocalypse does not produce an answer to a question,
but a response to a call. Of course, to have that experience will result
in facts that one acknowledges, but the orientation and the experience
which it engenders is fundamental rather than the facts.
Having read to his people from Isaiah’s prophecy of Israel’s eventual redemption, Jacob says:
O then, my beloved brethren, come unto the Lord, the
Holy One. . . . And whoso knocketh, to him will he open;
and the wise, and the learned, and they that are rich, who are
5. In Greek, antitypos means “that which corresponds to something else” (Bauer and
others, A Greek-English Dictionary, s.v. ντίτυπος). The type is the shape impressed in
the soft wax. The antitype is that which has struck the wax, forming the impression. Cf.
1 Peter 3:21: “which [referring to the salvation of Noah’s family in the ark] was a prefigure
[antitypos] of baptism.”
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puffed up because of their learning, and their wisdom, and
their riches—yea, they are they whom he despiseth; and save
they shall cast these things away, and consider themselves
fools before God, and come down in the depths of humility,
he will not open unto them. But the things of the wise and the
prudent shall be hid from them forever—yea, that happiness
which is prepared for the saints. (2 Nephi 9:41–43)
Those who trust what their riches, learning, or worldly wisdom
allow them to see will not be able to see the happiness prepared for
the Saints. The results of the gospel are hidden from, invisible to, the
merely learned; without the figured, typological experience of conversion we cannot see the truth of the gospel. Jacob’s insight has been,
I believe, shared by other thinkers. It is, for example, a variation of
Augustine’s admonition, “Believe that you may understand,”6 which
became Anselm’s motto, “faith seeking understanding.”7 These thinkers agree that the understanding that the Christian seeks can only be
achieved if he or she first has faith; without faith understanding will
be blind.
As I understand the implications of Jacob’s teaching for theology, they include that as long as theology remains merely a matter of
learning we can see neither the gospel nor its teaching. The doctrine
that the Messiah has come into the world and died so that all might
come to him—meaning that we repent, are baptized, receive the Holy
Ghost, and endure to the end (3 Nephi 27:13–16)—remains invisible
6. Tractates on the Gospel of John 29.6. Augustine was an adult convert to Christianity and lived in the fourth and fifth centuries ad. He became bishop of Hippo (in
North Africa), and was highly influential in using philosophical ideas, particularly those
of Plato, to understand Christianity. His most famous work is Confessions, perhaps the
first autobiography, though he did not think of it as one.
7. As Anselm explains in the preface to Proslogion, that motto was the original title
of his Monologion. Anselm was an eleventh-century Catholic theologian and thinker
who was made archbishop of Canterbury in 1093, though he spent a good deal of his time
as archbishop in exile because of church-king conflicts that foreshadowed those to come
during the reign of Henry VIII.
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if the gospel is merely a matter of learning.8 However, as long as the
Good News and God’s kingdom are invisible in a Christian theology,
it cannot really be talk about God. What we say may concern itself
with his effects in this world or with our ideas and understanding of
him. It may be about our doctrines, our understanding of his revelation: such a theology may say a good deal about those who espouse it.
Theology may be about many things, but it is not about him if it does
not reveal him, and it does not reveal him if it does not announce the
nearness of his kingdom. In light of what Jacob tells us, theology must
go beyond mere learning to allow the things of God to be opened or
revealed to us. Our theology must be a figure of the Apocalypse, a
theology that reveals God himself, even if only as a figure, rather than
revealing only our understanding of him.
Chapter 4 addressed the question of how Latter-day Saint theology is possible. There I argued that the absence of official rational
explanations or descriptions of beliefs and practices, and the presence of differing and inconsistent explanations for and descriptions
of belief within the membership of the church, suggests that we have
little if any official systematic, rational, or dogmatic theology. (I use
those three terms, systematic theology, rational theology, and dogmatic theology, as synonyms.9) We are “a-theological”—which means
that we are without a church-sanctioned, church-approved, or even
8. In scripture the doctrine is the preaching of the gospel described by Christ in
3 Nephi. The word doctrines, in the plural, is used exclusively to refer to false teachings.
Louis Midgley, review of Doctrinal Commentary on the Book of Mormon: Volume I, First
and Second Nephi; Volume II, Jacob through Mosiah, by Joseph Fielding McConkie and
Robert L. Millet, Review of Books on the Book of Mormon 1/1 (1989): 92–113, especially
p. 100. It seems that scripture generally understands doctrine to be the preaching of the
gospel rather than a collection of beliefs.
9. As used in theology, dogmatic means “pertaining to doctrines/teachings,” not
“asserting . . . opinions in an authoritative, imperious, or arrogant manner.” (Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “dogmatic.”) Though dogmatic and systematic theologies are not the
same, the difference between them, namely the sanction of a church for the first but not
the second, is irrelevant here, so I ignore it.
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church-encouraged systematic theology—and that is as it should be
because systematic theology is dangerous.10
I made my argument using three sub-arguments:
(1) Continuing revelation is primary to Mormonism. Since
Latter-day Saints insist on continuing revelation, they cannot
have a dogmatic theology that is any more than provisional and
heuristic, for a theology claiming to be more than that could
always be trumped by new revelation. Dogmatic theology,
however, tempts us to think we have found something more
since, as a rational system, it gives the appearance of being
complete.
(2) Practice or response is more important than belief,
particularly explicated belief. By focusing on belief rather than
on practice, dogmatic theology poses a danger to true religion
(see James 1:27), threatening to invert the relative importance
of thought or belief, on the one hand, and practice, the acts of
life in covenant relation, on the other, as it eventually did in
the early church.11
(3) Scripture is more important than rational explanation. In
addition to continuing revelation, the locus of explanation
for Latter-day Saint belief is scripture. However, unlike
rational/dogmatic theology as it is usually construed, but like
prophetic revelation, scripture is testimony that questions us,
thereby calling us to new life in Christ rather than to a set of
rationally-ordered belief propositions to which we are asked
to assent. In other words, dogmatic theology does not deal
directly with the substance of religious faith: life in Christ
rather than beliefs about Christ.
10. See chapter 5 in this volume.
11. In “Ritual as Theology and as Communication” (Dialogue 33/2 [2000]: 117–28),
John L. Sorenson makes a case that for Latter-day Saints the ritual—a practice—is our
most common theology. Needless to say, I find Sorenson’s paper persuasive.
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If my arguments are right, then systematic theology is dangerous,
and it is not surprising that we find little official sanction for it in the
church.
Of course, for Latter-day Saints, talk about God that reveals
God—the best sense of the word theology—is, first of all, the revelations given through the prophets. We dare to say that God continues
to reveal himself authoritatively to human beings through another
human being. Unless one insists that all theology be systematically
rational, and I know of no one who does, it makes sense to call prophetic revelation theology. Indeed, revelation is the Latter-day Saint
theology. However, I believe that those Saints who have done theology
in the nonrevelatory sense have, for the most part, done it systematically and rationally.12 In the nineteenth and early twentieth century
Orson Pratt and John A. Widtsoe come to mind, both in works that
few today would find philosophically or scientifically acceptable.13
Some, such as BYU’s David Paulsen and the independent scholar
Blake Ostler, do it today with interesting and well-respected results.
These kinds of thinkers see no difficulty in holding to two propositions, “Theology is the continuously revealed word of God” and
“Theology is rational, dogmatic, or systematic theology.” I do not
know what either Paulsen or Ostler believes regarding the second
of these claims,14 though I assume that they accept the first as one
meaning for the word theology. Regardless of their positions, however,
based on more than thirty-five years of talking with other Latter-day
Saints about theological questions, I believe that most of us who do
theology or some informal version of it assume that God’s knowledge is a systematic whole, and that he reveals parts of that whole
12. I ignore the fact that I think church history has been, for many Latter-day Saints,
the place where our theology has been expressed. (See chapter 3 in this volume.) I do so
because few, if any, church historians or other Saints have seen history as at the same time
theological.
13. Some of Pratt’s work is particularly flawed, but to my mind both Widtsoe and
Pratt accept Newtonian science as if it were unquestionable, making each untenable.
14. Either of them, for example, could believe that systematic theology is merely one
of several kinds of theology rather than either the fundamental or the only kind.
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over time, gradually revealing more and more if it. If so, then those
who think that way assume that, using the part of the whole that has
been revealed so far, they can tentatively speculate as to the systematic
whole that stands behind the part. However, as reasonable as that may
seem, I think it is mistaken.
For one thing, to claim that our speculations are concerned with
an eternal, rational system of truths that God reveals to us over time
assumes that knowledge is fundamentally and essentially systematic
and rational. In other words, it assumes that all knowledge is either
self-evident,15 incorrigible,16 or a result of direct sense perception—or
it can be rationally and systematically derived from those three kinds
of knowledge. But much of twentieth-century philosophy, with work
ranging from that of Martin Heidegger, to American pragmatism,
to Alvin Plantinga, Nicholas Wolterstorff, and others in the analytic
tradition of philosophy, has made that assumption about the character of knowledge dubious, each in different ways. It is questionable
whether it makes sense to believe that there is an eternally existing set
of systematically related fundamental truths expressed at least in part
in our accurate understanding of things. Indeed, I believe that most
who have dealt with the question carefully have concluded that the
notion is rationally incoherent. But it does not follow from that rejection of an eternal, static realm of truth that is metaphysically prior to
or beyond this world that there is neither truth, nor that there is no
eternal truth. Indeed, the revealed truth that God is embodied and,
so, within the cosmos in some way rather than metaphysically apart
from it, suggests that the realm of truth is not metaphysically prior to
the cosmos within which human beings find themselves. Instead the
truth is part of the cosmos, perhaps as its happening. We can reject
the Enlightenment formulation of truth (a formulation that continues
to use the traditional God as its model even if it sometimes rejects
15. For example, axioms.
16. For example, my genuinely held beliefs about what I am currently, explicitly
thinking.
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his existence) without rejecting truth itself. However, the assumptions
of modern rationalism and the Enlightenment have become so much
part of our common sense that we may sometimes have to struggle to
rethink them.
Thus, some forms of systematic theology that we find among
Latter-day Saints are philosophically problematic and, whether a particular kind of systematic theology is entangled in those problems or
not, it is dangerous. But the possible problems of systematic theology mean neither that systematic theology per se is impossible nor
that those who do it sin. We need apocalyptic theology, to be sure—at
least as continuing revelation—but apocalyptic theology is not a kind
like “dogmatic theology” or “liturgical theology.” A kind is a group
of related objects, and apocalyptic theology is not in the same group
as dogmatic, liturgical, or other ways of doing theology, for it is not a
method for doing theology. Dogmatic and other kinds of theology are
defined by their objects and methods. They differ by having differing
objects and methods, but they are alike in that they are defined by
their objects and methods. In contrast, apocalyptic theology is defined
by what it does rather than by objects and methods; it is defined by its
revelation of the nearness of the kingdom of God.
So I would supplement my previous argument: though rational,
dogmatic theology may be dangerous, it too can be apocalyptic.
Indeed, systematic theology has an important place in apologetics as
well as in critical theology, for it explains our beliefs to others and
helps us understand the limits of our claims about God. I doubt that
we could argue against a systematic theology, such as Orson Pratt’s,
without doing systematic theology in response, and I think that Pratt’s
theology is ultimately philosophically incoherent. Making that claim
requires doing at least a minimal level of systematic theology. Perhaps,
as I believe, other kinds of theology are less likely to fail to be apocalyptic, but no theology is, in itself, incompatible with apocalyptic theology, and no theology can, in itself, avoid the dangers of theology.
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How, then, does a theology avoid the heresy17 of being nonapocalyptic, of making the gospel something I choose rather than something God gives? Theologizing by those who are not prophets may put
the kingdom at a distance by making talk about the gospel merely talk
about our own learning, but how does theologizing by nonprophets
avoid doing that and, at the same time, take seriously the proximity of
the kingdom, inviting us to enter it?18
With Jacob as our guide, as a first step toward understanding
what apocalyptic theology is, we could say that it opens a moment of
understanding and conversion, a moment on the way toward membership in the kingdom of God. Thus, we could recast the discussion
in these terms: Philosophy thinks being-in-the-world.19 Theology
thinks being-in-the-world directed toward God. If we recast the discussion further, using the terms of apocalyptic theology we can say
that philosophy thinks being-in-the-world while apocalyptic theology
thinks being-in-the-world as a figure of the Apocalypse. The danger is
that the addendum, directed toward God, will cease to be the compass
of our thinking. When it does, our being-in-the-world is no longer a
type and shadow of the Apocalypse. The nearness of God’s reign no
longer defines as a whole the movement of our life with others and
among things.
17. I depend here on the meaning of the Greek root, hairetikos, “to grasp,” “to take for
oneself,” “to choose.” Bauer and others, A Greek-English Dictionary, s.v. αρετικός. That
which is truly heretical is that which we make for ourselves, taking the things of God as
if they were our property, to do with as we please.
18. I am, of course, using the word prophet here in its narrow sense, namely to refer
to those called and set apart as prophets. In its wider sense, “someone who genuinely
speaks the word of God,” the term prophetic theology would mean the same as apocalyptic
theology.
19. This phrase comes from the work of the twentieth-century German philosopher
Martin Heidegger. He argued that our fundamental encounter with the world is not one
of a consciousness faced with something outside of or opposed to it. Rather, we are beings
who find ourselves already in a world of things and others, with projects to accomplish.
Reason, abstraction, explicit consciousness—these arise as part of and in response to our
initial situation in the world. “Being-in-the-world” describes that initial situation. (For
more on Heidegger, see chapter 2, note 62 in this volume.)
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Of course, theology occurs in the world. However we theologize,
whether with dogmatic theology or some other kind (hermeneutic,
feminist, liberation, liturgical . . .), the challenge is to do it without
succumbing to the unavoidable risk that theology turns in on itself,
becoming a merely academic, only mental exercise that claims to refer
to God but in which he does not make himself known and within
which he does not call us to his kingdom because it is an exercise
referring to our own ideas. But the alternative to that mistake is not
a thinking that is outside of or beyond the world in some way, the
thought of that which is absolutely other than this world—and given
the Latter-day Saint belief in God’s immanence in existence, his
indwelling in existence, we ought not even to desire such supposed
purity of thought. The challenge is not to think another world or to
think other than the world. It is not to create a Platonic metaphysics.
The challenge is to think our being-in-the-world differently, to think
it as directed toward God by his self-revelation in the world. In other
words, apocalyptic theology aims to remake the world of its hearers
and readers by allowing the kingdom to be revealed.20 An apocalyptic
theology is one in which the theologian can see the “happiness which
is prepared for the saints” in this world (2 Nephi 9:43).
The contemporary French philosopher-theologian Jean-Luc Marion makes a distinction that we can use to think further about the difference between apocalyptic and nonapocalyptic theology because it
mirrors the distinctions of scripture. Marion writes of the “idol” and
the “icon.”21 Begin with an icon: an icon reveals something other than
itself, something divine. Apocalyptic theology as I am describing it is
iconic. It reveals the nearness of the kingdom, its coming, something
I can anticipate but which is not present. In contrast, with an idol I
claim to produce something that re-presents, that makes manifest, the
Divine. The idol creates the appearing of the god rather than merely
20. “Allowing” is essential. We cannot force or guarantee that the revelation will
occur. We can only strive to make it possible.
21. See, in particular, Jean-Luc Marion, The Idol and Distance: Five Studies (New
York: Fordham University Press, 2001).
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creating a locus in which that appearing may happen. In creating an
idol I have the audacity to claim to make the Divine appear, even if
only in an image, a representation.22 If theology means only “our talk
about God,” then it is idolatrous, for in it I use my powers of language
to create an image or representation of God, violating the second of
the Ten Commandments (Exodus 20:4–5; Deuteronomy 5:8–9). I walk
in my own way and after the image of my own god, “whose image is
in the likeness of the world, and whose substance is that of an idol”
(D&C 1:16). I reveal myself—my ideas, my world, my perspective on
God—in what I say; I do “autology” rather than theology. By contrast,
in an icon the Divine reveals itself through something made by human
beings (cf. D&C 1:17). As Christian theologians know (and not only
Latter-day Saint Christian theologians), absent revelation theology is
idolatry. In my terms, unless a theology is apocalyptic, it is idolatrous.
Marion’s terminology helps us see more clearly something about
theology that we have already glimpsed—namely, that the difference
between the two ways of doing theology is not methodological. The
difference between them is how they exist in our world, not what
properties they have. Just as is true for any religious object, any theology can be idolatrous, and any theology can be iconic. There is
probably no theology that is, in itself, apocalyptic; there is probably
no theology that is completely blind to “the things of the wise and the
prudent” (2 Nephi 9:43). However, if the essential difference between
idolatrous and apocalyptic theology is neither their objects nor their
methods, then how can we describe the latter? If the difference
between the two is primarily their existential how, what can we say
of that how? What happens in a theology in which God reveals himself, an apocalyptic theology, that does not happen in one in which
we merely examine our ideas of God, in an idolatrous theology? In
22. See Clifford Ando, “Idols and Their Critics,” in How Should We Talk About Religion: Perspectives, Contexts, Particularities, ed. James Boyd White (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), 33–54. Ando does an excellent job of explaining how
pagans could understand the physical idol not only to represent their gods, but actually
to be their gods.
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apocalyptic theology, whatever we do, what is most important is not
what we do or what we say, but what happens to us and our audiences. The passivity of experience is more important than the activity
of reason and will (which does not make reason, will, or content
unimportant). What happens, what we experience, is the coming of
the kingdom. We find ourselves in the kingdom of God—at least at
its periphery—rather than in the dark and dreary world. The practice of psychoanalytic psychiatry, whatever one thinks of the merits
of that practice, provides a good analogy to apocalyptic theology.23
The traditional psychoanalytic therapist encourages the patient to
talk, asking questions to encourage more talk and to give direction
to the patient’s talk. Whatever cure finally comes is the result of the
patient talking in response to the psychiatrist’s questions. Trying to
deal with the therapist’s questions and aporias (puzzling difficulties),
and trying to say something coherent in response, the patient comes
to see the world newly. It is not that the questions led directly to the
patient’s insight. It is not that the content of the patient’s responses
was the cure. Rather, trying to formulate coherent responses to the
questions and aporias brought the patient to the point of seeing things
differently. A new world was revealed to the patient—in the patient
if the therapy is successful—as he went through the therapy of being
questioned. Using terminology I used earlier, we could say that the
patient has been reoriented in the world.
We can think of doing apocalyptic theology as something like
that. An apocalyptic theologian puts himself or herself in the position
of the psychoanalytic patient.24 An apocalyptic theology, therefore,
confronts us with questions and aporias, whether it does so explicitly
or not. The questions may arise in us without being explicitly proposed
23. I am indebted to an online discussion with Joe Spencer, and others, particularly
Adam Miller, for this analogy.
24. It is probably no coincidence that the word therapist comes from a Greek word
that means, not “healer,” but “servant” or “companion in arms.” In Homer the therapon
is the person who fights with one against a common enemy. Henry George Liddell and
Robert Scott, comps., A Greek-English Lexicon (1843; repr., Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), s.v.
θεράπων.
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by the theologian. They may come from the philosophical tradition as
things for us to ponder. They may happen as we read scripture and
find ourselves accused, as did David, “Thou art the man” (2 Samuel
12:7). Of course the questions have content, as do our answers. Without a particular content, the questions are meaningless. But the questions and answers are not the point. The point is what happens to us
in dealing with those aporias: trying to respond to them coherently,
we find ourselves reinterpreted, resituated in the world. We find ourselves in a world revealed by the Spirit and directed toward a God who
makes himself known. In the aporias I experience the second coming,
the nearness of the kingdom. I hear a call that obliges me to respond,
and I respond with acceptance.
I recognize that many will find this way of thinking about theology difficult. I suspect that the difficulty is rooted in our tendency
to think of religion as a set of beliefs, a tendency inherited from the
Christian tradition. On this view, religion is a set of beliefs and theology examines that set of beliefs in some way. Those who understand
theology in that way do not understand talk of apocalyptic theology
because they cannot see more than one basic kind of theology, and in
the kind they see religion is defined by belief. Of course religion as we
understand it entails beliefs. It is problematic to say, “I am a Mormon,
but I do not believe what Mormons believe.” Beliefs certainly matter.
Nevertheless, believing what Mormons believe is not enough to make
one a Mormon, so examining beliefs is not enough to understand
Mormonism. We can imagine someone who believes everything that
most Mormons believe but is, in spite of that, not a member of the
church. Why? Because that person has not yet been baptized. Even in
religions that do not—as do we Latter-day Saints—insist on the necessity of ordinances, religion cannot be reduced merely to belief.25 Especially in a religion for which priesthood is essential and ordinances are
required, beliefs are not sufficient to define religion.
25. See chapter 8, especially p. 192, n. 76 in this volume.
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The Lord commands ancient Israel, “Ye shall be holy [“set apart,”
“consecrated”]: for I the Lord your God am holy” (Leviticus 19:2).
Similarly, during his ministry in Israel, he commands, “Be ye therefore perfect [or “whole”], even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect” (Matthew 5:48), and he repeats that command when he comes
to the Nephites (3 Nephi 12:48). To be in Israel, ancient or modern, is
not only to hold a set of beliefs, but to make and keep covenants with
God. It is to enter into a formal relation with him in which we imitate
him. For Latter-day Saints, covenant rather than belief is the heart
of religion. It is probably true that no covenants fail to entail beliefs,
but the important point is that religious beliefs do not matter if they
are not intimately bound up with covenants. Apocalyptic theology
evinces that intimate connection to covenant. It is not enough to say
what we think about God. It is not enough even to say what we know.
If a theology is apocalyptic, it must go beyond learning to the gospel,
to the revelation of Christ. It must be not only about beliefs; it must
also be testimony. For Latter-day Saints, apocalyptic theology must go
beyond learning and even testimony to being part of covenant life, for
we cannot reveal God by re-presenting him in an idol of some sort, but
he reveals himself in our covenant life.
That we cannot reveal God, make an image of him, represent him
conceptually, takes us back to a point in Jacob’s sermon: theology is
not only a matter of going beyond learning through testimony and
covenant, though it is that. It is also a matter of remaining a fool before
God in knowledge. The fool is not empty-headed merely because there
is some fact he does not yet know.26 To be a fool is to be silly in the old
sense of that word;27 it is to be weak, to be deficient in judgment and
sense. It is to be nothing (and King Benjamin reminds us that salvation requires that we recognize our nothingness; Mosiah 4:5, 8–9, 11).
26. Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “fool,” from the Latin follem, “bellows”—so “one
full of air,” “an empty-headed person.”
27. Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “silly.” The older meaning was “deserving compassion, defenseless,” “weak,” or “rustic.”
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Of course the silliness, deficiency, and nothingness of the foolishness recommended by Jacob are before God rather than human
beings. Foolishness and humility before God do not require that we
say and know nothing in our relations with others. Being dumbstruck
before God is one kind of deficiency, but so are many kinds of speech.
Neither does foolishness before God require that we have no confidence in what we say. Indeed, divine foolishness may be the ground of
our confidence before other human beings.28 Nevertheless, the necessity of foolishness and humility before God means that if our theology is to be apocalyptic, it must demonstrate its foolishness before
God in some way. One person may do so by an explicit, sincere statement acknowledging the not only tentative but foolish character of
her speculation. Another person may do it in a style that reveals his
humility.29 Surely there are also other ways. In addition, I think that
some theological methods are more conducive to demonstrating godly
foolishness, including hermeneutic and narrative theologies, because
they make questioning and being questioned rather than claiming the
center of their methods.
Sometimes nothing is so helpful as an example, and in philosophy
sometimes nothing is so rare. Let me try, therefore, to give an example
of theological thinking that I hope will show one way that theology
can be apocalyptic, showing our foolishness as thinkers before God as
well as the nearness of his kingdom. My example will be the problem
of theodicy, and my thinking about that problem will rely heavily on
the work of the twentieth-century French thinker Paul Ricoeur.30
28. D&C 121:45 suggests as much.
29. I take this to be characteristic of David Paulsen’s work: students love his classes,
not as much because of what he teaches as because of what he is when he teaches. In my
day, David Yarn was a popular philosophy teacher for the same reason.
30. See, for example, Paul Ricoeur, Le mal (Geneva: Labor et Fides, 1996). To a lesser
degree, I also depend on the work of Philippe Nemo, Job and The Excess of Evil (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1998). Ricoeur (1913–2005) taught not only in France,
but also at the University of Chicago for fifteen years (1970–1985). He was one of the most
important French thinkers of the twentieth century.
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As classically formulated, the problem of theodicy is the seeming impossibility of believing four propositions at the same time, four
propositions that most religious people believe:
1.
2.
3.
4.

God is all-loving.
God is all-powerful.
God is all-knowing.
Evil exists.

The argument is that if God is all-loving, all-powerful, and allknowing, then the existence of evil is inexplicable, for such a God
could create a world without evil—he has the power and the knowledge to do so—and he would create it, for his love would require that
he do so. According to the argument, therefore, the existence of God
is incompatible with the existence of evil. For many, the suppressed
conclusion is that it is irrational to believe in God if one recognizes the
existence of evil, as most people do.
Notice, first of all, that neither the prophets nor scripture has
given us these propositions as they are understood philosophically.
These are philosophical interpretations of scriptural and prophetic
statements, and we must not assume without question that the translation of prophetic discourse into philosophical discourse is innocent,
retaining the meaning of the former in the latter without changing it
or introducing something not in scripture. Every translation of one
language into another risks changing the meaning of the original, so
we must be wary of changes that this translation might have made,
changes which we do not notice.
Theologians have responded to the problem of theodicy in a variety
of ways. For example, some have denied the reality of evil.31 Others
have argued that the problem is set up so that it demands that God
31. David Ray Griffin argues that all theologians prior to the twentieth century disputed the existence of evil: God, Power, and Evil (Philadelphia: Westminster, 2004). I
suspect that if he is right, they did so as a consequence of assuming creation ex nihilo. If
God created the world from absolutely nothing, then one can argue that either evil is not
real or he created it. Latter-day Saints avoid that dilemma by not believing that the world
was created ex nihilo.
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do what is logically contradictory. That means that the problem itself
is faulty. For example, one might argue that, by definition, embodied
beings are necessarily passive as well as active, for they can be acted
on: to be embodied is to be able to be affected. In technical terms, it is
to be pathetic in the root sense of that word: to have things happen to
one.32 But to be pathetic is to suffer in the broad sense of the word: “to
be affected.”33 If an argument from the nature of embodiment were
successful, it would show that it is logically contradictory to create a
world without creating suffering. Perhaps one could argue that if there
is suffering in the broad sense, then it is impossible to avoid evil, suffering in the narrow sense, as well. If so, then it seems that the three
characteristics describing God could continue to be held without contradicting the claim that evil exists. That is because the contradiction
between God’s character and the existence of evil is derived only if
one supposes that God logically could create embodied beings that are
not affected, and that supposition may involve contradiction.
Another tack is to take up the problem of theodicy in terms of the
quantity of suffering: “Why didn’t God create the world with less suffering in it than he did?” Most answers to this question accord with
Leibniz’s answer in some way: this is the best of all possible worlds; if
there were more or less evil in the world, the world would be defective. The problem is that, by asserting that the way we find the world
is, inexplicably, the way things must be, Leibniz’s answer runs the risk
of denying the evil of evil. If I say that the evil of the world is a necessity, then I no longer call it evil. At best, perhaps I express my lack
of understanding; at worst, I acquiesce to or become complicit in its
presence, implicitly assuming it to be a good in that it is necessary. The
only answer of this sort that does not go in the direction of denying
evil is one that goes in the direction of faith: though we cannot explain
the degree of suffering we see in the world, we have to trust God as
32. The Greek word pathos from which our word “pathetic” is derived means “that
which happens to a person.” Liddell and Scott, Greek-English Lexicon, s.v. πάθος.
33. For our purposes, suffering is not best defined as “feeling pain” because feeling
pain is a species of suffering, of being affected.
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we confront that suffering. Of course, to say that I do and must trust
God is not to answer the question, “Why isn’t there less suffering in
the world?” It is to deny that there is an answer for us. This may be the
best of all possible worlds, but the claim that it is requires an incredible amount of optimism, an optimism explicable only on the basis of
faith and, so, an optimism that begs the question.
There is yet another way of understanding the problem itself to be
the problem: As usually set forth, the problem of theodicy assumes that
God’s power is essential to his being; the claim that God is omnipotent
is crucial to the problem. That may sound reasonable at first, but it is
questionable. Latter-day Saints are hardly alone in seeing in God, not
power, but a kind of powerlessness, namely the holding back, allowing,
suffering, persuasion, charity, gentleness, and absence of compulsion
that is described so eloquently in Doctrine and Covenants 121:41–46
and that informs much of the scripture that we share with other Christians.34 That seeming—but my mind only seeming—limitation of
power appears to be correlate with God’s power to save, perhaps the
only power essential to his divinity. I take it that this way of understanding his power is among the reasons why the scriptures show us a very
human God rather than an omnipotent one: After dinner, Abraham
walks with God’s messengers and perhaps with God himself, showing
them the way to Sodom, and God bargains with Abraham over the fate
of those who live there (Genesis 18). It is one thing to speak of God as
all-powerful when we praise him and to mean what we say when we do.
It is another to assume that our praise can be parsed directly into logical
propositions that we can use to solve theological conundra such as the
problem of theodicy. Whatever the case for dogmatic or rational theology, scriptural assertions of God’s power are enriched and, therefore,
complicated by instances in which his power is limited and, even more,
by the importance he puts on his patience, persuasion, and love.
34. Modernism’s definition of knowledge as power rather than relation (charity) puts
modernism at odds with religion from the beginning. The solution is to rethink the intellectual and other advantages bequeathed us in modernism in terms of charity rather than
in terms of power. See the discussion of knowledge as power in chapter 1 in this volume.
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Still another way a Christian might respond to the problem of
theodicy is to object to the question it asks. It would not be unreasonable for a Christian to argue that since even Christ suffered on the
cross, with suffering incomparable to any of our own, we have no right
to ask why we suffer. To do so is impertinent, perhaps impertinent to
the point of blasphemy. To complain about my suffering when faced
with the suffering of Jesus Christ is, implicitly, to deny the gravity
and effect of his suffering. I have no right to ask why I suffer. Here
is another way to put the same point: If Jesus Christ asked the question of God’s justice while on the cross—“My God, my God, why hast
thou forsaken me?” (Matthew 27:46; Mark 15:34)—we have no right to
think that we can avoid the same question. And if he did not receive
an answer in mortality, we have no reason to think that we can.
But thinking about the problem of evil need not be a complaint
about my suffering. It could be a question about the suffering of others. As the name we have given to the problem suggests, our question is about God’s justice as a whole, including his dealings with others. The question is not only a personal complaint, and the scriptures
themselves show prophets from Abraham to Joseph Smith sometimes
questioning God’s justice. In fact, it is not unreasonable to construe
their ability to question God’s justice as a sign of their righteousness
before God. Abraham’s bargain with God over Sodom occurs immediately after the Lord has described him as someone who “will command his children . . . to do justice and judgment” (Genesis 18:19).
Thus the Christian argument puts me in my place, but it does not dissipate the question of theodicy, for as a general question rather than a
complaint, the question may be rooted in Christ-like compassion for
our fellows rather than in a demand for a justification of my suffering.
My intuition as a philosophy teacher of Latter-day Saint students
is that most Mormons who have tackled the problem have done so by
reformulating the second proposition of its traditional formulation,
namely that God is all-powerful. They do so by redefining what it means
to be all-powerful in such a way that the paradox will disappear. That
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solution neatly dissolves the problem, but many Saints are uncomfortable with the limitation that the solution puts on God’s power.
I have described a few of the ways of dealing with the problem
of evil. There are any number of others, but I believe we see a pattern
here. When we deal with the problem of theodicy, we often, perhaps
always, find ourselves at an impasse that requires us either to give up,
to reformulate the question, or to show how the problem is itself problematic; and even when we do seem to have dissolved the problem, it
reappears soon afterward in some new form. But behind that impasse
is a perhaps surprising assumption. If I look at the problem, its solutions, and its problems with a merely theological eye, I find in it the
attempt to represent rationally a god who is God and also allows the
evil we encounter. I create a god in my own image, a rational representation of God (an idol), and then I try to resolve—to dissolve—the
problem of evil; I try to make it go away. I commit idolatry. Then I pretend that the enemy of God is either illusory or not really an enemy.
There is, however, another way to think about the problem, namely
as a problem that makes things more difficult, a problem that will not
go away. We may not be able to answer the philosophical problem.
But the problem of evil will continue to call for our response—and
dealing with the philosophical problem, whether with a solution or
not, may be an obstacle to responding to the call. Though the problem
of theodicy can be a legitimate topic of philosophical and theological
thought, and philosophical and theological thought can be legitimate
pursuits, even apocalyptic ones, seeing the problem of theodicy as one
that makes thinking more difficult rather than as a problem to be dissolved tends toward apocalyptic theology.
Notice that the Christian talks about the problem of evil differently than does the philosopher. This difference is not just a matter
of taste or style. It has everything to do with the difference between
what each kind of discourse does. Sometimes we treat scripture and
revelation as if they were simplified scientific explanations of things
or poetic philosophizing, but I think that is a mistake, and sometimes
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a serious one. For it assumes that the rationality characteristic of science is the measure of all discourse. Though religious discourse may
offer us explanations, its purpose is not explanatory, but soteriological: It is concerned, not with telling us how the world and the things
in the world are (at least not in the way that science and philosophy
do),35 but with telling us about God’s power to save and how we can
be saved. Religious discourse calls for our repentance and good works
rather than our rational reflection. It is not that the two are incompatible, but that religious discourse does something different than does
the discourse of science and philosophy. Given its purposes, revelation ignores the problem of theodicy—which, since theodicy is a
philosophical/theological problem rather than a religious one, is not
the same as ignoring the problem we face in reconciling the evil we
encounter with our faith in God.
That religion ignores the problem is deeply suggestive. Of course
revelation is not blind to suffering.36 Christian revelation often
reminds us that we must be deeply concerned with suffering, especially with the suffering of others and with our own spiritual suffering. God wills neither and he offers answers to both. But Christian
concern is with the proper, Christ-like response to that suffering, not
with explaining its logical compatibility with God’s existence. One
can even imagine a Christian arguing that, as a speculative rather
than a practical problem, the problem of theodicy distracts us from
the existential problem.
Obviously I am sympathetic to the charge that the philosophical
problem of evil and suffering is a distraction. However, since concern for
the philosophical problem can be a concern for justice, it is not enough
35. And its explanations are not scientific, not even in a primitive way. For a discussion of the difference between religious thinking and scientific, see chapter 3 in this volume. For a discussion of how I understand scripture and, therefore, religious discourse,
see chapter 8 in this volume.
36. Christ’s healing miracles were not incidental to his mission. Indeed, in Jesus’s
first sermon he identifies himself as the one appointed “to heal the broken-hearted, to
preach deliverance to the captives, and recovering of sight to the blind” (Luke 4:18; cf.
Isaiah 61:1).
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to ignore that problem as a distraction. My sympathy does not extend
to agreement. Nevertheless, even if the problem of evil is not merely a
distraction, it is also not a purely philosophical, theoretical problem. In
the end, it is a problem for action, and philosophical speculation has
little place among the actions required when we respond concretely to
suffering and evil. At the second coming not only will every knee bow
and every tongue confess, but also the lame and the halt will be cured.37
Confession and cure show themselves in the type and shadow of our
concrete responses to suffering rather than in rational speculation. They
show themselves in the confession we make and the succor we offer in a
world remade by our encounter with God.
Of course, it does not follow that careful thought is irrelevant or
unnecessary, and by “careful thought” I am not just referring to the
planning we must do to make our actions fruitful. Careful thought
may include the rigorous analyses of rational philosophy. Philosophy
does many things. It has many purposes, including the pleasure of
philosophy, a good that does not require that I justify it by showing
how it leads to some other good. But among its other purposes is that
of showing us the limits of reason. When we think of philosophers
who are concerned with the limits of reason, perhaps we most often
first think of Immanuel Kant and the first critique. Kant says that
knowing the limits of pure reason will remove obstacles that stand in
the way of practical reason38 and will make it possible to take morality and religion seriously.39 But Kant was neither the first nor the last
philosopher to think that we needed to consider the limits of reason.
In fact, thinkers whose goal it is to make things difficult—Kierkegaard
and Nietzsche come to mind—generally do so as a means of showing
the limits of reason.
37. See Mosiah 3:5, where we see the first coming as a figure of the second. See also
such passages as Jeremiah 30:17 and Alma 41:4.
38. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman K. Smith (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1929), Bxxv.
39. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Bxxx–xxxi.
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In the fifth century, Pseudo-Dionysius gave us negative theology,
not to demonstrate that we cannot have faith nor to attack religion, but
to show us the limits of reason when reason tries to talk about God.
He believed that by opposing negative theology to affirmative theology, a third way will show itself to us, the way of revelation.40 PseudoDionysius explicitly wanted to do apocalyptic theology and saw negative theology as a means for doing so. Others, such as Maimonides,
have taken a similar approach. As I read Kierkegaard, though he does
not do negative theology, he does show us the limits of reason by making it less philosophically clear how to understand what it means to be
a Christian. For example, his claim in Fear and Trembling that Abraham can only be understood by means of the absurd is a claim that we
can understand Abraham, but not philosophically.41 Similarly, we can
understand the problem of theodicy as demonstrating the limit of reason confronted by evil. We, therefore, can see the problem as an aid to
foolishness, reminding us of God’s greatness and our own nothingness.
However, to see the problem as demonstrating the limits of reason
is not to reject reason. We can neither reject nor avoid it. We ought not
to wish to do so. For reason not only helps us find solutions to problems, it sometimes sharpens the problem. I think the long history of
the problem of theodicy is sufficient evidence that we are unlikely to
find a solution that puts an end to that problem once and for all. The
merely theological response is to take up the question of theodicy as a
free-floating philosophical problem, but if we take it up, the most we
can gain from it is the pleasure of philosophical thought. Few who are
religious can deal with this issue only for its philosophical pleasure.
The apocalyptic alternative is that the problem is a philosophical goad,
a spur, an itch that will not go away, for it challenges our faith even
when it points to the need for faith. Every call invites a response, and
40. For one of the best brief explanations of the thought of the fifth- and sixth-century
thinker, Pseudo-Dionysius (also called simply “Denys”), see Jean-Luc Marion, In Excess:
Studies of Saturated Phenomena, trans. Robyn Horner and Vincent Berraud (New York:
Fordham University Press, 2002), 134–39, 145–48.
41. See chapter 1 in this volume.
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in doing so it disturbs the status quo.42 The problem of theodicy calls
to us, challenging our faith and, by doing so, inviting us to respond.
It invites us to see the world as still awaiting the second coming even
if we live in a world that has been figured by the presence of Christ.
For some, faith fails in the face of that challenge by the problem
of theodicy, but not for most. Most of us continue to believe even as
we struggle with the problem. In fact, we struggle with the problem
because we believe. We struggle only because we have faith. If we find
the problem of theodicy to be a real problem rather than only an intellectual game, that is evidence that we have faith. Thus, by continuing
to be a problem—by the fact that we seem unable to find any solution
to the problem of theodicy that does not merely shift it some place else
where it reappears in a new and slightly different guise—the problem
of theodicy shows us the necessity of trust as well as the limits of reason. The problem of evil and suffering is intractable to our powers of
reason. As believers we find ourselves foolish before it. Ultimately the
only thing to which it is tractable is moral and faithful response: action.
Thus, the intractability of the problem of theodicy can be positive
in Christian life rather than merely negative. First, it can continue to
serve as a goad. That it is intractable can continue to remind us that
evil and suffering are real and that they require our response. Second,
the rational difficulty of the problem can provide an impetus for recognizing that faith is prior to reason.43 To paraphrase something that
Heidegger said of theology and that Kierkegaard could have said, the
problem of theodicy may only render faith more difficult—that is, render it more certain that faithfulness cannot be gained through reason,
but only through faith.44 So, the problem of theodicy continues to be
important to believers for two reasons: because it points to the ground
42. Jean-Louis Chrétien, L’Appele et le Reponse (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuet, 1992),
20.
43. Notice that I do not think faith is opposed to reason. I am not a fideist.
44. Heidegger, “Phenomenology and Theology,” trans. James G. Hart and John C.
Maraldo, in Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998), 39–62, especially p. 46.
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of our belief by showing a limit of reason, and because it reminds us
that we must not neglect to respond to evil and suffering as Christian
faith calls us to respond.45 When the problem of theodicy does these
things for us, we find ourselves not only awaiting but expecting the
coming of Christ and seeing his nearness. When it does these things,
it is apocalyptic.
In the end, therefore, the difficulty with merely philosophical or
theological answers to the problem of theodicy is that every one of them
looks for a way to integrate evil into our understanding of the world. To
understand something is to understand how it fits with the other things
that we understand, how they make sense together, as a whole. But it
is evil to integrate evil into our understanding, to make sense of it and
make it part of the wholeness of our existence. It is evil to do so precisely
because evil cannot be made sense of, cannot be justified. It is evil to
explain evil, to tame it, no longer to be horrified by it. If evil ceases to
be horrible, but instead makes sense, then we cease to struggle with it.
The shadow of the apocalypse is concrete struggle with evil, not abstract
thought about it, which may well be relevant but is never enough. Our
horror in response to transcendent evil is one with our eschatological
hope for the good of the kingdom that is to come, and that hope makes
no sense apart from the fight against evil. Only if the problem of theodicy is genuinely a problem—only if all solutions ultimately fail in this
world without the Apocalypse, the Revelation of Jesus Christ—can we
continue to know that evil is genuinely evil.
I hope it is not too much of a conceit to suggest that thinking philosophically about the problem of theodicy has a relation to the struggle
for justice that is similar to the relation of prayer to that struggle: for the
apocalyptic Christian theologian, the problem of theodicy is a kind of
prayer.46 To pray is to turn oneself toward God in response to his call.
45. Though this is not the place to explore the question, it may be that these two
things are really one.
46. For a discussion of the phenomenology of prayer, see Jean-Louis Chrétien, “The
Wounded Word,” in Phenomenology and the “Theological Turn”: The French Debate (New
York: Fordham University Press, 2000), 147–75. Chrétien pays insufficient attention to
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The believer who approaches the problem of theodicy also turns toward
God, responding to the question of God’s justice as to a question and a
call: the question of his or her justice, the call to do good. At the same
time, because that person’s intellectual powers fail in responding to the
call, the believer recognizes her own weakness, her own foolishness, a
recognition requisite to prayer. And as every prayer ought, in responding to the problem of theodicy, the believer praises God’s goodness, wisdom, power, and sovereignty, and prays for his kingdom to come—for
the Apocalypse (Matthew 6:9–10, 13). Those are, after all, the divine
attributes which give rise to the question that calls us to respond. Without those divine attributes, there is no problem of evil, only evil. Without the promise of the Apocalypse, there is no answer to the problem,
only intellectual confusion and continued evil.
Finally, as is also true of prayer, to deal with the problem of
theodicy is to be concerned for others beside oneself. Just as I always
pray in community with others who pray, even when I pray only for
myself—“our Father” rather than “my Father” in the Lord’s Prayer
(Matthew 6:9)—the problem of theodicy is a concern for others as
well as myself. When thought apocalyptically, prayer and thinking
come together in the problem of theodicy, and because it continues to
remain a problem, the problem of theodicy can allow us to continue
the prayerful thought of belief and a believing awareness of the nearness of the kingdom of God.
Theology is possible that, in responding to God’s call, demonstrates
our foolishness before God, praises God, and opens the possibility of
seeing the world anew by seeing the nearness of God’s kingdom (covenant life with others) both in time and space. Some theologies are better at doing that than others. As I have said, I believe that hermeneutic
and narrative theologies—to which I would add liturgical, ritual,
scriptural, and pastoral or practical theologies, as well perhaps as a
theology modeled on what some Protestants call canonical theology
the fact that much prayer is petitionary and that the believer hopes that the requests of
his petitions will be granted, but in spite of that his description of prayer is very helpful.
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(without the forced assumption of scriptural inerrancy)47—are more
likely to be apocalyptic.
However, ultimately the question of whether our theologies are, on
the one hand, merely theology and, therefore, idolatrous or, on the other
hand, apocalyptic is not a methodological question. It is a question of
character and spirit—our own, our audience’s. That is why, though
some theologies may be more amenable to idolatry than others, none
are immune to it. As human beings, we are not immune to it. Whether
a theology is apocalyptic depends on what the theologian does and the
experience of his or her audience, not on the content of what the theologian says nor on the method the theologian uses. Understanding the
difference between theology simpliciter and apocalyptic theology brings
us to understand that the danger of theology is ultimately the danger
of human character: we may believe that the theological work we do is
directed toward God—and be wrong; we may be right that it is, but our
audience may fail to take it up as the apocalyptic theology that it is for
us. The attempt to do apocalyptic theology can go wrong in many ways,
all of them ways in which we are wrong.
It does not follow that we ought to avoid all theology. Rather, it follows that we ought not to do theology unaware of the danger of failure,
of the danger that our theology may be a species of idolatry. Apocalyptic
theology should be our goal, but idolatrous theology is its ever-present
danger. If we do theology, whatever other reasons we have—and there
are other good reasons—we must do it to announce “the Lord is nigh”
(D&C 1:12) and to proclaim the revelations of the restoration (D&C
1:18), remaining weak, simple (D&C 1:23), and prayerful,48 yet confident in the presence of God that figures our lives (D&C 121:45).
47. Canonical theology is a theology of the canon, of scripture. It seeks to understand
the scriptures in their own terms rather than as documents to be deciphered as merely
historical or so as to conform to some implied, preexisting theology. I would use, instead,
the term scriptural theology.
48. Matthew 7:7: “Ask, and it shall be given you; seek, and ye shall find; knock, and
it shall be opened unto you.” This and its variations appear over and over again in scripture. In Alma 33, Alma particularly emphasizes the importance of prayer to faith, as does
Amulek in Alma 34.

chapter seven

The Writings of Zion
•

L

et me hold in abeyance for a bit the question of what I mean by the
writings in order to think a little about the word Zion. And let me
begin that discussion by citing a few texts (perhaps promiscuously)
and saying a few things about each of them that will, together, constitute a little story about Zion.
Begin with Doctrine and Covenants 82:14: “Zion must increase
in beauty, and in holiness; . . . Zion must arise and put on her beautiful garments.” For Zion, the beautiful and the holy are of a piece,
so the way to holiness is the way of beauty: as we become beautiful,
we also become holy, and vice versa. Indeed, the possible reversal of
those—“as we become holy, we also become beautiful”—says a great
deal about what beauty means.
In Exodus, the Lord tells Israel that the way of beauty is also that
of language, of hearing: “If ye will hearken to my voice indeed, and
keep my covenant, then ye shall be a special treasure unto me above all
people: for all the earth is mine. And ye shall be unto me a kingdom
of priests, and an holy nation” (Exodus 19:5–6; translation revised).
Being Zion, the holy nation of God, being a kingdom of priests and
priestesses, means hearing the voice of God. And what do we hear in
that voice? Latter-day revelation answers the question:
[We hear] a voice of gladness! A voice of mercy from heaven;
and a voice of truth out of the earth; glad tidings for the
dead; a voice of gladness for the living and the dead; glad
tidings of great joy. How beautiful upon the mountains are
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the feet of those that bring glad tidings of good things, and
that say unto Zion: Behold, thy God reigneth! As the dews of
Carmel, so shall the knowledge of God descend upon them!
(D&C 128:19)
If we truly hear the gospel, our hearing is hearkening, and the
voice to which we hearken is a voice of gladness, mercy, truth, glad
tidings for the living and the dead, a voice of great joy. We hear the
announcement of the coming reign of God. To hear that voice is to
have the knowledge of God descend on us. To hearken to the word is
to know God, and to know him is to be given and to receive gladness,
truth, and joy.
When we hearken to God and know him gladly, truthfully, joyfully, we live in a new creation. Through Isaiah he says: “I have put my
words in thy mouth . . . that I may plant the heavens and lay the foundations of the earth, and say unto Zion: Behold, thou art my people”
(Isaiah 51:16; 2 Nephi 8:16). Giving us his words to speak is the means
by which God creates a new world, one other than the world which
we call “the world.” His words are that by which he calls us to be his
people, the people to inhabit that new world. But this new world is not
something that we can merely await. We are commanded in several
revelations of the Doctrine and Covenants: “Seek to bring forth and
establish the cause of Zion” (D&C 6:6, 11:6, 12:6; cf. 14:6). Presumably,
the work of interpretation, of understanding, is part of what bringing
forth and establishing Zion requires.
Latter-day scripture also tells us in several places what Zion is
when established. It is purity of heart: “Let Zion rejoice, for this is
Zion—the pure in heart” (D&C 97:21). It is unity of heart and mind:
“The Lord called his people Zion, because they were of one heart and
one mind” (Moses 7:18). It is, therefore, also the vision of God and
the coming of his kingdom: “Blessed are the pure in heart, for they
shall see God” (Matthew 5:8; 3 Nephi 12:8). And: “Blessed are the poor
who are pure in heart, whose hearts are broken, and whose spirits
are contrite, for they shall see the kingdom of God coming in power
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and great glory unto their deliverance” (D&C 56:18). Purity of heart
means unity of heart and mind. It means having a broken heart and a
contrite spirit. And it results in seeing God’s kingdom come in power
and glory to deliver us from our poverty, both spiritual and physical—in this life.1
That purity and unity of broken heart and contrite spirit, delivering us from our impoverishment, means the fulfillment of the covenants of the Father with our fathers and with us. That purity and unity
and richness in covenant is the beauty of Zion:
Awake, and arise from the dust, O Jerusalem; yea, and put on
thy beautiful garments, O daughter of Zion; and strengthen
thy stakes and enlarge thy borders forever, that thou mayest
no more be confounded, that the covenants of the Eternal
Father which he hath made unto thee, O house of Israel, may
be fulfilled. (Moroni 10:31; cf. Isaiah 52:1, 2 Nephi 8:24)
The story of Zion is the story of becoming beautiful.
Like any good Aristotelian story, it has a beginning, a middle, and
an end. It begins with God speaking to us, moves to our hearing his
words of gladness, truth, and joy, and ends in the new world of Zion,
a world of unity, humility, and covenant as well as a world of power,
glory, and deliverance. It ends with the holy reign of God in which all
things are beautiful.
My thesis is that the revelatory writings of the church, especially,
but not only the canonized scriptures, mean in such a way that they
call us to join Zion, that they, in words of gladness, truth, and joy, call
us to the beauty of unity and humility, of power, glory, and deliverance in the kingdom of God. They call us to covenant with God and
each other. Of course their content is important. Without that content, they could not call us to repentance or to covenant. But what is
most important is that they call to us.
1. See chapter 6 in this volume for a discussion of the coming of God’s kingdom in
this life.
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But how do they do so? Since Spinoza, the most common answer
to how scripture means has been that it does so in the same way as
any other book. Of course there are ways in which that must be true,
however books mean. But scripture isn’t just “another book.” It is revelation. Scripture is a text in which God reveals himself to us, and not
just any text does that. Like the law of Moses, scripture points our
souls to Christ (Jacob 4:5), also something that other texts do not do.
Therefore, we cannot read scripture or any other revealed text in quite
the same way that we read another book, for to do so is to ignore the
holiness that it reveals and calls for.
However, if revealed writings do not mean as other writings do,
then how do they mean?2 For at least a couple of hundred years, many
religious people have felt that the best response they could give to that
question was, “They mean what they say literally, except when they
obviously mean something more poetic,” an explanation at which we
may smile because of its circularity, but a common explanation nonetheless. It is common, I believe, because there is an important sense
in which it is true. Nevertheless, that answer has created problems for
thinking about the meaning of scripture. I believe that most of those
problems stem from the fact that literalists as well as those whose
work would undermine the literal historicity of scripture share an
important assumption. They assume that “the most primitive meaning of a text is its only valid meaning”3 or, at least, its most important meaning. Notoriously those in the self-importantly named Jesus
Seminar have spent hours combing the New Testament texts, parsing
words and phrases and what we think we know of history trying to
discover the primitive meaning of the New Testament, the authentic
sayings of Jesus as opposed to those which were supposedly invented
2. I address the issue of how scripture means more fully in chapter 8. This is an overview of the argument I make there.
3. David C Steinmetz, “The Superiority of Pre-Critical Exegesis,” in The Theological Interpretation of Scripture: Classic and Contemporary Readings, ed. Stephen E. Fowl
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 26–38, especially p. 27.
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by admiring disciples.4 The biblical literalists disagree vehemently
with the Jesus Seminar about what is primitive meaning and what is
not. In spite of that, and it seems with neither of them having reflected
on the fact, the two groups agree exactly with the insistence that the
primitive meaning determines scripture’s meaning.
That assumption is problematic, however, because, as the Book
of Mormon demonstrates, a text is scriptural precisely because the
primitivist assumption about meaning is not true. In 2 Nephi 11:2,
Nephi says that he will liken the words of Isaiah to his people—even
though he knows that Isaiah’s words were not originally about the
Lehites (see 1 Nephi 19:23; 2 Nephi 6:5, 11:8). The primitive meaning—what Isaiah’s words meant for Israel when Isaiah first delivered
them—is more or less irrelevant to the Lehites, but Nephi can liken
the words of Isaiah to them nevertheless. Isaiah is scripturally meaningful to the people of Lehi, apart from its primitive meaning. The
likening of scripture to people did not privilege its primitive meaning.
Second Nephi 6:5—“There are many things spoken by Isaiah which may be likened unto you, because ye are of the house of
Israel”—might be taken to suggest that Isaiah could be likened to
the Nephites because they and Israel share a common history and
heritage or because the responsibilities and blessings of Israel are also
theirs. However, as 2 Nephi 11:8 tells us, the words of Isaiah may be
likened “unto all men.” The interpretation of scripture that we see
modeled in Nephi’s reading of Isaiah is interpretation by likening,
and scripture can be likened to all people.5
In Isaiah, the word liken and its cognates, such as like, usually
translates some form of the Hebrew verb dmh, meaning “to share the
4. The participants in the Jesus Seminar recognize the challenge that their work
presents to ordinary belief. Its founder, Robert Funk, said in his address to the first meeting of the Seminar, “We will be asking a question that borders the sacred, that even abuts
blasphemy, for many in our society.” Jesus Seminar home page: www.westarinstitute.org/
Jesus_Seminar/jesus_seminar.html (accessed 9 March 2008).
5. I find it informative that Nephi explicitly avoids teaching his people the culture of
the Jews. Evidently language, culture, and context are not always necessary for likening
the scriptures. See 2 Nephi 25:2.
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same attributes,” as in Isaiah 14:14.6 Using this verb, something that
is like something else does not only look like that which it is like. Perhaps it does not at all look like what it is like. Indeed as Thorlief Boman reminds us, “In the historical and presumptively historical writings it is never reported how a person looked”7 nor are biblical writers
particularly interested in giving a visual description of the things they
see.8 The Isaiah sermon—which mocks the king of Babylon (sarcastically calling him “Lucifer,” “Morning Star”9) and his pretensions of
being like God—shows us that the verb liken means “to be like something else.” Nephi is comparing a way of being that we find portrayed
in Isaiah with the way of being of the Nephites, and not to compliment
them.10
As Nephi suggests, the argument about the meaning of Isaiah for
the Lehites is expandable: The scriptures as a whole are meaningful to
us only because their primitive meaning is not determinative. Scripture is God’s revelation to us, now, as well as to its original hearers. Its
meaning, therefore, must go beyond the particular ideas and settings
6. G. Johannes Botterweck and Helmer Ringgren, eds., Theological Dictionary of the
Old Testament, vol. 3, trans. John T. Willis, Geoffrey Bromiley, and David Green (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1978), s.v. דמה. Interestingly, the verb can also mean “to think” or “to
plan,” as in Isaiah 10:7.
7. Thorlief Boman, Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek (New York: Norton, 1954;
rev. ed., 1960), 76.
8. Boman, Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek, 74–76.
9. Isaiah 14:12. The Hebrew word translated “Lucifer” in the King James translation
is hêlēl ()הילל, and means “shining one” but can imply boastfulness. Francis Brown, S. R.
Driver, and Charles A. Briggs, Hebrew and English Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon, 1951), s.v.
הילל. The name Lucifer means “shining one,” but has Latin rather than Hebrew roots.
10. Of course we cannot be sure what the original word was that Joseph Smith translated liken in 1 and 2 Nephi, for though we know that Nephi was writing in reformed
Egyptian (Mormon 9:32), we do not know whether that describes the characters he was
using to write in Hebrew or the language in which he was writing. Nevertheless, since
Nephi is an immigrant from Israel, the chances are that he and his people still speak
some variant of Hebrew, particularly since he is reading and transmitting the work
of Isaiah, and it is likely (though not necessary) that he wrote in the language that he
spoke. With caution, we can assume that the underlying language was Hebrew. See
Royal Skousen, “The Original Language of the Book of Mormon: Upstate New York
Dialect, King James English, or Hebrew?” Journal of Book of Mormon Studies 3/1
(1994): 28–38, especially p. 38.
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of the original writer. However inspired he was, he did not—could
not—see all the ways in which the scriptures can be likened to each of
our lives in particular. He did not see all the meaning implicate in his
writing. However, he did not need to. All he needed to do was record
the defective way of being of Israel (as well the possibility of its being
otherwise), for we could then understand our own being as a type and
a shadow of what the Lord has revealed through Israel. Just as it was
for the children of Lehi, to liken scripture to ourselves is to compare
the way of being that it reveals with our own way of being.
As revelations of God’s interaction with his people, the scriptures
come to us as a call, a call to consider another way of being than that
we currently inhabit, in other words, a call to repentance. By opening a new range of possible meanings, scripture outlines an alternative way of being-in-the-world, to use the philosophical language of
Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Paul Ricoeur, a way of
being-in-the-world in which God has revealed and continues to reveal
himself, a way in which his self-revelation calls us to repentance.
If we think of scripture in that way, as a text in which God reveals
himself and calls us to his kingdom and which, therefore, questions
our mundane being-in-the-world, making it possible for us to see an
alternative, the alternative made possible by Jesus Christ, then we can
say at least this about interpretation: The meaning of a scriptural text
is that meaning that leads us to godly life (though the relation between godly life and scriptural meaning is circular: scriptural meaning leads us to godly life, and godly life produces spiritual meaning as
its fruit).11
Does it follow that historical meaning is irrelevant, then, or that
the interpreter has free reign to impute to the scriptural text whatever comes to mind? Neither. Historical meaning is important. It is
important to ask questions like “How did those who wrote the texts
understand their meaning?” It is important, first, because historical
11. Compare Henri de Lubac, “Spiritual Understanding,” in Theological Interpretation of Scripture, ed. Fowl, 3–25, especially p. 13.
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meaning cannot be separated from scriptural meaning. The historicity of Jesus, the basic historicity of the scriptural accounts (leaving
room for variations in understanding, for editing and transmission,
etc.) is essential to the scriptural meaning of the Bible. The spiritual
claim that the New Testament makes on us is in the announcement
that Jesus the Messiah was born, suffered, died, and was resurrected.
If these claims are not historical, then our hope is vain and Jesus was
an exemplary moral teacher rather than the Savior of the world. Likewise, the historicity of the Book of Mormon is essential to its scriptural meaning. It does not mean the same spiritually if there were
no Nephites or Lamanites. The types and shadows of scripture, the
schema or patterns they offer us for reunderstanding our lives—for
repenting—mean something very different (if they mean at all) if they
are not manifest in history.
The historicity of scripture is also important because it can serve
a spiritual function. Historical understanding of the scriptures can
challenge us to question the overlay of interpretation that has accrued
to the text and become “obvious,” a tradition of our fathers. For us,
such unquestioned accruals become its scriptural meaning, and they
make it difficult for us to be brought to repentance by what we read
because the text no longer challenges us when we already know what it
has to teach. When that happens, what we take to be scriptural meaning displaces the meaningfulness of scripture. By making us reconsider our traditional interpretations of the text, historical research
can help the scriptures question our understanding of ourselves and
the world, as well as the ways we comport ourselves in the world.12
Historical research on scripture often forces us to recognize that the
work of interpretation is to conform our ideas to scripture rather than
to force scripture to conform to our ideas. Or, better, by helping us
conform our ideas to scripture, historical research helps us conform
12. Some of the work of N. T. Wright is exceptional in this regard. See, for example,
his The Challenge of Jesus: Rediscovering Who Jesus Was and Is (Downers Grove, IL:
InterVarsity Press, 1999).
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our souls to scripture. It is, therefore, a good place to begin scriptural
interpretation. Nevertheless, historical meaning is secondary to scriptural meaning.
Though sometimes we may appear to think otherwise, we also do
not have free rein in interpreting scripture—scripture is of no private,
no merely individual, interpretation (see 2 Peter 1:20)—because the
interpretation of scripture requires unity. One form of that unity is the
unity of the literal and the spiritual. Just as the body and the spirit are
ultimately a unit rather than two things at war with one another, the
literal and the spiritual are aspects of a unit. Neither exists without the
other. Each influences the other; each limits the other. Together they
prevent scriptural interpretation from proceeding willy-nilly. To use
an extreme example to make a point, Moroni 10 cannot be interpreted
to be a recipe for fondue because the words and grammar of that chapter as well at its history do not allow for such an interpretation. Nevertheless, though unity in interpretation is important, interpretation is
also manifold because meaning is implicate in the writing of the text
as much as it is explicit. It does not follow that the writing itself can
be ignored. Interpretation must often be rethought because there are
historical textual and editorial questions to sort out (Which is the best
manuscript? What was the original form of that manuscript? etc.). It
also does not follow that the answers to those historical questions
will tell us how to understand scripture. Every good interpretation of
scripture must give careful heed to the words of scripture, to the unity
of the literal and the spiritual.13
A second and overarching unity of our revelatory writings is the
unity of Zion: We live in covenant with one another because we live in
covenant with God. Within that covenant, we have recognized some
revelation as scripture, as “standard works,” works against which to
measure ourselves, not only as individuals, but as a people. The choice
of the Latter-day Saint canon has not always been an explicit choice.
Sometimes, as in the case of the Bible, it has occurred through history
13. Chapter 8 in this volume is about that unity.
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and tradition as well as by common consent. Presumably, however,
these choices have come about under the influence of the Holy Ghost
working in the church as a body.14 The standard works provide unity
of interpretation by serving as a common source of understanding.
However, within the unity of Zion the standard works do not
stand alone. Because we have an open canon, and as part of living in
covenant relation with God and one another, we recognize priesthood
authority as a second unity. Prophetic voices speak to us, continuing
to call us to repentance, continuing to offer us an alternative way of
being. Like the standard works, they provide limits on interpretation,
the limits of our common life together in Zion.
A further element of the unity of Zion in scriptural interpretation
is what, in Catholicism, is called “the tradition.” As we have standard
works, we also have, even if not officially, what we could call standard
interpretations, the interpretations we have in common. We share
with one another understandings that provide limits within which
scriptural meaning takes place. At the practical level, this unity is
both necessary and most dangerous. The tension between our shared
interpretations and the possibility that they are things overlaid on the
text, things apart from their authentically scriptural meaning, is obvious. That is the tension in which much interpretation of scripture is
situated, unable to distinguish easily between which traditional interpretations give us scriptural meaning and which hide that meaning,
14. I take it, however, that we differ from many others because, believing in an open
canon and in continuing revelation, we understand that the Bible could have been otherwise. It could have included fewer or more books than it does. Its present shape is the
product of social forces and decisions as well as the inspiration of the Holy Ghost. We
also know that the Doctrine and Covenants could be otherwise, because we have seen it
change over the life of the restored church. I assume that the Book of Mormon could have
been otherwise, that its editors could have chosen to include some additional texts or to
exclude something, though there are also indications that the Lord had a direct hand in
selecting at least some of its texts. (See, for example, 1 Nephi 9:3 and Words of Mormon
1:9.) Thus, for Latter-day Saints, what makes something canonical is not only that it is
inspired by the Holy Ghost, for there are many such revelations in addition to those canonized. Something is canonical because, from among the revelations, it has been agreed
on by common consent to be a standard.
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perhaps spoiling us “through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men” (Colossians 2:8).15
Given that tension, a member of the church may argue against
our common interpretations. However, the fact that we live together,
that we are covenant with one another and with God, that when it
comes to scriptural meaning, our individual understanding is not primary—this means we cannot argue against common interpretations
heedlessly. We need not accept everything that is commonly believed.
Far from it. However, if someone does not, the burden of proof falls
on that person. That burden need not be heavy. Indeed, it can be light,
and carrying it can lead to the beautiful and holy. Good interpretation of our writings and beliefs is perhaps most often done by someone who accepts that burden of proof, showing us how our common
interpretations have fallen short or how they can be renewed. That
kind of scripture interpretation is most likely to open our understanding and allow us to liken the scriptures and our beliefs to ourselves
freshly. However, we cannot interpret scripture in Zion without living
in that tension between the need to renew our interpretations and the
requirement that we recognize the legitimacy of what we share. To
leave that tension, either to insist on the legitimacy of my private interpretations or on the absolute authority of common interpretations,
with little or no regard for the other side of the tension, is to give up
the desire to establish Zion. It is to fail the beauty of Zion.
Thus, scriptural meaning occurs in covenant relation. Our situatedness in that covenant and the way-of-being that it opens, the life of
covenant obligation to God and our fellows, presumably determines
the likening that can occur in interpretation. To interpret scripture in
the covenant is to be called to be in Zion, called on by God and others
who speak words of gladness, truth, and joy, and who demand that
we accommodate ourselves and our interpretations to the canon, to
15. I understand most, if not all, references to “the philosophies of men” in LDS discourse to refer to what we might otherwise call “common sense,” to the traditions of
understanding that seem obvious to the world and that we often take up because we too
take them to be obvious.
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authority, and to the traditions of the Saints, not in some inflexible way,
but by taking up the cause of Zion and seeking to establish and bring it
forth in interpretation. It is to be called to the interpretation of a Christian life, as well as in the explicit interpretations of scriptural texts.
It would be inaccurate to say that I encounter God in the writings
of his revelations. I encounter him in prayer and ordinance, and especially in my reception of the Holy Ghost. It would be inaccurate to
say that I encounter the other person in writings, for I encounter others in my family, in the church, and in society. However, I can recollect—re-collect—my covenant relation with God and others through
scripture.16 The distance between myself and the primitive meaning
of a text and the work to understand which that distance imposes on
me is one way in which the obligation created in my relation to what
is other than myself is manifest. The distance between my life as it
is and the life to which I am called imposes a similar work and is,
therefore, evidence of a similar obligation. Those distances are a matter of otherness: the Other speaking to me in scripture (the standard
works), the otherness of authority (both God and those who represent
him), the obligation to respond to and renew the testimonies of other
persons (common consent).17 Within the covenant, I have an obligation to make the concretized said of the scriptures into something
that continues to say,18 both for myself and for others, a saying that is
enacted not only in my ideas and beliefs, but particularly in my life.
Responding to the call of scripture, I must en-act the cause of Zion.
16. In the language of contemporary philosophy, I encounter the obligation to the
Other. The work of Emmanuel Levinas is perhaps most obviously in play here, but as
my earlier remark suggested, the work of Gadamer, Ricoeur and, particularly, Jean-Luc
Marion has been at least as important for my reflection on these issues. And, of course,
given their reliance on the work of Heidegger, that is always also in the background. For
more on recollection, see chapter 1 in this volume.
17. Of course, it is not determined only by these. It is determined, foremost, in personal relations of love, both with the Divine and with other people.
18. This distinction between the saying and the said is something that I take from
Levinas. Roughly defined, the said is the content of a speaking and the saying is the significance of the act of speaking. See Levinas, Totality and Infinity: Essay on Exteriority,
trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969). See, for example,
pages 30 and 62.
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Because we have continuing revelation, within mortality there
can be no end to the work of interpretation that enacts the establishment of Zion. There can also be no end to that work because we live
together in an organic rather than a static whole. And there can be
no end because we have not yet come to an end: as temporal, living
beings, we are not always the same, unchanging from moment to moment; we live in that we continue to come to be, in that we continue to
renew our life. We hopefully await the Apocalypse, the final revelation
of the Son of God, his reign. Awaiting it, we must continue to renew
our hope and expectation of that revelation, for ourselves and for others, by continuing to read, interpret, and reread. The medieval scriptorian’s19 motto—lege, lege, lege, labore, ora, et relege; “read, read, read,
work, pray, and reread”—must also be ours. In that unending rereading, reinterpretation, and renewal, we find ourselves always partaking
of what is new and everlasting (see D&C 132) rather than “ever learning and never able to come to the knowledge of the truth” (2 Timothy
3:7). Reading scripture we find ourselves called to and participating in
Zion, called to holiness and beauty.

19. I use the word scriptorian with its common meaning, “one who copies scripture,”
rather than with its LDS meaning, “one who knows the scriptures well.”

chapter eight

Scripture as Incarnation
•
Christian Belief and the Historicity of Scripture
The historicity of scripture is important to most Christians and,
especially, to Latter-day Saints. Christians disagree among themselves
about how to understand scriptural history, but few deny that, in some
important sense, Christian scripture is historical. However, given the
challenges to scriptural history, challenges that are especially strong
for Latter-day Saints who take the Book of Mormon to be historical,
what are we to make of the claim that scriptures are history? Given
those challenges, is it possible to understand scripture as literal history? The answer to that question—positive, I will argue—lies in answering the question of what we mean by history, a question that becomes more difficult the more we think about it.
The way that academic historians have thought of history since
the beginning of modernism (about 1500) is not the only way to think
about it.1 However, since the eighteenth century, but especially in
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, those approaching the Bible
and, therefore, also Latter-day Saint scripture, have used some variation of the academic understanding of history as their entrée into the
1. Philosophically, modernism is a way of thinking about the world that is dominant
from roughly 1500 to about 1800, though it continues as an important force into the present. (In that regard, it is important to note that for philosophy modern and contemporary
are not synonyms.) However, though modernism is the dominant way of thinking during
that period and though that period has given its name to modernism, what we call modernist thought is not confined to that historical period. There were modernist thinkers
and elements prior to modernism and, obviously, there continue to be modernist thinkers. See Stephen Daniels, “Paramodern Strategies of Philosophical Historiography,” Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 1/1 (1993): 41–63.
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question of scriptural historicity. We understand scriptural interpretation to be a subset of scholarly historical understanding, but the science of history has raised and continues to raise a variety of questions about the historicity of scriptural accounts. For the Bible, some
of those questions have been resolved to the satisfaction of believers
and others remain questions. Given the unique character of the Book
of Mormon, work on defending its historicity has been much less decisive. As a result, believers, especially Latter-day Saints, find ourselves
having to answer the question of to what degree our scriptural accounts are historical.
In general, scholars, even believing ones, have been more or less
skeptical of the historical character of scripture. However, believers
(scholars and otherwise) have felt it necessary to defend the historicity of scripture with the historian’s scholarly tools. Most Christians
believe that the religious claims of Christianity cannot be completely
separated from its historical claims, and we think that we have no way
of understanding those claims except via the tools of historical scholarship. For example, few have been willing completely to give up the
historicity of Jesus’s life and, particularly, the historicity of his death.
Even those who deny the physical character of the resurrection usually tie the idea of resurrection to an historical event, such as an experience of the first apostles.2 We seem faced with two options for understanding scripture: On the one hand, we can accept some variety
of the academic historians’ approach to scripture. We may opt for the
more “liberal” approach of people such as Raymond Brown or we may
prefer the more “conservative” approach of Christian literalists, but
we agree that scripture is historical. Believers have generally sought
to show that the scriptures are accurate histories, to some degree, and
they have accepted some version of the canons of historical scholarship as the canons for understanding the historicity of scripture.3
2. For example, see Thomas Sheehan, The First Coming: How the Kingdom of God
Became Christianity (New York: Random House, 1986).
3. During the last several years there has been a sometimes rancorous discussion
among Latter-day Saint scholars about how to understand history. I think the rancor of
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A common alternative is to escape the problems created by accepting those canons by arguing that the scriptures are not essentially
historical. On this view, rather than being accurate descriptions of
historical events, the scriptures are writings that may often look like
history and, in fact, may have historical elements, but they are really
about something other than the events portrayed in them. These believers often argue that scriptures are not about history, but about another reality, such as a reality of archetypal meanings. Given the problems of establishing the historicity of scripture, such believers want to
reject the necessity of that historicity but retain the truth of scripture:
Scriptures may or may not be historical, but they are not about historical truth, they are about religious truth, these people argue. Thus,
according to them, though scripture takes the guise of history, it is
actually about something else, such as an ahistorical transcendent or
archetypal reality.4
that discussion has died down—thank goodness—so I hope that I can take up this related
question without becoming embroiled in that earlier debate. What follows is not a criticism of academic history nor historians nor their methods. To offer another understanding of what the word history can mean is not to suggest that there is something wrong
with other meanings of the word. We make a mistake when we use a notion of history
inappropriate to the context at hand, not when we use a different notion of history. That
mistake, a kind of equivocation, is what I believe often happens in the debates between
those who defend scriptural historicity and those who attack it, as well as between those
who deal with that historicity by means of differing understandings of history. (For an
important though, I believe, generally misunderstood discussion of several possibilities
for history, see the second of Nietzsche’s Untimely Meditations.)
4. One problem with this view, a problem that I cannot explore here, is that on such
a view there can be nothing new in the world. What-is is always and only what has already been; everything was given “in the beginning,” and nothing else can be. Though,
under the influence of Greek philosophy, this understanding has been a feature of much
traditional Christianity—perhaps most explicitly in Calvinism—it is a view that is out of
character with Christianity, in which the hope for what is to come, what Bloch calls “the
Not-Yet,” plays a crucial role. See Ernst Bloch, The Principle of Hope, trans. Neville Plaice,
Stephen Plaice, and Paul Knight (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1986). The not-yet is a notion
without which it is difficult to understand how such things as repentance and exaltation
can have meaning, but if everything already has been given, then there is nothing that we
can describe as genuinely not-yet. Some versions of this position are likely to seem very
unorthodox to ordinary Mormons. However, the Platonic view, common among many
orthodox Latter-day Saints, in which religious truth is the expression of a Platonic realm
of truth—laws, principles, for example—may be subject to the same criticism.
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Most Christian believers find this ahistorical resolution of the
problem of scriptural historicity unacceptable, and this is doubly
true for Latter-day Saint believers. For example, most Latter-day
Saints find it difficult to explain and accept the Book of Mormon’s
account of itself and Joseph Smith’s account of its origin if it is not
substantially a historical document rather than an embodiment of
a- or trans-historical truth. Most Latter-day Saints feel that if the Book
of Mormon is not substantially historical, then much of its text—the
narrative, major portion—is irrelevant to its meaning for us, and it is
difficult to see how to avoid accusing Joseph Smith of fraud.
Perhaps one way to avoid that charge would be to understand the
production of the Book of Mormon as the creation of myth, in the positive sense of that word which academics often use, namely a discourse
that purports to give the structure of reality. As will be apparent, I am
sympathetic to that understanding. Nevertheless, I think it is flawed because, as the view is usually argued, it gives up too much. Such an explanation gives up the claim of peculiar and unique truth—a truth inseparable from historical truth—that most Christians and (even more) most
Latter-day Saints take to be essential to their religion and their religious
experience. The historicity of origins has been an essential element of
biblical religion from the beginning. To understand any of those religions only in terms of myth changes them and the religious experience
within them to such a degree that it is not clear how those who take the
mythic view can claim that they are Christians or Latter-day Saints or
Jews or Muslims rather than merely religious people with no particular
religious identity.
For Latter-day Saints the problem of the mythic understanding of scripture is even more severe. For it is difficult to understand
such things as the hefting of the gold plates and the testimony of the
various witnesses and the visits of the Angel Moroni if they are only
part of the construction of a myth.5 Mythmakers account for their
5. Though I am not using the word myth in its everyday sense—a false or fanciful
story—in contrast to the way it is used in chapter 4, I do use it here to denote an account
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myths as things they have received.6 To that degree Joseph Smith’s
account could be construed as mythic. However, mythmakers do
not consciously create the kinds of detailed, first-person accounts of
that reception that Joseph Smith gives. Mythmakers give accounts in
which they have received the story of someone who received the sacred objects. They have not themselves received the objects. Thus, if
we explain Latter-day Saint scripture by saying that Joseph Smith was
making myth rather than reporting historical experiences, it is still
difficult to avoid coming to the conclusion that not only was he making myth, he was also committing fraud. The phenomenon of mythmaking and the phenomenon of the origins of the LDS Church are not
consonant with each other.
However, I believe that there is a more difficult problem. Beside
the existential and phenomenological problems of the myth-making
understanding of scripture, there is a theoretical problem: Those who
argue that the authors of scripture are mythmakers assume, with the
apologists and the academics, that the canons of academic history are
the canons of history. They do not consider the possibility that there
are other ways of understanding history and that, on one of those understandings, scripture is historical, literally so.
As a result of such problems, believers find it necessary to insist
on the historical character of scripture, though doing so is sometimes
rationally difficult; historical scholarship seldom lines up with our
understanding of scripture as well as most believers would like it to.
We can take various positions on the historicity of scripture, but if
we are to think about that historicity, we must ask ourselves what the
word history can mean and which of its possible meanings we can
that is not historically true. As I noted in the earlier discussion, the common scholarly
meaning of the word myth does not include that it is not historically true, but I am not
using the word in that sense. However, if one were to use the word in that scholarly sense,
then one could take my argument to say, among other things, that scripture is myth, but
the myth of scripture and its factual history are not mutually exclusive.
6. Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Explained to Children: Correspondence
1982-1985, ed. Julian Pefanis and Morgan Thomas, trans. Don Berry and others (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), 31–32.
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most accurately apply to scripture. I argue that our discomfort with
the various alternative attempts to deal with the historicity of scripture results from using a concept of history that is inappropriate to
scripture. As a result, though I believe that the historical part of scripture is genuinely historical, I do not think the canons of contemporary
historical scholarship will be much help to us in understanding scripture as history. We must reconsider what history is.
The discussion of history and its meaning, and—especially in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries—the discussion of the historicity
of scripture, have been an important part of modern intellectual history. Much of the contemporary discussion of these issues owes its
form and content to those earlier debates.7 However, though the terms
premodern and modern are not unproblematic,8 I believe that the understanding of history held by premoderns is quite different from our
own, that it is a plausible alternative understanding of history, and
that a contemporary rethinking of it gives us a better way to understand scripture than does a modern understanding—not just a way
of understanding how premoderns understood history and scripture,
7. Literary criticism also owes much to those debates. Most of the varieties of positions taken in literary criticism are very much descendants of the various positions taken
in the eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century debates about the Bible, and even the
positions that are not directly descended from the debates two hundred years ago often
rely on parts of those arguments and positions. One need only read Frei’s overview of
the debates about biblical meaning to see that. See Hans Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative; A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1974), especially chaps. 2–7. Much of the contemporary row over texts
and meaning amounts to little more than a rehash of those earlier discussions.
8. Among other reasons, the terms are problematic because the periodization of
history is a questionable and peculiarly modern practice, because the definitions of the
periods take modernism as their point of reference, and because the names of the periods
do not name specific periods of history so much as ways of thinking that may be more
obvious in one time than another, but are rarely exclusive to any period. As I will use the
terms here, premodern and modern are general terms. There were a variety of ways of understanding history prior to modernism and there are a variety of ways of understanding
it in modernism. However, there is, nevertheless, a divide between the two. Thus, in spite
of the difficulties of doing so, I will use the word premodern to refer to an understanding
of history perhaps best exemplified in medieval thinking and I will use the word modern
to refer to the “scientific” ways of understanding history that come to dominate with
modernism.
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but the basis for understanding our own relation to history and scripture differently than we do. Consequently, a brief comparison of modern and premodern history can serve as a starting point for thinking
about alternative conceptions of history.9
The Modern Concept of History: Representation/Reference
Perhaps the first thing to be said about the difference between
modern and premodern history is that modern history takes narratives and the events they describe to be separable from each other, but
premodern history does not. The distinction is not an obvious one. In
fact, even if we understand that distinction conceptually, we do not
find it easy to think about scripture except by using the modern distinction. Though, in its origins, the separation of event and narrative
is an academic distinction, it has become so “obvious,” so “natural,”
that we have difficulty understanding the distinction or reading scripture in any other way. It seems inescapably true to us that there are
two things, the event itself and what one can truthfully say about that
event. But premodern thinking does not make that distinction, at least
not in the way that modern history does.
To give an account of an event is to speak meaningfully of that
event. For example, “The cat sat on the mat” is meaningful, but it
does not mean much. Though we can understand it lexically and syntactically, unless that sentence is correlated to an event in some way
(whether negatively or positively), it lacks fullness of meaning. If I say
“The cat sat on the mat” as a description of a particular event, then
I find that event meaningful, and the meaning of the sentence is a
presentation of a meaning of the event. However, counterintuitively,
without such presentations of meaning, whether or not explicitly put
into language, there are no events. Events without meaning are strictly
inconceivable; as events, events are meaningful. Without meaning, the
9. Though I do not agree with some of his conclusions, Frei’s seminal work on biblical meaning and the influence of the modern understanding of history on our understanding of biblical meaning serves as my starting point.
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flux of time and space is not filled with events. Without meaning, the
flux is random motion of “stuff,” at best.
Modernism’s mistake was to think that the meaning of sentences
and the events they describe is explained merely referentially. Modernism assumes that the truth of the sentence is a function of its reference to a particular event, but reference is not enough to explain the
meaning of events. If there is to be some meaningful notion of truth,
then the constituting and interpreting subject must be in relation to a
world that is more than and, in some sense, prior to his or her perceptions and interpretations. The question is how to refer to that which is
prior to perception and interpretation when it seems that we can only
do so through perception and interpretation.
I am not saying that reference is impossible. After all, we do speak
of things in the world, and attempts to do away with referential talk
about things in the world are self-refuting (if there are such attempts).10
The modernist mistake is not in thinking that meaning requires reference, but in thinking that reference is sufficient to explain meaning
as truth. There is meaning, but it always goes beyond what one can
account for merely referentially.11
10. However, whether we talk about real things in the real world in a referential way
(i.e., as explained by a referential theory) remains a question. Strictly speaking, reference
per se may be impossible, as thinkers such as Frege and Davidson argue. It does not follow
that we cannot speak of the world, only that we do not do so in the way that referential
theories of meaning assume that we do, namely, by correlating our meaningful sentences
with states of affairs in something like a one-to-one manner. One response to the problem, a response I find interesting and perhaps compelling, is in the work of Jean-Luc
Marion. See, for example, his essay, “The Event, the Phenomenon, and the Revealed,” in
Transcendence in Philosophy and Religion, ed. James E. Faulconer (Indianapolis: Indiana
University Press, 2003), 87–105. Marion argues, not that reference is possible, but that we
have meaningful contact with the things themselves in the world.
11. I will take up the issue of signs from a Derridean standpoint: Every system of signs
depends on something outside the system, so no system of signs can completely capture
that to which it refers; thus, there is always more to reality than any interpretation of it
can capture, though we can give only interpretations. Nevertheless, I do not think the
Derridean character of my argument is essential to it, as I will argue later. The points I
take from Derrida could also be made using other contemporary philosophers, including
Anglo-American ones. See Kevin Hart’s The Trespass of the Sign: Deconstruction, Theology, and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) for a readable, more
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The connection between a word and the thing it refers to—in other
words, meaningful reference—exists only in an act of reference, but
no theory of reference can give an account of that act. Among other
things, a theory of reference cannot account for the particular thing
to which the meaning-act points or for the fact that it does so point
in this case. Language theories can tell us how words relate to each
other (in an “endless chain of signification,” to use a phrase from the
twentieth-century French philosopher Jacques Derrida), but given the
infinite variety of possible references in any particular act of meaning,
language theories cannot fully account for the success of acts in which
we talk about things in the world.
Many theories mark this inability by mentioning the importance
of context, but such a remark makes the Derridean point, for context
does not name something to which we can refer, though at first glance
it may seem to. Each reference to a context is made possible by another
context which is, itself, not referred to, making any attempt to refer to
context itself endless. One cannot refer to context as such; context is
beyond reference, though essential to it. This means that the invocation of context in a theory of reference shows that, beside whatever
the theory proposes to explain meaning, something more is needed.
What I mean in a putative referential act, such as the description of an
historical event, is not completely decided by the sign system (such as
a natural language) that I use to make that reference or by any theory
of such sign systems. It is always also decided by “something more.”
We may try to specify what that something more is by mentioning
the speaker’s intent, the particular audience she addresses, the history
of the language, the social relations in force at the time of the event, and
all of the other “things” to which rhetoric attends, including the relation
detailed overview of Derrida’s discussion of signs and for a treatment of the relevance
of that discussion to religious understanding. For an excellent criticism of Derrida, see
Françoise Dastur, “Heidegger and Derrida: On Play and Difference,” Epoché: A Journal
for the History of Philosophy 3/1–2 (1995): 1–23. However, her criticism does not undo this
point about signs and referentiality. Eco has made an argument similar to Derrida’s. See
Umberto Eco, Theory of Semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976).
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of the referential object to the person making the reference (which begs
the question of reference). However, though we can talk about context,
about what else reference requires, there seems to be no possible science
or theory of context. Beside that, the act of reference (which must, as
an act, include both the object of reference and the particular, existent
thing that corresponds to that object) exists within the system of signs
in which the reference occurs. Thus, the referential act is not a simple
connection of two autonomous things, the thing to which I refer and
the reference.12 We cannot leave language behind, even in our putative
reference to what is outside language.
We must use language to speak of what is beyond language. Nevertheless, we necessarily say what is, strictly speaking, impossible to
say—namely, that talk about the world and the things in the world always involves something more than language. Something more than/
other than language, something that cannot be said directly, accounts
for any successful talk about things. Contrary to a common American (mis)interpretation of Derrida, the point is not that there are only
texts, but that, though we can deal with only texts and text analogs,
12. Thus, also, reference is inherently unstable, not only in its inability to be explained
by any theory of reference, but over time. As the context of an event changes (and the
event has temporal as well as momentary context), so too does the event, as anyone who
genuinely believes in repentance must believe. The present can change the past or there
is no difference between repentance and mere regret. This idea of backward causation
sounds nonsensical to most people (though how, without it, to explain repentance as anything other than a change of mind rather than a purification remains a mystery). However, consider rhythm as an analog. The moments of a rhythm cannot be discreet like the
moments in a time line. If they were, they would not be moments of a rhythm. Rhythmic
moments require (already “contain”) their before and their after. One hit on the head of
a drum is not part of any rhythm; each beat in a rhythm is what it is only in its relation
to each of the other, preceding and following beats, only as it fits into the rhythm as a
whole. Consequently, as one varies a rhythm at any particular beat, the meaning of each
previous beat changes. Since beats are defined in their relation to each other, a change in
the relation between the various beats changes any beat in the past into something “new,”
something other than what it was. The past beat no longer exists in the same way that it
did. At the time the drumhead was struck initially, the beat was one thing. However, with
subsequent strikes, that past event is now something other than what it was. If events
are what they are in relation to each other, then the analogy suggests that their meaning
could change over time, that they, therefore, could change over time.
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there is necessarily something more than any text.13 Ironically, modernism rather than Derrida insists that there is nothing other than
the text: By assuming that, in principle, it is possible, or at least desirable, for human beings to give a final, complete description of the
world, modernism makes an identity of its ultimate, though ideal, text
and the world described by that text. In contrast, Derrida denies the
possibility of that identification. Something always remains beyond
the text—beyond explanation—something that explains the text in
question but is not explained by that text.
The empiricism of modernism (not the only kind of empiricism)
imitates the Sophists of classical Greece, for it pins its hopes for understanding on a supposed ability to fix the connections between ideas
and words, on the one hand, and things on the other. However, as
Catherine Pickstock notes, it is not only impossible to achieve fixity
in that connection, it is dishonest to seek for it: “Human life is always
in the midst of things; the clarity of empiricist conclusions is an illusion fostered by the falsely isolated and inert nature of its artificial
13. Explaining Derrida’s position, John Caputo says: “Derrida does not deny but delimits reference; what he denies is reference-without-difference. Without différance [Derrida’s technical term for what happens in acts of reference: the sign differs from its object
and defers complete identification, never completely corresponding to its object]. Différance does not lock us up inside anything. On the contrary, différance is a doorway, a
threshold (limen), a door through which everything outgoing (reference, messages sent,
etc.) and incoming (messages received, perceptions, etc.) must pass. A threshold supposes both an inside and an outside. . . . On this accounting, proper names refer in
actu exercitu, in the exercised act, in actual use, in the concrete happening or the factual
event. . . . It is a wonder, a little difficult to account for, but it happens. . . . [It is] something that philosophy is forced to swallow while being unable to digest” (John D. Caputo,
Against Ethics: Contributions to a Poetics of Obligation with Constant Reference to Deconstruction [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993], 76–77; boldface added.) The
misunderstanding that attributes to Derrida the claim that there is nothing external to
language is common, so common that it has become the “common sense” of those who
criticize Derrida, as well as many of those who praise him. Nevertheless, it is mistaken, as
a careful reading of Derrida, in the context of his background in Husserl and Heidegger,
will show. Out of ignorance, some continue to make and repeat this mistake because it
has become so common. Others, such as Huston Smith, seem to do so more willfully. See
Huston Smith, “The Religious Significance of Postmodernism: A Rejoinder,” Faith and
Philosophy 12/3 (1995): 409–22.
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findings.”14 In contrast, “the genuine ‘fixity’ parodied by the Sophists
can be attained only in the unshakeable conviction of a certain way
of life.” In other words, as Aristotle argues in Nicomachean Ethics,
the alternative to the fixity of ideas is fixity of character, the fixity
of a lived life, a fixity that cannot be reduced to a fixed connection
between ideas and things. By ignoring that alternative, when modernism discovers that it cannot nail things down as it wishes, that crucifixion is no more appropriate for ideas and values than it is for human
beings, it concludes that nihilism is the only alternative.15
For history, as for any other discipline, the question that a nonmodern understanding of signs and reference raises is, “What else
is involved in producing the ‘text’ of our understanding of history?”
According to what we choose, we will get different ways of understanding history. And, though we can and must adjudicate between
the various ways of understanding history, there is no way to do so
“purely”—in other words, without referring to such things as various authorities; our goals and traditions; social, scholastic, and other
conventions; social relations; and so on. As Friedrich Nietzsche saw
clearly (in the second of his Untimely Meditations), we must take into
account the lives and ways of life into which such histories enter. We
cannot name, once and for all, what the “what else” of language or
even of an individual language act is. Contrary to the expectations of
the Enlightenment, we have no Archimedean point from which we
can leverage our decision for or against a particular understanding of
the world, much less of history.
It is important to note, however, that the consequence of the absence of such a risk-free leverage or standpoint does not result in absolute relativity and, therefore, in the meaninglessness of our decisions.
14. Catherine Pickstock, After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 19.
15. This explains why so many who read the work of thinkers such as Derrida,
Lyotard, Levinas, and others cannot see anything in them but nihilism: since such thinkers reject modernism’s understanding of fixity, those readers assume that the thinkers in
question must argue for no fixity at all.
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That relativist consequence would follow only if, contrary to fact, we
have only two options: mathematical certainty or absolute relativity.16
Philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle, among the ancients, and
Hannah Arendt, in this century, have offered other options. However,
we need not know the work of these philosophers to see that we can
break the horns of the dilemma with other options. The necessity of
faith (though not necessarily religious faith) shows that there are more
than those two options.17
Since the eighteenth century, both those who criticize scripture
as history and those who defend it have assumed the modernist understanding of the connection between history and meaning, though
usually only implicitly. I argue that, in spite of themselves, eighteenthcentury biblical critics give up the Bible as a sacred text—even, implicitly, those who wished to defend it as sacred. They assume that there is
a universal, language-free view available to them (at least in principle)
and that the scriptures refer to or depict that universal view more or
less accurately.18 They assume that events exist prior to and independent of the meanings of those events, and that the better a historical
16. Those who assume that the absence of a risk-free, universal viewpoint results in
thoroughgoing relativism share with the Enlightenment the assumption that meaning
is either constituted as the Enlightenment says it is or there is no meaning. With most
contemporary philosophers, I deny that assumption. As a consequence, vicious relativism does not necessarily follow from denying an Archimedean leverage point for understanding and interpretation.
17. For example, echoing what other contemporary philosophers have also said, Derrida says: “There is no morality without faith, faith in the other. There is no social experience without bearing witness, without attestation, the recognition of a dimension of trust
and faith. This is not a religious point; it is the general structure of experience” (Derrida,
private discussion, Paris, 1 March 1996). The first of the Lectures on Faith made a similar
point more than one hundred years ago, and it presumably echoes what the Prophet Joseph Smith believed. Joseph Smith might reply to Derrida: “True, it is the general structure of experience, but that is a religious point, for religion gives the general structure to
experience.”
18. Such a view may be consequent on the traditional Christian understanding of
God: As an unembodied being, God is omnipresent. For such an omnipresent being,
knowledge is aperspectival, i.e., universal. Thus, as the Renaissance and Enlightenment
argument goes, since we are made in God’s image, to the degree possible our knowledge
also should be aperspectival and universal. However, one can believe in God’s knowledge, understanding, and omniscience without assuming that they are to be understood
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text is, the more accurately it describes the independent event. By
agreeing to the modernist assumption about how meaning is fixed,
even defenders of the Bible conflate historical understanding with an
accurate, referential description of events. They assume that meaning, biblical or otherwise, is essentially referential/representative and
that only a rational method can give us understanding of historical
texts, such as the Bible. By making the question of scriptural truth—
scriptural literalness—a merely referential question (in other words,
by understanding meaning via a referential theory and by applying
that understanding to scripture), both the religious and the critics of
religion turn religion into a set of beliefs to which one assents because
one takes them to be referentially valid. But to paraphrase James, the
devils also refer, and tremble (see James 2:19).
A Premodern Concept of History: Incarnation
In contrast, premodern thinkers take the Bible not as an accurate reference to either history or another reality (though they do not
deny that we can speak of the world), but as the incarnation (or enactment) of a symbolic ordering.19 Work in the anthropology of religion,
in these universal, aperspectival terms. Much of David Paulsen’s work is dedicated to
showing the alternative.
19. The concept of a symbolic ordering is not a rigorous concept, but I do not think it
a difficult concept to understand. I think its meaning will become clear as I use the term
in context. However, let me try to say something for those who would like more of an
explanation. For background in understanding my discussion of symbolic ordering, one
should read sections 31 and 32 of Heidegger’s Being and Time (and perhaps the material
leading up to those sections). See Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward
Robinson (New York: Harper, 1962). There he discusses understanding and the necessity
of preunderstanding to understanding and interpretation. (By understanding Heidegger
means something like “implicit understanding,” and by interpretation he means the explication of understanding.) The correlate discussion of prejudice in Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Truth and Method, trans. Joel Wein, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Continuum, 1993),
265–300, and the discussion of prefiguration (also called mimesis 1) in Paul Ricoeur’s
Time and Narrative, Volume 1, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer (Chicago:
University of Chicago, 1984), 1–64, might be helpful. (Both Gadamer and Ricoeur rely
heavily on Heidegger’s work.) Charles Guignon’s book may also be helpful: Heidegger and
the Problem of Knowledge (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983). Briefly put, what we think of as
understanding requires preunderstanding; preunderstanding gives us our possibilities
for understanding. As we have understood since Plato, our understanding of the world
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such as that of Mircea Eliade, suggests that we misunderstand religion when we understand it as essentially a set of beliefs.20 In contrast,
when we see what such anthropological work shows us, we discover
that religion is an ordering of the world in and through symbols. Beliefs are consequent on that ordering, not constitutive of it. Thus, a
Catholic, a Southern Baptist, and a Latter-day Saint differ from one
another, not so much because they hold different beliefs (though they
do), but because they are involved in different ways of ordering the
world symbolically (though, given that they are all Christians, there
is considerable overlap in the orderings manifest in their lives). The
most obvious place to find symbolic ordering is in the rituals of religions and in their sacred objects, though symbolic ordering also
cannot begin from zero, ex nihilo. Something, some way in which the world gives itself
to us prior to reflection, makes reflective understanding possible. But the world does not
give itself as the bare presence of mere things. It always—always already—gives itself to
us in shape and relations, in a figure. The world gives itself to us, prereflectively, as configured in various ways. One fundamental preunderstanding is the configuration of the
world (anciently, the kosmos), within which one finds oneself oriented in the world: an
ordering gives the possibilities for understanding by configuring the possible relations
of the world. Various things can serve to order the kosmos, language and mathematics,
for example. A symbolic ordering is a preunderstanding in which symbols and symbols
systems (as opposed to sign systems) are fundamental, though not exclusive, to the configuration in which one finds oneself oriented.
20. This reduction of religion to sets of beliefs is also consequent on the traditional
understanding of God and the way that understanding led to the Enlightenment: On a
voluntaristic Christian view, God’s will is coextensive with his knowledge, which is ideal
and at least a representation of the world. Thus, since humans image God, human knowledge (i.e., representation of the ideal), like God’s knowledge, is prior to or fundamental
to human action and life. (This explains why Western thought consistently values theory
over praxis.) On a voluntarist view, religious beliefs are representations to ourselves of the
religious aspect of the ideal world. As such, they make it possible for us to act in religious
ways. Therefore, beliefs are fundamental to religion. We generally take recognition of and
adherence to a particular set of beliefs to be identical with being an adherent of that religion. (Note that it is possible to understand a good deal of modernism as an outgrowth of
voluntarism in theology. For an argument to this effect, see Klaus Held, “Civic Prudence
in Machiavelli: Toward the Paradigm Transformation in Philosophy in the Transition to
Modernity,” in The Ancients and the Moderns, ed. Reginald Lilly [Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1996], 115–29.) To take religion to be a matter of symbolic ordering is to
reject this understanding of the connection between religion and belief. (Of course, I do
not necessarily reject everything about voluntarism, only those features that make belief
and representation fundamental to action in the way that voluntarism does.)
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encompasses more ordinary aspects of life, including such things as
peculiar idioms and patterns of deference—and assertions of belief.
Especially in religion, systems and sets of beliefs are part of the orders in question, but they are not foundational to those orders. To be
religious, therefore, is not to assent to particular propositions or assertions, though that assent follows from the fact that one is religious.
Instead, to be religious is to recognize—to reverence—the holy and
to live in a world of which the contents, including beliefs, are ordered
by the holy.21 For the religious, the holy is the ordering principle, the
“form” of the world, to use a term important to Plato, Aristotle, and all
of medieval philosophy.22 For premodern thought, both religious and
21. I am hesitant to define what I mean by holy. I fear a kind of definitional blasphemy,
but I can say that it has to do with what is excessive—in other words, abundant, and determinative: the holy “transcends” the world of our experience and our ability to explain
(though it transcends without having to be, itself, in or of another quasi-Platonic metaphysical realm) and it “explains” the world (by grounding that world, though—again—it
is not a ground outside or beyond the world). Those curious about how to think such
transcendence and ground might find Heidegger’s Principle of Reason, trans. Reginald
Lilly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), interesting. Though that book is not
about the holy, it does deal with transcendence without making transcendence otherworldly. The question of transcendence has become central to much contemporary European philosophy, so much so that some philosophers have complained of a “theological
turn” in French thought. See Dominique Janicaud, The Theological Turn of French Phenomenology, in Dominique Janicaud and others, Phenomenology and the “Theological
Turn”: The French Debate, trans. Bernard G. Prusak and Jeffrey L. Klosky (New York:
Fordham University Press, 2000), 16–103.
22. I use the language of form and content here for heuristic reasons. As we usually
understand that language, it requires another world to which this world refers; that is,
something like a metatheory of representation. However, one need not be a Platonist or a
representationalist to find the language of form meaningful and helpful. For the ancients,
form is that in which the real shows itself, presents itself. That is the point, and the point
need not be understood in representational terms, as Aristotle well shows. Put otherwise:
the language of form and content can be helpful, though the danger is that we will understand that language via a theory of representation or something like it. The work of
Heidegger, for example, is amenable to this way of thinking. I believe that Wittgenstein’s
work is similarly amenable to form and content language, though of course neither Heidegger nor Wittgenstein would use the word form in its Platonic sense because of the
metaphysical, representational, baggage that the word carries with it. Heidegger speaks
of horizons, Wittgenstein of forms of life. In what follows, I will discuss how form can
be that in which the real shows itself without assuming that the form must have some
existence independent of that which it informs.
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nonreligious, the real is primarily “formal.” There not only can be, but
must be, a variety of manifestations of what I here call form, but each
is an instance of the “same thing.” The form of something is the real
manifesting itself in the world. For religious premoderns, the holy is
the real manifest in the symbolic order of things—it is the form not
just of individual things but of things as a whole—and religion gives
us that form/order.
It is important to note that rational ordering and symbolic ordering are not necessarily at odds with one another. Within a symbolic order, rational discourse is one of the forms in which the real
is manifest. Therefore, it is not opposed to symbolic ordering, but a
possible part of any symbolic order. In contrast, in a rational ordering,
symbolic discourse cannot be made an instance of reason, except as a
parasitic form of reference; in other words, as ambiguous or “poetic”
speech.23 As a result, though within a symbolic ordering there is no
necessary opposition between the rational and the symbolic, that opposition may be necessary to a rational order.24 There is an asymmetry
between symbolic order and rational order, an asymmetry that is to
the advantage of symbolic order.
Living as we do in an age when modernism is the common sense
for perhaps most human beings (at least those under the sway of progress and its Euro-American manifestation), the holy is no longer what
orders the world as a whole. When we are asked to talk or think about
religion, we usually do so as if religion were one of several regions of
life. On this view, there are many regions of my life: the world of work,
the political world, the family, the world of morality, the academic and
scholarly world, the economic region, the world of leisure, and so on.
23. John Searle’s work is an interesting and relevant example of the attempt to take the
language of symbolic ordering as parasitic. See, for example, Speech Acts: An Essay in the
Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969).
24. Ironically, however, the exclusion of symbolic ordering from the rational is selfdefeating since rational language cannot avoid the intrusion of the symbolic via such
features of language as metaphor: we no longer understand words such as inference and
phrases such as follows from out of the metaphors that inform them, but if all metaphorical language were removed, even the language of logic, like all language, would cease to
function.
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Religion is one of these regions of our lives, and some people’s lives
may have no such region. Though we engage in activities that involve
the various regions of our lives, we assume that each is, strictly speaking, separate from the others, though possibly overlapping; in themselves, each region is on an equal footing with the others, and each
region is differentiated in value from any other only by my valuing of
it, in other words by my interests, desires, or needs.25
In contrast, for the premodern, religion is not one of several possible regions of my life. Instead, it is the field within which any other
regions or aspects are marked out and related to each other. Religion
is that which makes regions possible and which enacts the world as a
whole, giving it unity, order, and meaning in and through symbols.
To use Platonic language, religion manifests the “form” of the world.
On this view, we can still speak of regions of human endeavor and interest, but ultimately those regions, such as economics or morality or
politics, get their meaning in themselves and in their relations to each
other, as well as their relative weight and importance from religion,
rather than from our valuing.
If we understand religion this way, then I think we must conclude
that the religious and the critics of religion implicitly agreed to give
up the Bible as a sacred text when they agreed to take it as a referential
text like any other referential text rather than as a symbolically ordering one. For to understand the Bible by means of a referential theory is
to take it as a manifestation of one region of human experience among
others. It is to take it as something on a conceptual and ontological
par with other of its regions, rather than as something incomparable
because it is a revelation of what gives meaning to any possible region
of life as life’s enactment. The eighteenth- and nineteenth-century interest in reading the Bible with the methods that one would use to
read any other book was, implicitly, a recognition that the Bible was
25. Some may expand on this, not placing the value in the individual, but in the
group. However, the basic structure remains the same: the distinction between regions
and the value of each is determined subjectively or intersubjectively.
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no longer the text about human existence, but one of many texts, each
referring to or describing more or less accurately a different dimension or region of human reality.
The disagreement between Catholicism and the Reformation over
the nature of symbols is one locus of this difference between symbolic
ordering and reference. The doctrine of transubstantiation is the most
obvious instance of this difference in the understanding of symbols.
Because those outside the Roman Catholic tradition do not accept
that doctrine, they also often reject the idea that symbols are incarnations rather than mere references. However, one need not accept
transubstantiation—at least not as it is usually understood—to accept
that symbols in general are incarnations.
As the roots of the word transubstantiation imply, the problem
with the doctrine for those who are not Roman Catholics is that it
requires one to believe that the substance of the Eucharist has become, essentially and substantially, the actual flesh and blood of Jesus
Christ. Such an understanding of the Eucharist is the consequence, on
the one hand, of believing that symbols are incarnations, and, on the
other, of having an Aristotelian/Thomistic metaphysics of substance
and, therefore, a commensurate explanation of what it means for a
symbol to be an incarnation.26
26. This is not to say that the dogma of transubstantiation begins with Aquinas.
Rather, he formulates philosophically the justification for a teaching that has been generally argued for (though not always required to be believed) since at least the tenth century
and that was made dogmatic only with the Fourth Lateran Council (1215). The Thomist
interpretation of Aristotle’s doctrine of substance takes substance to be that which exists in itself or that which remains what it is, though it might have differing qualities
at different moments. (For more on substance, see Aristotle’s Categories.) The second
of these characterizations of substance makes possible the doctrine of transubstantiation as usually understood in the dogma of the Catholic Church: the bread takes on the
metaphysical substance of Christ’s body, though in doing so it has different qualities than
it does in the person of Jesus Christ. However, one caveat: Pickstock takes a position
very much like that of Marion (God Without Being, trans. Thomas A. Carlson [Chicago:
University of Chicago, 1991]), arguing cogently and more fully than he that the Thomist
interpretation of transubstantiation is not what makes that doctrine implausible. Rather,
the implausibility results from the metaphysics of Duns Scotus and the consequent spatialization of ontology: Before Scotus, the sacrament of the Eucharist was understood
as the embodied, temporal link of the past to the present and to the future. As such, it

170

Faith, Philosophy, Scripture

However, one could believe that symbols are incarnations without
accepting an Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics of substance and the
explanations of incarnation that follow from it. The tight connection
between the two ideas is only an historical one. Those who accepted
the first of these ideas, incarnation, but not the second, Aristotelian
metaphysics, would not hold to the doctrine of transubstantiation in
the dogmatic sense. Even Catholics have other alternatives for understanding the doctrine of transubstantiation, non-Thomistic, Augustinian ones.27 Thus, Marion argues that the bread and wine (or water for Latter-day Saints) are incarnations of Christ without arguing
that they become, in metaphysical substance, his body and blood; he
connected the meaning of the past event of the atonement to the coming event of the
Apocalypse, through the present. Therefore, the Eucharist was the embodied presenting
of the atonement, an act. See Pickstock, After Writing, 160–65. In contrast, under Scotus’s
influence, the Eucharist later “instantiated a transposition from a temporal distribution
(which linked sacramentally the past and present to the eschatological future), to a spatial
one, according to which the sacramental ‘action’ became less a non-identical repetition
continuous with the ‘original’ event and more a simple, positive, authoritative ‘miracle’
in the present’ ” (Pickstock, After Writing, 160), the presence of a thing. On the pre-Scotus
reading, “that which exists in itself” is dynamic rather than static, more like an event
than a thing. See Heidegger’s Aristotle’s Metaphysics θ 1-3: On the Essence and Actuality of
Force, trans. Walter Brogan and Peter Warnek (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1995), for a discussion of this way of understanding Aristotle and, thus, also Aquinas.
Thus, Pickstock reads Aquinas’s pre-Scotus explanation of the Eucharist and transubstantiation as escaping my criticism, above, though her understanding of Aquinas’s explanation fits well with my understanding of how ordinances, symbols, and texts work in
the premodern world. Whatever one might think is the most coherent explanation of the
doctrine of transubstantiation, my point is that medieval Christians rejected the modernist assumption that the most important symbol in Christianity, the eucharistic wafer
and wine, are material things that merely direct our attention to something immaterial
and invisible. Their understanding of the Eucharist implicitly rejects any simple version
of reference, and that rejection can be generalized to their understanding of symbols
and to the meaning of texts, as I argue we must do to understand the literal character
of scripture.
27. We have seen Pickstock’s explanation. Marion explains the Eucharist, neither as
a mere “perceptible medium for a wholly intellectual or representational process” nor
as “an imposture of idolatry” by which “the community would seek to place ‘God’ at its
disposition like a thing,” but as an incarnation of the eucharistic gift, as a temporalizing
memorial, a physical memorial that orders the present and, in doing so, grants the future:
“The Eucharist anticipates what we will be, will see, will love: figura nostra, the figure of
what we will be, but above all ourselves, facing the gift that we cannot yet welcome, so, in
the strict sense, that we cannot yet figure it” (Marion, God Without Being, 166–67).
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argues for transubstantiation without arguing for that which most of
us associate with transubstantiation and which non-Catholics find religiously and philosophically objectionable. Marion does so with an
understanding similar to that we see in Eliade and others like Pickstock: symbols are incarnate orderings of our world.
One way to understand Marion’s point better is to consider that
early Christians also did not take the Eucharist as a mere reminder,
but as a corporate (in other words, an embodied, incarnate) act, an
enactment of a way of life. For early Christians, the Eucharist is
something the church does and becomes rather than merely something by which the individual signifies and recalls. To remember the
sacrifice of Jesus is to take part in a community and the life of that
community. It is to incarnate the divine community—the body of
Christ (see 1 Corinthians 12:27 and Ephesians 4:12)—and to become
incarnate in it, not merely to recall a past event. (If the sacrament
were merely a matter of recall, one could effectively perform the
sacramental ritual by passing out slips of paper on which was written, “Remember Christ and your relation to him”—or even with an
e-mail message to that effect or a note in one’s tackle box.) For early
Christians and, presumably, for contemporary ones, to partake in
the elements of the Eucharist was to be and become something—to
be made something (“incarnated” in the divine community, Zion)
in and through ritual—not merely to recall a past event.28 Of course,
one cannot become what one must without recalling that past event
at some times, but the point stands that the ritual’s function cannot
be understood only in terms of recollection. Marion’s point about
how the Eucharist temporalizes—incarnates, putting us into the
world in a particular way—is similar.
In contrast, the Reformation understanding of symbols breaks
the incarnans of the symbol (the material of the symbol) from the incarnatum (that which is manifest in the symbol). In doing so, it makes
28. Gregory Dix, The Shape of the Liturgy (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1945),
29ff., 78ff.
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the relation of symbol and what it manifests a matter merely of reference.29 Rejecting the Reformation, Catholicism continues to insist that
the incarnans and the incarnatum cannot be separated: the incarnans
is more than something that helps us think about the incarnatum.
Certainly one need not be a Catholic or believe that the bread of the
sacrament becomes the actual body of Christ to think that this insistence has something valuable to say. The issue is not one of Catholics
versus Protestants, especially for those like ourselves who are neither.
The point is that, contrary to the modernist understanding, religions
do not take symbols merely to be referential; they understand them as
something more (even when their theologies deny that they do, as in
much Protestantism). Contemporary philosophical arguments about
meaning and reference point in the direction of a need for something
more. The anthropology of religions suggests that we must understand that religion requires more than referentially valid beliefs. The
Catholic tradition has called this something more incarnation, a term
that I adopt as informative, though I will supplement that term with
another, enactment. To be incarnate is to be, materially, a manifestation of, an instance of, what is, supposedly, only referred to. On this
way of thinking, the symbol is what it incarnates (or what “in-forms”
it, if we use Platonic language) rather than merely a representation of
or reference to it. To use the language of Aristotle, to be incarnate is
to en-act that to which we might think the thing refers.30 My claim is
that we can understand scripture as an incarnation or enactment of
history rather than a representation of it.
Catholicism has given the most thought to how to understand
sacred things, including rituals and symbols, in terms of enactment.
However, that tradition fails to attend fully to scripture. The Reformation reverses this problem, giving attention to scripture but rejecting
29. Thus, one takes a Reformation view when one understands scripture as a more or
less successful attempt to describe events accurately and when one takes it to be essentially ahistorical and referential to something transcendent.
30. Note that the literal meaning of actual is “enacted.” To be something is to enact
something.
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the understanding of ritual and sacrament as incarnation. And this is
true even though the Reformation and Christian humanism also speak
of the Bible as an incarnation of Christ, as Erasmus does in speaking of the text as the body of Christ.31 In spite of what might appear
to be incarnational language in Reformation works, we can see the
shift from enacted incarnation to representation in the seventeenthcentury debates over theater (a debate between written text—
representation—and enactment). As Richard Helgerson says:
Where print fixes the author and frees the reader, performance
[in my terms, enactment] does the reverse. It frees the
performer and fixes—transfixes—the audience. Performance
allows the self a Protean adaptability, but skillfully
managed, it overwhelms its audience, rendering it captive to
impressions that defy interpretation. For over a millennium
the Western community of Christian believers was held in at
least a semblance of unity, despite theological difference and
hierarchical schism, by the power of ritual performance, only
to disintegrate into countless mutually hostile churches when
the printed word replaced performed ritual as the primary
source of authority.32
One could make many points from this observation, from points
about the importance of the temple to an explanation of why priesthood authority, something enacted rather than spoken or written
down, loses its importance in Reformation belief. However, for our
purposes, the point is that the rise of Protestantism involved a shift
from scripture as incarnation (enacted presentation) to scripture as
written re-presentation.
Having rejected the enactment of incarnation, the Reformation
finds itself in trouble when it tries to preserve the sacred character of
31. Cited in Richard Helgerson, “Milton Reads the King’s Book: Print, Performance,
and the Making of a Bourgeois Idol,” Criticism 29/1 (1987): 1–25, at p. 4.
32. Cited in Helgerson, “Milton Reads the King’s Book,” 6.
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scripture, even though it insists on that. By the eighteenth century,
the Reformation relies on referential theories of meaning, with the
consequence that scripture, too, loses its sacred character. By itself,
writing cannot do the work that the Reformation places on its back;
it always falls short of re-presenting its object.33 Though individual
Protestants and Protestant churches may think of scripture otherwise,
in principle it ceases to be sacred.34 For the Reformation, scripture
refers to what is sacred, but it is not itself an incarnation of what is
sacred. This is because the Reformation gives up the possibility of understanding symbols as incarnations and replaces the incarnational
understanding of symbols with the modern theory of reference that
comes to the fore.
Thus, the key to the alternative understanding of history that
I think saves us from the dilemma of academic history, on the one
hand, and ahistory, on the other, is to understand the scriptures as
incarnational: the scriptures are literal history, but their history is incarnational rather than representational. One can still reasonably ask,
however, what it means to speak of incarnation.
To better understand what it means to say that a symbol (and,
therefore, also a religious text) is an incarnation, consider an example
from the contemporary Belgian philosopher, Paul Moyaert:35 When
Moyaert’s father died, he inherited his father’s cup. The cup, which
he uses for his coffee every morning, has a surplus value. It cannot be
reduced to instrumental values. For example, it cannot be reduced to
an instrument for helping Moyaert recall his father. If it were, such a
33. Writing falls short when it assumes that the relation between the written word
is simple reference rather than enactment, for it will always fail to reach that which it
supposedly represents because, as only reference, it removes itself from the act in which
genuine reference occurs. Reference is an act, not a relation. Writing must be read and
interpreted for it to be enacted.
34. Ironically, I take it that the nineteenth- and twentieth-century conservative
Christian interpretations of sola scriptura are the consequence of the fact that scripture
has lost its sacred character—an insistence on its sacred character when the rational underpinnings for thinking it sacred have disappeared.
35. The example comes from a lecture by Moyaert, Catholic University of Leuven,
8 January 1996. I have used a variation of the same example in chapter 1 in this volume.
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perspective would make the cup, as symbol, only a means for having a
particular mental attitude, such as contemplative recollection or psychological reverence for his father. That kind of understanding of the
cup will not do. Among other things, it robs the cup of its symbolic
value by making it possible that anything, even something that Moyaert chose arbitrarily, could serve the same purpose. If a symbol were
only something for creating a mental attitude, then Moyaert could
choose a pebble from the street in front of his house to remind him of
his father, but it is no coincidence that symbols do not come into being
in such an arbitrary fashion. They are not mere keepsakes (and even
the keepsake is rarely, if ever, arbitrary or merely subjective).
The cup is not just a tool for recollecting; the surplus value of the
cup comes from the fact that Moyaert’s father touched it. Thus, its
character as a symbol is a matter of contiguity rather than representation or instrumentality. However, when Moyaert uses the cup, it is not
that, by doing so, he touches his father in absentia. The cup is not a
substitute for his father—another reason that it is not essentially a reminder. Though the cup can remind him, often Moyaert uses it without explicitly recalling his father. Instead, the cup is a symbol of Moyaert’s father because it does something for Moyaert in spite of himself:
even when he is not thinking of his father, the cup demands Moyaert’s
reverence; it connects Moyaert to his father even when Moyaert is not
conscious of his father. In a small way, the cup gives a symbolic order
to Moyaert’s world, an order that relates him to his father and to the
rest of the world, an order that cannot be reduced to his intentions
to recall his father. It is as if the cup remembers Moyaert’s father for
Moyaert.36
Thus, not only does the cup not refer to or even represent Moyaert’s father, it does not take his place. In a very real sense, it takes
36. It is not central to the thesis of this paper, but I should note that, as I say in chapter 1,
I distinguish memory from recall. Recall is a psychological event. Memory is what we share
and participate in. As such, it gives us direction (intention) beyond our subjective intentions, often intentions we do not know. It also creates expectations of us that are beyond our
will. Though the cup remembers for Moyaert, it may not always or ever recall for him.
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Moyaert’s place rather than his father’s. In that sense, Moyaert is willing to grant something like but not identical to consciousness—within
the symbolic order—to his father’s cup. This approaches what we see
described in anthropological encounters with so-called “primitive”
religions: symbols are objects that do something in spite of my intentions; they do something that we otherwise could attribute only to human beings. In this sense, religion is magical—though we must avoid
equating magic with naive or bad science.37 The cup is an incarnation
rather than a reference; it gives a symbolic order to Moyaert’s world
rather than a rational one, and the cup gives order by embodying that
order in the lived world that it orders.
It is important to emphasize that this result—that symbols operate in a “magical” way—is because the reverence that characterizes
life in a symbolic ordering is not a matter of consciousness. Of course
conscious reverence for the sacred is possible. However, one could
not have the mental attitude of reverence without already being in a
symbolic ordering, an ordering that gives one the possibility of conscious reverence, at least partly by manifesting objects that demand
reverence. The symbolic order gives objects as objects of reverence,
so to be within the symbolic order is to be reverent, to attend to the
sacred, whether or not one is explicitly conscious of and attentive to
that order. For to be within a symbolic ordering is to be ordered by,
to have the world ordered by, that symbolic ordering. The objects and
possibilities of the world, especially but not only ritual objects and
possibilities, are related to each other in and through the fact that they
manifest the ordering of the symbolic; the symbolic ordering gives
them their place and their relations in the world, and it makes possible
our understanding. And in ritual acts, one’s own body, as well as the
objects to which one attends, are loci for such incarnations of the sym37. For an interesting discussion of symbolic ordering and its power—in the context
of witchcraft rather than magic—see Jeanne Favret-Saada, Deadly Words, trans. Catherine Cullen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). The introduction to that
book also shows why symbolic ordering cannot be reduced to primitive science.
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bolic. Symbolic relations do not come from mental acts and attitudes;
they make acts and attitudes, such as conscious reverence, possible.
One way to state my thesis is to say that scripture is incarnation
and religion is sacred ordering. Thus, difficulties occur when, with the
onset of modernism, scripture becomes, like any other book, something that is understood merely referentially, and religion ceases to be
thought of as the ordering power of the world and becomes one sphere
of interest among many, a sphere that must be ordered by something
else. For modernism, that “something else” is reason, though for
Christian premoderns, the ordering power is the incarnate Divine—
and this difference in the ordering “principle” produces the chasm
(and the common antipathy) between the two.
We see a symptom of this loss of symbolic ordering in Descartes’
Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason (published
in 1637). In the Discourse, Descartes tells us that he needs something
by which to adjudicate between the various plausible opinions he
learned in the schools. Finding nothing, he takes up the method of
geometry, namely formal reason. In addition, Descartes confines religion to the region of morals. He not only speaks of the moral truths of
his country and Catholicism (truths that he accepts as provisional),38
he also mentions the truths of faith.39 Nevertheless, Descartes does no
more than mention the truths of faith. Rather than being that which
orders the regions of our lives, for Descartes, religion is one region of
human life among other possible regions, a region that can be ignored
or set to the side as one goes about laying a foundation for understanding the world and its various regions.40 Descartes finds himself
in a chaos in which it seems that nothing can be known or trusted.41
Prior to the Reformation, the Catholic Church had given the world
38. Descartes, Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason, part III ¶1.
39. Descartes, Discourse on the Method, part III ¶6.
40. Interestingly, Descartes reduces the religious region of human experience to the
moral, a reduction that begins at about his time and grows more prevalent until, today,
the identity of religion and morality is common sense—in spite of Nietzsche’s pointed
and accurate attacks on such religion. Such common sense robs religion of its vitality.
41. Descartes, Discourse on the Method, part I.
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its order, but that order has failed for Descartes. Thus, if there is to
be something other than chaos—in Descartes’ terms, if knowledge
is possible—then something other than religion must order life as a
whole, including religion. For Descartes, religion has ceased to give
order to the world and has become one of its regions. His project in
Discourse and in Meditations on First Philosophy is to allow reason to
order life by giving us the method for conducting/ordering reason; in
other words, by showing us that reason can order itself.42
That Descartes believes we need a method for ordering reason is
evidence that the symbolic ordering no longer has force: Descartes
confuses our tool for dealing with the various regions of existence,
namely reason, for the ordering authority of the world. He makes
it clear that he has settled on a method for conducting reason and
finding truth because he has no way of choosing between the various
opinions of his predecessors: finding nothing that orders reason, Descartes must give a rational method for ordering it. Yet the necessity
of grounding reason on itself (method) would never have occurred
to an ancient Greek or a medieval Christian, Jew, or Muslim because,
whatever the many differences between them, for each, the exercise of
reason occurs within an ordering that is prior to and fundamental to
reason. For them, whether it is physis or Divine creation, reason has a
ground that is, on a modern view, nonrational.43 Even those thinkers,
such as the Averroists, for whom the truths of reason and the truths of
faith are ultimately commensurable, do not assume that something is
true because it is rational. Instead, something is rational because it is
true. That reversal of the relation between truth and reason is signifi42. As Emmanuel Levinas shows in Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority,
trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 48ff., Descartes’
attempt relies on the necessity of something beyond the rational (see Meditations III).
Nevertheless, Descartes seems not to have understood the degree to which the necessity
of recourse to the extrarational Infinite undercuts his methodological claims. Even if he
did understand that, it is certainly the case that those following him did not.
43. Of course, if one does not have the narrower definition of reason that modernism
adopts, then it becomes possible to identify the ground of reason (in that word’s modern
sense) with reason itself, as ancients and medievals usually do.
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cant. It marks the huge difference between the way that the ancients
and the medievals see the world, on the one hand, and the way that we
see the world once modernism arrives.
For premodern thinkers, reason’s being is granted by the truth
of the symbolic ordering, even if the rational order and the symbolic
order are ultimately identical. Thus, for those in the centuries before
modernism, there had been means for adjudicating between various
plausible opinions. For Christians, the Catholic Church—its authority,
its doctrines and practices, its institutional structure—provided those
means and order came to the world through them. Descartes’ inability
to adjudicate between differing opinions and his subsequent search for
a method shows us that by Descartes’ time a radical shift had already
taken place, a shift away from an understanding that finds the use of
reason within what is given by a symbolic ordering. Prior to modernism, the world had been given order by the Divine and reason was a
tool for dealing with and in that order, though not itself the source of
order. However, the loss of the Divine as a ground left reason and the
world without moorings and, so, required something like the four-part
rational method that Descartes prescribes.44 Reason filled the vacuum
created when religion ceased to order life.
This loss of the Divine as a ground shows up in the difference
between modern and premodern understandings of certainty. Prior
to modernism, Christian certainty was the certainty of salvation, a
certainty given by the life of faith, a certainty available to all who lived
that life. Thus, though Christians had certainty, that certainty did not
include a complete apprehension of the rational (in other words, of
the mind of God). With modernism the ground shifts: since certainty
is no longer given, it must be achieved; one must have a method for
gaining certainty, rules for what to do to get it.
Since, as we see in Descartes, the method for achieving certainty
is rational, the rational is thought of as self-revealing. Based on the
biblical teaching that humans are made in God’s image (Genesis 1:26
44. Descartes, Discourse on the Method, part II ¶¶7–10.
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and Moses 2:27), human reason is rethought and at least implicitly
modeled on the mind of God, a mind that has come to be understood
as, strictly speaking, capable of only purely theoretic understanding.
As a result, modernism assumes that the use of the proper method,
a self-grounding method, will (in principle) lead one to the complete
capture, the complete apprehension, of the rational (which, though no
longer identical to the mind of God, continues to be thought in the
same terms: for example, as self-revealing and atemporal). This shift
changes the meaning of everything—the rational, certainty, method,
knowledge—in such a way that the premodern understanding becomes inaccessible to thought, incomprehensible, at best naive and
primitive.45
One way to see the difference between a modern and a premodern
understanding of religion is to focus on the question of signs. In latterday scripture, the Lord says to Adam:
Behold, all things have their likeness, and all things are
created and made to bear record of me, both things which
are temporal, and things which are spiritual; things which are
in the heavens above, and things which are on the earth, and
things which are in the earth, and things which are under the
earth, both above and beneath: all things bear record of me.
(Moses 6:63)
45. In spite of the way that, for heuristic reasons, I have described the change from
premodernism to modernism and in spite of the way that modern thinkers often portrayed and understood themselves, modernism was no sudden and absolute rupture with
its past. Such things as Greek epistēmē combined with the Christian idea of an external
nature over which humans rule, the certainty of salvation, ascetic “methods” for achieving salvation, and voluntarism are important antecedents of modernism. Nevertheless,
with modernism’s explicit rejection of its roots and its move to the subject (individual
consciousness) as fundamental, a very new understanding of things and the world entered into European history. For more on the antecedents of modernism, see Louis Dupré, Passage to Modernity: An Essay in the Hermeneutics of Nature and Culture (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), and Pickstock, After Writing.
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We often read this passage and similar ones as if it speaks of signs
referentially. However, there are problems with that view.46 The understanding that this citation exemplifies was a common one among
ancient thinkers, including Augustine, so consider his reflection on
signs and on the claim in question. In one obvious reading, Augustine is said to argue that signs are essentially referential. The referential character of signs seems difficult to avoid in Christian Doctrine
1.2 and 2, where Augustine seems to give a standard, modern theory
of signs, a referential theory: words are signs of other things; we use
words to refer to things. However, it is important to notice that in Augustine’s discussion God is not a creature, so (in Augustine’s understanding) he is not a thing. We cannot refer to God.47 Nevertheless,
all things, particularly corporeal things, point to God.48 It follows that
all things point to God, though none refer to him. Either God is an
exception, or some ways of signifying point at that which they intend,
but they do not refer.
In addition, Augustine explicitly compares the Incarnation with
speech,49 but the Incarnation cannot be understood as a merely referential event. Thus, though every thing (every creature; every created
thing) is a sign, the final object of signs, which makes all other signs
possible as signs, is no thing (because it is no creature), and cannot be
referred to. The consequence is that, for Augustine (and I think also
for the scriptural passage in question), we cannot understand signs
merely referentially; referential theories of signs are only partial theories. Something more is needed, namely God (for Augustine) and I
would add “also other intelligences.”
Notice also that, according to traditional Christian doctrine, after the fall of Adam, human beings are unable to see God directly,
a thought often expressed for Latter-day Saints in the idea that we
46. One problem is that, as I argue in chapter 7 in this volume, likeness in scripture
seems to suggest likeness of being rather than likeness merely of appearance or qualities.
47. Augustine, Christian Doctrine 1.5.
48. Augustine, Christian Doctrine 1.6.
49. Augustine, Christian Doctrine 1.13.
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cannot see God “with natural eyes.”50 From this comes the traditional
Christian view that language—veiling and obscuring as it may be
in some sense—is not only a consequence of the fall, it is a blessing.
Language gives human beings our only access to the Divine, which
otherwise would blind us. If, as modernism suggests, the words that
refer to God and divine things were mere signs, tools for thinking
about something else, just tools for referring to something else, then
for them to function as signs we would also have to have direct access
to the referent, to God, which is impossible. Merely referential signs
require that what they refer to must be available to the person who
understands them.
Consider a simple sign: my driver’s license. My license has a name,
a number, and a picture. They each refer to me and together they represent me. To understand this reference and representation—for any
one of them or all of them as a group to function as a sign—a person
taking my license as a sign must have access not only to these signs,
but also to that which they refer. In principle, a person must be able
to encounter me independent of those signs. He or she must be able
to see, hear, or touch me independent of my license. Without that,
the license cannot refer to me because the merely referential sign is
a substitute for the thing signified, the license is a substitute for my
person. Imagine a case in which someone says, “This license has a
referent, but the picture is not the picture of the person it refers to,
the number is not that person’s number, and the name on it is not the
referent’s name.” No one would take the person’s claim seriously. As
merely references, signs function only if that to which they refer is also
independently accessible to those who read them.
If we understand symbols as a kind of referential sign, then we understand signs of God as substitutes for him and, therefore, we assume
implicitly that we have direct access to him. However, signs of God
do not work that way, for if they refer, they do so across a chasm with
50. In latter-day scripture, see Moses 1:11 and Doctrine and Covenants 58:3, as well as
2 Corinthians 12:1–4.
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“nothing available” on the other side. Of course, religious people will
deny that nothing is available on the other side, but that makes my
point rather than contradicts it. The religious can see and listen to and
be commanded by the Being to whom the religious symbol refers, not
because it refers in the same way that an ordinary sign does (in other
words to something public, something that anyone can see or hear independent of the sign), but because, being enlightened fundamentally
by the Divine rather than by reason,51 they see the “other side” in and
through the symbol.52
Though there are a variety of positions among premodern thinkers regarding signs, I think we can characterize them as generally taking the words of scripture not to be merely referential signs of a divine
reality (though they may have what we could call a referential component). Instead of referring to the Divine as do ordinary signs, the
words of scripture are an embodiment of the Divine, an incarnation;
they embody the divine order of that to which, on a modern view, they
seem only to refer.53 Thus, according to Carol Harrison, in spite of the
homonymy, instead of translating Augustine’s word signum as “sign,”
we should understand it to mean sacramentum, itself a translation of
mystērion: what is secret or hidden.54 And we must remember that the
mystērion is not just temporarily hidden. It is hidden in principle; in
51. Which, of course, is not to say that they are not, secondarily, also enlightened by
reason.
52. The difference between what Augustine and Aquinas mean by enlightenment and
what the moderns mean is another way to mark the difference between the medieval and
the modern. The former has to do with the gift of seeing the sacred in the temporal, seeing the sacred order of the temporal; the latter has to do with using reason critically. For
the former, see Augustine’s The Literal Meaning of Genesis; for the latter, see Kant, “What
Is Enlightenment?” in Kant Selections, ed. Lewis W. Beck (New York: Macmillan, 1988),
462–67.
53. The incarnationist view of scripture is not confined to Christianity. Speaking of
the medieval Jewish mystical understanding of Torah, Fishbane says, “On this view, the
Bible . . . is ontologically unique principally because it is nothing less than a dimension of
divinity itself.” Michael Fishbane, The Garments of Torah: Essays in Biblical Hermeneutics
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), 35.
54. Carol Harrison, Beauty and Revelation in the Thought of Saint Augustine (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1992), 85, 203.
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other words, it is invisible to human or “natural” eyes. We see it only
by revelation.
On such thinking, the visible—the elements and objects of the
created world, the history of the world, our lives together—bears (incarnates, enacts) rather than refers to spiritual reality. It bears and
enacts it as depth and richness—as mystery in the strict, positive sense
of that word, “a secret”—just as the human body bears and enacts the
depth and richness and mystery of the person. For a Muslim, a Jew,
or a Christian, the full history of the world is necessarily a history
understood under the order of divine creation. Thus, strictly speaking, the actual, literal history of the world is invisible except as the
symbolic ordering of creation embodies and reveals it. Any other history is an abstraction from that literal history. For the religions of the
Bible and Qur’an, scripture is an important incarnation of the divine
ordering (as are also ordinance, priesthood authority, tradition, and
so on). Because it is symbolic, scripture embodies what reference cannot yield, what is in itself unrepresentable because it is excessive of
reference. Scripture embodies and bodies forth the divine ordering of
the world and its events. For premoderns, that embodiment is history,
literal history, not the accurate reference to and description of events
that have no order or meaning other than the chronology of time and
the relations of reason.55
For Christians, the Incarnation of Christ is the perfect instance of
the conjunction of factum and sacramentum: Christ is neither a rep55. Suppose, however, that one cannot accept the argument that symbols are best understood incarnationally, that one still feels that symbols must be understood as references,
as a kind of sign. Even then, it is impossible for us to refer adequately and accurately to the
history of the world. Human understanding may hold some few points of that history together, but it cannot hold them together as a whole, especially not an ordered whole. For human understanding, the kosmos becomes, at best, a blur of amorphous shapes in an ancient
mirror. (See 1 Corinthians 13:12.) If the kosmos can be comprehended, only God can do so.
Therefore, even if scripture were referential rather than incarnational, for a believer only
the divine revelation of history—in other words, scripture—could be an accurate reference
to and representation of that history as a whole, something that scientific history neither
attempts nor wishes to give. The events of history can be understood only as they fit into the
whole of which they are a part. Thus, even the particular events of a divine history could
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resentation of divine reality nor a reference to it. He is not something
given to help us recall God.56 He is that divine reality perceptible to
human beings. As such, he is also the perfect analogy for scripture: “In
the case of Scripture, the visible, created, temporal order cannot simply be shunned as an ambiguous, misleading imitation of a spiritual
truth which is better grasped by the mind. Rather, . . . Scripture is the
‘incarnate’ form of the Christian revelation.”57 Similarly, New Testament statements about the church being the body of Christ suggest
that one encounters Christ in the church. The church is an incarnation
of Christ, not a simple signifier of or reference to him—an incarnation
in the sense I have discussed earlier, namely something that materially
manifests or enacts a symbolic ordering, here, that of Christ.
Though this language of incarnation, as when we speak of the
church as the incarnation of Christ, is scriptural,58 it strikes Latterday Saints as odd. It is sufficiently odd for a Mormon audience that
we assume it to be, perhaps, metaphorical or a matter of simile: we
want to say, “the church is like the body of Christ,” though that is not
a particularly informative clause. The problem is that, given Standard
English usage, we think of incarnation as an event in which something that is without a body becomes manifest in something embodied. Therefore, we speak of that event as “the incarnation of x, y, or z,”
where the variables stand for the unembodied thing in question. Since
Christ is embodied, it is not clear how he could become incarnate in
the church. In fact, according to our standard usage, to say that he
does suggests that he is not already incarnate himself.59 No surprise
not be understood except from within the perspective of a divine revelation, the perspective
purportedly offered by scripture and a perspective purposefully and necessarily unavailable within the parameters of modern historiography.
56. For Latter-day Saints, the comparison is even closer: the Son is an incarnation of
the Father without being the same person as the Father.
57. Harrison, Beauty and Revelation, 81.
58. For example, 1 Corinthians 12:27; Ephesians 4:12.
59. Alternatively, it suggests something that we find too mysterious, something like
the traditional interpretation of the doctrine of transubstantiation.
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that we are confused by talk of the church being the body of Christ, or
by this discussion of scripture as incarnation.
However, consider that Joseph Smith says, “There is no such thing
as immaterial matter. All spirit is matter.”60 According to his teachings,
my body is not the incarnation of something non-bodily, for the spirit
is also incarnate. In fact, there are no non-incarnate entities.61 This suggests that we cannot understand incarnation as something unembodied
becoming embodied. What, then, can we mean by incarnation?
Our common usage and the history of thought about incarnation
make it difficult for us to think of incarnation in terms consonant with
the Prophet’s teaching. His teaching flies in the face of that usage and
history. Nevertheless I do not think we are faced with an insurmountable difficulty. We must think carefully about embodiment. We must
ask what it means to say that we “have” a body, given that we cannot
mean that something unembodied possesses or inhabits something
embodied and we do not explain that usage when we speak of one
kind of body (a spirit body) possessing another (a physical body).62
Though this is not as simple as it first might seem (thinking otherwise
than our usual prejudgments and understandings is often difficult,
even when we know they are wrong), there are philosophers, such as
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who may help us begin to do this thinking.
Put broadly, Merleau-Ponty argues that to be embodied is to inhabit
(to “enact,” if you will) a world in a particular way:63 “We must . . .
60. Teachings of the Prophet Joseph Smith, comp. Joseph Fielding Smith (Salt Lake
City: Deseret Book, 1938), 301.
61. This is how I read the Prophet’s seemingly tautologous statement that there is no
immaterial matter.
62. Talk of spirit bodies possessing physical bodies does not explain what it means to
have a body since, according to LDS doctrine, spirits, too, have material bodies. They too
are incarnate.
63. One reason that I find Merleau-Ponty’s discussion helpful is that it echoes Paul’s
way of talking about what it means to be a Christian. See, for example, Romans 7 and 8,
where it is clear that the change that occurs in a Christian is not a change of characteristics, but a change of being. (Compare 7:22–23 with 8:8–9.) For Paul, the division is not
between inner and outer, or mind/spirit and body, but between living by the Spirit and
living according to one’s will—that is, living according to the world. For Paul, to be a
Christian is to inhabit the world in a particular way, not to subscribe to a particular set
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avoid saying that our body is in space, or in time. It inhabits space
and time”;64 “To be a body is to be tied to a certain world.”65 Taking
off from Merleau-Ponty’s insight, perhaps we can say that the body is
one’s attitude (in the literal sense—“fittedness; disposition; posture”—
rather than in mentalistic terms) and attitudinizing in the world. The
body is the position one takes in the world, where position refers not
only to a spatio-temporal position that we can fix by specifying a series of coordinates, but also to one’s temporal relations to other things,
persons, and so on—one’s orientation. We have a body like we have
an idea or a fear, not as a possession, but as the way in which things
appear to me and the way in which I project myself in living and in
relating to other persons and other things.66 Consciousness is part of
my bodily attitude, but not the sum of it.
Given this thinking about incarnation, we can expand it to think
about incarnation in general: to speak of something as an incarnation
is not to say that something else, something nonmaterial, has come
to be material in it. It is to say that a particular attitude, a particular
way of being situated in and among the things there are, comes to be
manifest, or enacted, in it. Of course, to be situated in the world in a
particular way is always, necessarily, also to be situated with regard to
what there is. There is no “pure, unembodied” enactment or presentation. In a strictly scientific attitude (an attitude that scientists need not
take except when they are explicitly doing science, an attitude that is
not the same as their mental attitude or personal beliefs) there is no
relation to God. The scientific region, the region in which one investigates bodies using the assumptions, methods, and background of
of beliefs (though beliefs will follow from the fact that one inhabits the world as a Christian—see note 20). See also 1 Corinthians 1:26–29, especially v. 28, where Paul speaks
of the Saints as “non-being” (mē on), suggesting that the difference between Christians
and non-Christians is a matter of their being rather than the propositions to which each
adheres.
64. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith
(New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), 139.
65. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 148.
66. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 174 n. 1.
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science is necessarily godless.67 Scientific objects, themselves impoverished, in other words abstracted objects, incarnate the work and understanding of that region. Other objects incarnate other regions and
orderings.68 Thus, to say that the church is an incarnation of Christ
is to say that in the church one finds oneself situated and oriented in
the world in a way given by Christ toward things revealed by Christ
as they are revealed by him: one finds oneself in a world that Christ
has enacted, and that enacts its relation to him as Creator. Similarly,
to say that scripture or an ordinance is an incarnation is to say that,
in the material existence of these things—as scripture and ordinance
rather than as abstracted to merely so-called objective qualities—we
are given an orientation in the world: relations to things, meanings
and values of things, the existence and nonexistence of things.
As incarnations in a symbolic ordering, symbols are opaque beings rather than signs with multiple reference. The use of the word
incarnation to describe the being of entities that give symbolic order
is not accidental, for signs are like the living, enacting body, as Augustine explicitly says: “How did He come except that ‘the Word was
made flesh, and dwelt among us?’ It is as when we speak.”69 The opacity
of the living human body, the density and richness that, in principle,
cannot be made transparent, means that no one, final description of a
human being is possible. This opacity need not be something arcane
67. This is not to criticize scientists for that attitude or to suggest that God ought to be
part of science. A great many other important things also do not exist in a world inhabited scientifically, things such as morality and value or, of less consequence, good taste in
food or clothing. That absence is the consequence of the specialized incarnation required
of science and is only a problem if scientists (or more often those who idolize science because they know too little of it) forget that such a specialized incarnation is not the only
one, the best one, or the final one. God is equally—and unproblematically—absent from
other regions, such as mathematics and military strategy. See also pages 167–68 of this
chapter, pages 72–74 of chapter 4 in this volume, and Heidegger’s “The Age of the World
Picture,” in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt
(New York: Harper Colophon, 1977), 115–54 and “Science and Reflection” in Question
Concerning Technology, 155–82.
68. Moyaert’s discussion of symbols—see pages 174–76—is a discussion of symbols as
incarnations.
69. Augustine, Christian Doctrine 1.13.

Scripture as Incarnation

189

or complex. Seeing it and understanding it does not require great erudition on the one hand or mumbo jumbo on the other. For example,
the opacity of living persons, an opacity consequent on their embodiment, both physical and spiritual, is an ordinary, everyday experience:
a person cannot be reduced to one “meaning” or perspective, though
a person has meaning and one has perspectives on any person.70 One
could argue that nonhuman objects, both animate and inanimate, are
similarly dense. The incarnational character of scripture makes it also
dense and opaque—embodied—but the opacity of scripture is different from the unclarity of a poorly formed assertion.
Assertions that can have more than one meaning are unclear because they are faulty as assertions. They are ambiguous at best. However, it follows that all language ought to be clear in the same way that
assertions are clear only if all language is best understood as assertional and referential. If scripture is not to be understood, fundamentally, by means of a referential theory of meaning, then one cannot
criticize it as if it were a set of referential assertions. Scriptural opacity
and depth are different from ambiguity. One cannot reduce the density of scripture to multiplicity of reference, as do most of the critics of
the Bible and most of its defenders.
Both poetry and scripture attend to what is excessive of language
and attention; both are matters of reverence for what exceeds and explains us. There is not enough space here to decide how they are related. It is enough to notice that they at least overlap, and that overlap
helps us see how religious language differs from merely referential language. In the languages of both poetry and religion, I intend what is
beyond my understanding, though often by means of something that
does not, especially at first glance, itself transcend my gaze. I intend
70. I have in mind here Edmund Husserl’s concept of Abschattungen, “profiles.” Ideas:
General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson (London: Collier
Macmillan, 1962), 117–20. We know an object only in its profiles, but it is always excessive
of those profiles as well as of any imaginative combination of profiles (and it is important
to recall that a combination of profiles is always the result of an act of imagination; the
scientific objectivity of a thing is the work of imagination rather than perception).
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what transcends my intention. Thus, in both poetry and religion one
speaks, but not to make everything transparent and easily accessible.
In fact, among other things, in both one denies, by one’s way of speaking, by the language itself and its “content” (as if the two could be
separated), the transparency of what one intends and one’s ability to
master it or fully intend it. Religious and poetic languages show us
that meaning is not reducible to reference, for they mean without being able fully to refer, without trying to refer. They mean by incarnating that which they mean rather than merely referring to it.
The languages of poetry and religion incarnate things that one is
mastered by rather than master of. In those languages, what I mean—
what my words and thoughts supposedly intend—outstrips what
I understand, outstrips what I mean. The object of my intention is
excessive of my intention, of any possible intention.71 However, what
exceeds my meaning is not another meaning, not something to be
said “in other words.” The abundance of meaning does not suggest
that, given sufficient time, I will be able to say everything, that the
abundance will disappear.72 Thus, what I intend in poetry or religion
is never an object in the strict sense of that term (“something placed
or thrown before me, clear to my sight and examination”), making
the word intention itself problematic, though it will do for now.73
Because of this abundance or excess, the languages of prophecy and
poetry do not dissimulate an adequacy and clarity of understanding
that belie the truth of what they say. They are not the clear and distinct languages that Descartes proposes for modernism because they
remain true to that of which they speak. For prophecy and poetry, as
71. See note 40.
72. The Enlightenment had this overcoming of all abundance and excess as its goal. In
Derridean terms, it aimed at the identity of text and world. However, the excess of meaning is a function of the embodiment of the world and ourselves, and it makes continued
speaking and relation possible. Thus, the implicit goal of the Enlightenment was the destruction of the body by the reduction of everything to certainty—absolute irrelation and
silence; absolute death.
73. Both Levinas’s and Marion’s discussions of intention are instructive (Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 23, 27–29, 49, 122–30, 204–9, 257–61, 294–95; Marion, God Without
Being, 18–23).
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the twentieth-century German thinker Walter Benjamin says, “Truth
is not ‘an unveiling that destroys the secret,’ but the revelation that
does it justice.”74
It may seem that this discussion of the abundance of scriptural language implies that scripture is necessarily obscure, but that does not follow. The alternative to understanding the opacity of scripture as multiple
references is not to understand it as obscure; scriptural language is neither essentially obscure nor essentially meaningless. Just as opacity and
the abundance that opacity makes possible are not the same as unclarity,
they are not the same as obscurity. Isaiah is not more of a prophet than
Mark or Nephi because he is more difficult to read; the abundance, depth,
and richness of incarnation should not be confused with obscurity.75 Any
74. Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. John Osborne (New
York: Verso, 1977), 31; translation revised. See also the text that Benjamin may have in
mind, namely Nietzsche’s preface to the second edition of The Gay Science, section four,
where Nietzsche compares the will to see everything to Egyptian boys who desecrate
temples: “We no longer believe that truth remains truth when one pulls off the veils: we
have lived too much to believe this. Today it seems to us a matter of propriety that one
would not to wish to see everything naked, to be present at everything, or to understand
and ‘know’ everything.” Perhaps this is a way of explaining the Savior’s remark in Matthew 13:13: “I speak to them in parables: because they seeing see not; and hearing they
hear not, neither do they understand.” That idea is an important part of the Christian tradition, though it is often a scandal to believers as well as nonbelievers. The traditional explanation for parables and parabolic language is: “The motives for symbolism are secrecy
and revelation, as accommodated to the abilities of the interpreters. God uses symbols so
that ‘the most sacred things are not easily handled by the profane but are revealed instead
to the real lovers of holiness’ (1105C, 283).” Pseudo-Dionysius, quoted in Paul Rorem,
Pseudo-Dionysius: A Commentary on the Texts and an Introduction to Their Influence
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 25. For more on Pseudo-Dionysius, see chapter
6, note 40. My argument suggests that perhaps, instead, parables are to be explained as
the only possible response to those who demand that the language of religion be “clear
and distinct.” Parables demand that their hearers deal with them as something containing a secret, but a secret that, it turns out, cannot simply be removed. (Of course, the
two explanations are not mutually exclusive.) Note also that the view I propose contests
Kermode’s explanation of the secrecy of parables and, therefore, of what it means to understand a narrative. See Frank Kermode, The Genesis of Secrecy: On the Interpretation of
Narrative (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979).
75. Of course, these remarks do not imply that we ought to avoid clear and distinct
language. Our preference for such language is not merely contingent. Taking the identity
of intention and expression to be an ultimate good for writing is an outgrowth of our
Cartesian goal of mastery over everything with no remainder, the transparency of the
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religious person has had the experience of discovering new meaning in
texts that she has read before, often many times. That is a phenomenon of
abundance, of the excess of meaning—of the incarnation of scripture—
not a phenomenon of ambiguity or obscurity. Religious ordinances are
a perfect example of the kind of abundance that we find in religion and
scripture. In religious rituals, in other words in symbolic ordering enacted in ritual objects and on my body, my words and actions intend more
than I, as an individual human being, can possibly intend, though they
can and often are themselves quite simple and straightforward.76
To take scripture as incarnational is neither to conflate historical
understanding and accurate description nor to take scripture to be essentially referential. Neither is it to take scripture to be merely metaphorical or poetic (in the impoverished, everyday sense of that word).
To see scripture as incarnational, as opaque and revelatory, is to see it
as telling the literal truth, as giving the literal history of the world. As
Frank Kermode says, speaking accurately of incarnational interpretations (though he does not recognize them as incarnational): “The spiritual sense so authorized [in other words, within the structure of the
medieval Catholic Church, official as well as unofficial] was the true
literal sense.”77
This identification of “spiritual sense” and “literal sense” is surprising to contemporary ears. After all, we take the literal truth to be
world. However, the identity of intention and expression is sometimes a good: when that
identity is possible, then our language ought to embody it. If our language does not, it
fails. It is inadequate. Nevertheless, languages other than the language of clarity are also
possible, even necessary. (For one thing, if they are not possible, then it is not clear how
to avoid making the desire for knowledge a desire, ultimately, for annihilation.)
76. The Latter-day Saint and Catholic recognition of the need for ordinances and for
authority in ordinances is a recognition of the inadequacy of individual intentions when
it comes to understanding or invoking the Divine. In general, Protestantism disagrees
on this point, but its disagreement runs the risk of reducing religion to the thoughts and
feelings of the individual, to only a psychological attitude. See my “A New Way of Looking at Scripture,” Sunstone, August 1995, 78–84. Though the title is unfortunate—not of
my choosing—that piece contains a sketch of an argument for the necessity of authority.
See also Marion, God Without Being, 153ff., from which I have adapted that argument.
77. However, Kermode misunderstands the relation of the Roman Catholic Church
to medieval scripture interpretation, accepting without question the modernist view of
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the truth that most accurately describes or refers to what happened, independent of any symbolic ordering, and we take the “spiritual sense”
to be something beyond the literal. We take the spiritual sense to be
“merely” symbolic. Premoderns, however, do not disjoin the literal and
the spiritual. For them, the word literal means something quite different. For them, it means, “what the letters, in other words, the words,
say,” rather than, “what an objective report would say.” The sentences,
“What x says” and “what x describes accurately,” do not mean the same,
even if the first is a description. Even a careless reading of medieval discussions of scriptural exegesis will show that the medievals’ interest was
not in deciding what the scriptures portray, but in what they say. They
do not take the scriptures to be picturing something for us, but to be
telling us the truth of the world, of its things, its events, and its people,
a truth that cannot be told apart from its situation in a divine, symbolic
ordering made manifest in human history.
Of course, that is not to deny that the scriptures tell about events
that actually happened. They are about real people and real events.
What I propose is not a way to reduce the premodern understanding of history to a modern view, to one that denies the historicity of
scripture by taking scripture to refer to a transcendent, nonhistorical
reality. I am not arguing that the scriptures only seem to be historical.
Premodern interpreters of the Bible understand the scriptures to be
about actual events. For them, what the scriptures say includes portrayal of and talk about real things. However, premodern interpreters
do not think it sufficient (or possible) to portray the real events of real
history without letting us see them in the light of that which gives
them their significance—their reality, the enactment of which they
the matter: he applies the distinction between what the texts are about and what they
mean, and he criticizes biblical texts for their failure to describe events accurately. As a
result, he does not seem to understand the incarnational character of premodern interpretation or its communal character. He also misunderstands Heidegger’s discussion of
interpretation.
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are part—as history, namely the symbolic order that they incarnate.
Without that light, portrayals cannot be accurate.
A bare description of the physical movements of certain persons
at a certain time is not history. “Person A raised his left hand, turning
it clockwise so that .03 milliliters of a liquid poured from a vial in that
hand into a receptacle situated midway between A and B” does not mean
the same as “Henry poured poison into Richard’s cup.” Only the latter
could be a historical claim (and even the former is no bare description).
History is not possible without meaning and significance, perhaps
not even mere chronicle is. The question is where that meaning and
significance derive from. For premodern Bible interpreters, the divine
order that events incarnate give them their meaning. A literal history,
therefore, necessarily incorporates and reveals that order. Any history
that does not incorporate it is incomplete and, therefore, inaccurate.78
It is inaccurate because it does not embody the divine order that makes
it what it is. That means that premodern literal histories—the accurate
portrayals of what happened, if one continues to insist on referential
language—will differ significantly from literal histories told under the
aspect of a different order, such as that of the rationalism of modernism.
As already noted, modernism, too, requires that meaning be
“added” to otherwise bare events so that we can understand them.
In modernism, too, something besides our accounts orders those accounts and stabilizes meaning. However, with the Enlightenment,
modernism does not recognize a divine order as the source of order
and stability. Modernist history intentionally and necessarily ignores
any divine ordering of history, taking up, instead, the order of causation as understood scientifically. This is not a matter of perversity or
78. However, we must remember that we decide accuracy relative to the region or
order within which a description occurs and to the purposes for which it is given. A scientific description would be inaccurate in a scriptural text; a scriptural description would
be inaccurate in a scientific text. In neither case could one rectify the inaccuracy of the
description by saying more, by giving more detail, by looking more closely, by correcting
one’s “mistakes,” for the inaccuracy is a function of the relation between the description,
the place in and purpose for which it is given, and the order which gives it meaning rather
than only a function of the descriptive skill of the person offering the description.
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antitheism on the part of modern historians. There are sound, methodological reasons for such an assumption in academic history, as
there are in the “hard” sciences.79 Nevertheless, it follows that modernist historians cannot mean by the word history what premoderns
mean, and modernist criticisms of premodern histories, such as the
histories we find in scripture, beg the question. In modernist history,
reason rather than the Divine gives the ultimate order of things, so
reason becomes the arbiter of any claims about divine order, rather
than the reverse. From the modernist point of view, history and scriptural accounts are incompatible. From the scriptural point of view,
they may be incompatible, but the latter may instead encompass the
former.
In conclusion and summary: If we understand scripture by means
of a referential theory of history, then we assume that there is an original event that we represent (re-present) in language; on that view, a
historian repeats the original event by constructing a description that
represents the event as fully and accurately as possible. However, such
a theory of history is problematic, for to the degree that a historian can
be successful, there is, ironically, no real history, only the repetition of
something that is always the same. One explanation for the unending
necessity of writing histories that represent an original event might
be that, though there is an original event that we describe in our histories and for which there is, in principle, one complete description,
our language, methods, and so on are finite. Thus, we do not come to
an end of giving the one, complete description. However, in addition
to the problem already mentioned (namely that such a theory seems
to deny history even as it describes it), we can ask this question: How
can one justify the claim that there is such an event and that there is
one ideal description of that event without encountering the very difficulty one is trying to avoid? With what language does one understand
and discuss the event that is in continual need of redescription? How
79. For a discussion of some of these reasons, see Heidegger’s “The Age of the World
Picture,” and chapter 4 in this volume.
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is it available to the historian apart from the finite language that he or
she uses to describe it? The only possible answer seems to be that historians are engaged not only in the accurate description of events, but
that they are so engaged based on some kind of intuition (in the strict,
philosophical sense) of something that is, in principle, not ultimately
capturable in human expression.
Because of this difficulty, some conclude that, even if we begin
with the view that there is only one, ultimate description of an event,
we are driven to conclude that there is nothing to history except what
we say about it. Recognizing the problematic character of claims to
intuitions of something ultimately ungraspable, they take what they
think is the only remaining position: history is only a socially determined, infinitely redescribable matter, a matter of what we have to say
about it and no more. Though that position and variations of it have
become fashionable, it is a position fraught with problems, among
them, that to say something is a human construction, even that it is
necessarily a human construction, is not to say that it is only a human construction. I think that the position also entails that the person
coming to this conclusion is self-contradictory, arguing for radical
historicism and invoking a principle that is not to be understood from
a radical historicist position. In short, in spite of the current popularity of this response to the problem, I think it is less sound than the
flawed, referential position against which it responds.
I too conclude that writing history involves an intuition of something more than what we can say. However, it is difficult to know what
it means to say that. For example, I do not think the usual referential
theories, which gloss over the problem, are adequate. I have attempted
to give one answer, though not the only one, to that question:80 Scriptural history is a matter of divine incarnation. And, I am supposing
that academic history is another kind of history, a kind that answers
very differently the question of what more there is to history than what
80. It should be clear that I do not think there is only one way to do history properly.
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we can say, a way that is, therefore, strictly speaking, not comparable
to scriptural history because it incarnates something very different.
On the view for which I argue, one can understand scriptural
history using as a starting point a premodern understanding of what
makes history. For premoderns, genuine, literal history is essentially
symbolic, in other words, incarnational. For moderns, it is essentially
referential. With the rise of modernism, symbols came to be understood as references (even if complex ones), and, therefore, so did the
Bible: scripture is a more or less accurate depiction of events that exist
independent of other considerations. (And whether one takes them
to be more or less accurate depends on one’s religious disposition.)
Premoderns, however, understand the Bible figurally or typologically:
as incarnating a symbolic order and as giving an order to life through
its symbolic work.81 To say that premoderns understand scripture typologically is not to say that premoderns understand the Bible to refer
to another reality or to be merely fictions. In fact, exactly the opposite
is true: for premoderns, history understood apart from revelation is a
fiction, a necessary and convenient one for some purposes, perhaps,
but nevertheless a fiction. It does not give us the fullness of the events
of history. Like moderns, those reading as premoderns understand
that scripture orders human history by giving it a shape—a figure.
However, they disagree with the moderns about what gives that shape.
For premoderns, the revelation of scripture gives history meaning,
without which there would be no real history, only chronology, if that.
For example, for medieval Christians the life of Christ as revealed
in scripture is a figure or type that we can use to understand the scriptures as a whole and, therefore, history and our place in it. It is not
81. As the “Concluding More Scientific Postscript” to this essay notes, prior to Christianity, pagans had a merely cyclical view of history. It might have no meaning beyond
the cycle itself, or it might, as in Platonism, only have meaning to the degree that one
could leave it behind, or it might, as in Stoicism, have only the meaning possible in detachment. But even though paganism did not have a figural understanding of history, as
did Christianity, it also did not have any notion of history as we understand it. See David
Bentley Hart, Atheist Delusions: The Christian Revolution and Its Fashionable Enemies
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 200–201.
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that Christ did not live or that the story of his life is “merely symbolic”
of some other reality. Instead, truly to understand the life of Christ is
to understand it as a life that literally (in other words, in the way that
the texts say it) is a figure of our lives and history. Thus, to read the
story of Israel’s exodus from Egypt, forty years in the wilderness, and
entry into the promised land as a figure of the granting of salvation,
our continuing sinfulness, and the promise of possible blessedness—
in other words, as it shows us our relation to Christ—is not to impose
an additional meaning onto the story of Israel. Contra some Jewish
thinkers, neither is it to reduce the children of Israel to mere shadows,
references to another reality. Instead, it is to see the biblical story of
Israel as an incarnation of the symbolic order of which we, being religious, find ourselves to be part.
Those who read the Bible as an incarnation do not reduce its texts
to what is described as only symbolic, for the literal/symbolic disjunction is not a disjunction for them. For premoderns, reading the story
of Moses and Israel typologically, figurally, anagogically, allegorically
is not what one does instead of or in addition to reading literally. Such
readings are part and parcel of a literal reading. Premodern understanding does not reduce the scriptural story to a reference to or representation of something else, though it also does not deny that there
may be an important representative element in scripture. Instead,
premoderns believe that understanding the story of Israel is essential to understanding history—actual history, the real events of the
world—as incarnation, a continuing incarnation, as types and shadows, to use the language of the Book of Mormon (for example, Mosiah
3:15). It is to understand history as having an order and the events of
history as related to each other within that ordering (an ordering that
does not exist independent of events, but that cannot be reduced to
those events as “bare” events). It is to understand history as part of a
symbolic ordering; an ordering that is given not only in scripture, but
also (perhaps most importantly) in ritual—ritual objects and ritual
language—as well as in the moments of history themselves. Thus, for
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premoderns, the biblical narrative is literal history; the literal truth,
the truth “by the letter,” is that told in the letters and words of the text
as revealing and embodying the order given by God. The literal truth
is the truth constituted in and through the text as incarnation, not the
supposed truth supposedly only referred to by those letters and words.
In spite of appearances or what we might say when we are asked
to talk about scriptural history without having reflected sufficiently
on our experience with it, I think that most Latter-day Saints read
scripture as an incarnation of a symbolic ordering.82 We may often
do so confusedly and inconsistently, but we do. That is why we feel
compelled to defend the historicity of the scriptures, whether we do
so naively or with a full range of scholarly, theoretical, and interpretational tools at our disposal. This is especially true for adherents, such
as us, of religions in which symbols and symbolic acts figure prominently. The informality of Latter-day Saint sacrament meetings may
make us think otherwise, but the church’s all-encompassing social
structure and the importance of temple liturgy show that Latter-day
Saints’ lives, like the lives of other religious people and perhaps more
than many, continue to be ordered symbolically.
For the most part, we have lost, forgotten, or never had the vocabulary and concepts for talking about our participation in a symbolic
order and our reading of scripture as part of that participation. As a
result, when called on to talk about scripture or to teach lessons from
it or to speak reflectively about it, we resort to language and methods
that ignore the symbolically ordered character of our lives and that
deny the incarnate character of scripture by making it merely referential. The fact that we mix implicit attention to scripture as symbolic
ordering with an insistence on simple reference often confuses our
reading. Nevertheless, it remains possible not only to continue to read
82. Many non-Mormon Christians probably also continue to read symbolically, especially those often thought of as literalists or conservative.
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scripture as incarnational rather than merely referential, but to do so
more explicitly than we have done.
Concluding More Scientific Postscript
Several years after this essay was originally published, for the most
part I continue to understand scripture along the lines it sketches, but I
have come to realize that I did not sufficiently differentiate two ways of
making sense of the premodern understanding of the world: I collapsed
the Greek and pagan Near Eastern way of understanding the world with
the Jewish and Christian way. Were I to explain my failure in terms of
those on whom I have depended intellectually, I would say that I leaned
too heavily on the work of Mircea Eliade.83 As a result, I did not notice
important differences between those two ways of understanding.84
There are important similarities between the two ways. Because
of those similarities I could make the argument I did, and because of
them I believe it still works. But there are also important differences
between them (differences which, for my purposes here, I will grossly
oversimplify). Perhaps the first thing to notice is that the archaic understanding of the world takes it as a cosmos, an ordered and beautiful
whole. (The Greek word kosmos, from which we get our word cosmos,
first referred to jewelry.)85 For the Greeks the cosmos may have come
83. I still think that Eliade’s work on premodern thought can be quite helpful to us
as we try to make sense of texts that have come to us from long ago. Reading his work,
such as The Sacred and the Profane (New York: Harcourt, 1959) and Myth and Reality
(New York: Harper & Row, 1963), has helped me think profitably about scripture and my
experience in the temple. Nevertheless, it is essential to notice that Eliade’s description
of the ways that scripture works is not only incomplete because it does not (and could
not, of course) include an understanding of the restored gospel, it is also incomplete as a
scholarly treatment of comparative religion, as I will describe in what follows.
84. I first noticed those differences when I read Paul Ricoeur, “Manifestation and
Proclamation,” in Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, and Imagination, ed. Mark I.
Wallace, trans. David Pellauer (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1995), 48–67.
85. Rémi Brague, The Wisdom of the World: The Human Experience of the Universe in
Western Thought, trans. Teresa Lavender Fagan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2003), 19–20. Brague’s book is excellent for understanding the complexity of the question of how the ancients of various Western cultures understood that which surrounded
them. Indeed, had I been paying better attention, I would have noticed when I first read
Brague’s book in 2001 what I have only now come to see.
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into being or it may have always existed, but it was rarely the product
of a creator.86 Perhaps more importantly, the cosmos was understood
cyclically: it has passed through cycles comparable to spring, summer,
winter, and fall, and it will continue to pass through them. Myth gives
us an understanding of the cycles, and religious ritual reenacts them
and may even insure them, but there is no historical vector in myth
nor its ritual. In this way of understanding, time amounts merely to
the repetition of what has already occurred.
Jewish and, later, Christian understanding is similar, but it differs
significantly on at least the two respects I have mentioned: it takes the
world to be the creation of God (rather than a cosmos), and it insists
that there is a historical aspect to its stories (rather than that they are
merely cycles in an eternal round). Instead of the ordered and beautiful,
perhaps eternal, cosmos, we have the ordered and beautiful creation of
God. Instead of the endless repetition of the cycles of nature, we have
ongoing history (with a beginning, a middle—the incarnation—and an
end) within which we can see the imprint of God’s patterns.87
For the understanding of the incarnational nature of scripture, the
second of these is most important. On the Jewish view, time moves.
Even if the types that God has prefigured show themselves in moments of history, showing us the way that some events are “the same”
as others—for example, the fall and expulsion from the Garden, with
its attendant promise of blessed life to come; Abraham leaving Ur to
wander in the wilderness before he enters the promised land; Israel’s
exodus from Egypt, wandering in the wilderness, and crossing into
the promised land; Lehi’s family’s flight from Jerusalem, wandering in
the wilderness and ocean, and arrival in the new promised land; the
Saints’ flight from Illinois to Utah; the experience of every repentant
sinner—these moments, all shadows of what Christ’s life, and indeed
the plan of salvation, prefigure are not merely a repetition of the same

86. The demiurge of Plato’s Timaeus is a notable exception.
87. See chapter 6 in this volume for a discussion of types and shadows, with their
antitypes or prefigures (what I have here called “patterns”).
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thing each time. The incarnation of a divine pattern in history rather
than the reoccurrence of the same event is the difference between
the Judeo-Christian understanding of itself and the archaic selfunderstanding. In contrast with both, modern history preserves and
amplifies the notion of history, but rarely if ever has a serious notion
of the cyclical (as in pagan cosmology) or the symbolically ordered
(as in Judeo-Christian cosmology). Understanding scripture requires
that we set aside our modern prejudices about how to understand history in order to read the histories of ancient writers, as Nephi suggests,
with the understanding of the Jews (2 Nephi 25:5)—and, I would add,
the early Christians.

chapter nine

On Scripture,
or Idolatry versus True Religion
•

A

ncient Israel was often called away from idolatry. Perhaps no
theme is more common in the Old Testament than that Israel
must give up idolatry. Michael Fishbane has argued that the heart of
Judaism is its rejection of idolatry and the worldview of idolatry, the
rejection of “idolatrous metaphysics.”1 We hear that theme much less
in modern Israel. Usually when we hear someone speak of idolatry
today, that person does so primarily in terms of materialism or something like it; we think our idolatry is primarily metaphorical. Real
idolatry is something done only by other people—perhaps in ancient
times, perhaps more primitive than we, at least more exotic. However, it is naive to assume that ancient Israel was susceptible to real
idolatry and we are not. What idolatry is and how we avoid it remain
questions, and they are as much questions for us as they were for
ancient Israel.
If we look closely, we see that at least three things mark the difference between pure religion—in Latter-day Saint terms, Zion—and
idolatry. First, pure religion is founding but ultimately not founded. It
is originary in that those “within” it are constantly reborn, constantly
re-originated. But pure religion has no theos, no metaphysical foundation.2 If it did, it would have an idol rather than a God. The word theos
1. Michael Fishbane, “Israel and the ‘Mothers,’ ” in The Garments of Torah: Essays in
Biblical Hermeneutics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), 49–63.
2. The Greek word theos has more than one meaning. I am not using the word here
in the same way that I do in chapter 5 in this volume. There theos has the sense it has in
the New Testament and the Septuagint: the God of Israel. I will explain the different,
philosophical meaning that it has here.
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is the Greek word for “god,” and it is the word that Aristotle uses for the
ultimate being in his metaphysics, a usage determinative for the rest
of the Western intellectual tradition. Traditional metaphysical systems,
religious or not, each have something like the Aristotelean theos as their
foundation or goal. Each assumes a theos, in Aristotle’s terms, as the basis for what-is, whether that theos is God or something else. In the terms
of the twentieth-century German philosopher, Martin Heidegger,3 each
is onto-theological. Given that traditional usage, I will use the word
theos here to designate any such metaphysical being or any other being that performs the same structural function as Aristotle’s theos: the
thing that accounts for or encompasses all other things.
In contrast, rather than a theos that acts as a foundation or goal,
pure religion finds its origin in our relation to a beneficent, living
Person rather than a metaphysical origin: the God of Israel. Thus,
the religions that have their origin in the Bible, which of course includes the Latter-day Saints, are strictly speaking metaphysically
a-theistic: their scriptures deny the unmoved and unmoving god
(whether it is called theos, Law, or Reason), whatever their theologies
might assert. Latter-day Saint doctrine, by asserting not only that
God is a beneficent, living Person (a claim with which all Christians
will agree), but also an embodied one (a claim that shocks most informed non–LDS Christians), insists on that denial. The Latter-day
Saint claim implicitly denies any foundation, at least as that word is
used in the tradition.
There is a sense in which God remains a foundation in Latter-day
Saint thinking. We do, after all, refer to him as the Creator. However,
the sense in which he is foundational is quite different for us than the
sense of foundation in the onto-theological tradition. We believe that
the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob is a person—not a foundation,
except to the degree that a person can be said to be a foundation (see
1 Corinthians 3:11). He is not, however, a metaphysical foundation.
3. For more on Heidegger, see chapter 2, note 62, in this volume.
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For more than twenty-five thousand years, however, when Western thinkers have reflected on religion philosophically or theologically, they have often assumed that to speak of God is to speak in
terms of a metaphysical foundation, in terms of a theos.4 The language
of foundations and the theos are virtually everywhere in our culture,
even in our discussions of our particular religious experiences, and
Latter-day Saints have not been immune to that way of talking. Our
thinking and speaking about our belief is sometimes not consonant
with our belief itself. In spite of what we intend, the language we
share with others and the assumptions common to that language
infiltrate our discussions because they come to us naturally. They are
the common sense of our culture and, so, something about which we
give little thought—but we do not yet have another language to use.
The question is, if we reject the assumption that we must speak of
God as a metaphysical theos, what can we say of our relation to the
person who is God? In other words, how can we make sense of the
world and its Creator if we reject the philosophical understanding of
the world and of its Creator as metaphysical foundation? What is the
alternative to idolatry, given that our reflective religious language is
permeated by traditional understanding? Where can we find a language suitable to our religious experience and understanding?
Among others, the work of the contemporary French Lithuanian
philosopher, Emmanuel Levinas, provides some outlines of part of
a philosophical answer. Levinas shows us much about our relations
to one another, focusing for example, on the family as the model for
4. There are ways of reading pre-modern theology (and perhaps much modern theology) as escaping this criticism. For example, Catherine Pickstock makes an argument
that the metaphysical/theological understanding of religion is a result of the thinking
of the thirteenth-century thinker, Duns Scotus. See her After Writing: On the Liturgical
Consummation of Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 121–40. This means that prior
to the thirteenth century, reflection on God is more or less nonmetaphysical. Pickstock’s
argument is an important one, but for reasons of brevity, I will continue the rhetorical
device of assuming that theology has more or less consistently assumed a theos.
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human being.5 I cannot accurately précis Levinas’s work here,6 but
among other things, in it we see how the other person gives the self
itself, its ego. Levinas shows, convincingly I believe, that I am not,
fundamentally, an entity existing on my own and beholden to no one.
Rather, my very existence as an autonomous, self-aware entity is a response to my relation to another person or persons who initiated my
response. And my continuation as a person, as a self, is based on my
continuing relation to others. The result is that the self and the growth
of the self—its repentance—have their origins from the other person.
But though the self and its repentance originate from the other
person, the other person is no foundation in any usual sense of that
term. And in the philosophical and theological sense of the term, the
other person is no founder. The other is a person, a creator, not a thing,
and the founding occurs in ethical demand, in the face-to-face of Joseph Smith before God, not in ontology. Persons, specifically other
persons, rather than metaphysical or some other kind of principles,
are fundamental. Persons can found us, but they are not themselves
a foundation. They are living, continuing persons, not static, impersonal, dead foundations. As a consequence we could go so far as to say,
shockingly, that in a strict philosophical sense, pure and true religion
is nihilistic, but that is only to say that it is not idolatrous, having no
onto-theological foundation. True religion posits no ultimate thing;
instead it is response to an Ultimate Person.
Second, because pure religion is not metaphysically founded,
because it has no theos, it recognizes no power before which it must
bow—though it bows. True religion bows before ethical demand—the
5. Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso
Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), discusses the relevant points most
directly—the section on fecundity comes immediately to mind—but Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. A. Lingis (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), also has a
number of important—though incredibly difficult—discussions of these points.
6. For an overview, see my “Emmanuel Levinas,” in Twentieth-Century European
Cultural Theorists, Dictionary of Literary Biography, 2nd ser. (Bloomfield Hills, MI:
Gale, 2004), 285–95. See also, Colin Davis, Levinas: An Introduction (Notre Dame:
Notre Dame University Press, 1996), or Simonne Plourde, Emmanuel Lévinas, altérité et
responsabilité: Guide de lecture (Paris: Cerf, 1996).
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relation of one person to another rather than rules for moral conduct 7—not superior and potentially threatening power.8 True religion
is a-theistic in refusing to bow before the supposed power of the idolatrous god, the theos of traditional philosophy and theology, with its
Santa-Claus promises and implicit threats.9 Instead it bows before the
God it loves and respects.
A third difference between true and idolatrous religion, between
Zion and “the world,” is that because the obedience of true religion is
a matter of service rather than appeasement, true religion is, at one
and the same time, both obedient and beyond any law. It is obedient
to the ethical demand that occurs when the other person disrupts my
totalizing, comprehending, dominating relation to the world. In other
words, true religion occurs when I respond to the obligation I have
to another person (including God) rather than to my reasoned and
coherent understanding of that person.
If I respond to my understanding of the world and of the other
person’s place in that world rather than to the other person herself, I
do not respond to the other. I respond only to myself: I have come to
an understanding of things and I respond to that understanding, my
understanding rather than the other person whose life impinges on
me. In contrast, ethical obligation requires that I respond to something that is other than myself, something I am unlikely fully to understand intellectually. I must respond to what is outside of myself, to
what is beyond my ability to grasp, comprehend, and dominate (even
intellectually) or thematize. Law is always at least a thematization of
the ethical obligation I experience: to universalize what I learn in my
relation to others is to make a theme of that relation. Therefore, as
7. This is the way that Levinas uses the term, and understanding him requires that
we not forget that his use is not what we usually expect.
8. Though true religion sometimes uses the word power, I think that use refers not
to the power found and feared in idolatrous religion, but to the power of the ethical
command.
9. See Paul Ricoeur, “Religion, Atheism, and Faith,” in Alasdair MacIntyre and Paul
Ricoeur, The Religious Significance of Atheism (New York: Columbia University Press,
1969), 58–98.
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universalization, in principle law always occurs within my comprehension and even under my domination. As the product of human
understanding, thematizing is something that human beings can in
principle dominate.10
We cannot escape the thematizing of law if we continue to speak
to one another, for example when we admonish another or apologize
for our behavior. We should not escape it. Not only is it not wrong to
thematize, it is essential that we do. Not only human justice, but also
teaching, require thematizing, for example. Nevertheless, ultimately
pure religion goes beyond any thematizing of the demands made
upon me by the other person. Pure religion is beyond any mere law:
“Therefore, my brothers, you too are dead to the law” (Romans 7:4).
That is inconceivable within idolatry, and is nihilistic to those who
insist that there must be a theos.
Of course, the nihilism of being without foundation and beyond
the law has nothing at all to do with a nihilism that rejects law of any
kind and opts for chaos. As mentioned, an ethical demand can occur
only where there is also a thematizing of that demand. It may be impossible for me to experience the ethical obligation and, at the same
time, not to thematize that obligation in consciousness. Consequently,
ethical demand may never be separable from law—so much so that
the law is essential to the demand; the law is a blessing, an appearance
of the command of God, though not the same as that command. The
ethical demand, God’s ongoing command—its appearing rather than
its appearance—always exceeds any thematizing in which it occurs.
No law captures the ethical demand that it thematizes. In true religion
the moral law is not that by which humans become calculable. Instead, it is that in which we fulfill the ethical obligation that confronts
us, an ethical obligation that always exceeds and makes possible any
moral law in which it is necessarily embodied.
10. Of course, the irony with which the atonement deals is that we do not dominate
the law and, in fact, find ourselves spiritually incapable of doing so: “What I would, that
I do not” (Romans 7:15).
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But if no law is sufficient, if true religion cannot be reduced to a
law, what remains for us to do? To quote someone now defunct, “What
will become of us?” How do we speak of this description of our being,
of fundamental ethics, of Zion, of the fact that we are already in Zion?
How do we speak of nonidolatrous, in other words, true, religion? And
where do we find such a speaking?
At first glance, it seems that the failure of philosophy and its issuance in the nihilism of onto-theology—its reliance on the idol of the
theos, which turns out to be nothing and nothingness—means that we
cannot expect philosophy to take account of its failure and to remedy
itself. As often conceived, philosophy is incapable of saying what needs
to be said. In fact, as traditionally conceived, philosophy is essentially
totalizing. As it is often taught, I find it difficult to doubt that philosophy is ultimately bankrupt.
But that is not to say that all philosophers or philosophies have
been totalizers. In general, great philosophers are great precisely
because their work did not and, for the most part, still does not fit
within the traditional, totalizing conception of philosophy.11 The tradition tames the great philosophers for its own totalizing use, but the
tamed philosopher is not the great philosopher. There may be other
possibilities for philosophy than those of the tradition. Perhaps Heidegger or Ludwig Wittgenstein provides the beginnings of an alternative. Perhaps some of the work of Edmond Jabès, Jacques Derrida,
Jean-François Lyotard, Levinas, or others points in the direction of an
alternative. Perhaps a fresh reading of Plato or Aristotle or Augustine
will teach us much. Or perhaps a careful return to our own tradition—which includes and overlays the philosophical tradition—will
do the job.
Thus, though it is not clear what we are to do philosophically in face
of the totalitarian character of traditional philosophy, it is clear that, in
some sense, philosophy will probably remain. In his discussion of this
11. Though I have used Aristotle as a bogeyman earlier, I think what I say here applies
at least as much to him as to any other philosopher.
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point Levinas insists that a role for philosophy remains, a role that does
not rely on the merely deconstructive or rhetorical.12 In spite of his criticisms of philosophy, Levinas consciously remains a philosopher. The
bankruptcy of philosophy is not a given, however common it may be.
But whatever we eventually decide about philosophy, Levinas
shows us that when we see the priority of ethics to ontology—in LDS
terms, when we genuinely come to believe that persons are prior to
principles—then from the beginning, our question is not “What is
it?” (as philosophy has traditionally asked), but “What must be done?”
There are ostensibly any number of ways one could take up this question. Perhaps, as Levinas, Derrida, Luce Irigaray, and others indicate,
some of these ways are philosophical. But, however other many ways
there might be, I believe that sacred scripture is such a speaking. In
fact, I think it is the most important of such ways because it is the
“most ethical,” asking us to listen not only to others, but to the Other
Person. Scripture is a speaking that has the virtue of being considerably more accessible to most of us than the work of writers like Heidegger, Derrida, and Levinas—and it is always better written.
As much as I am enamored of contemporary philosophy, as much
as I find contemporary Continental philosophy not only interesting
and useful but morally compelling, I nonetheless find scripture more
appealing and more accessible than contemporary philosophy, and
more morally compelling. But more than that, I find scripture more
genuinely revelatory. Paul Ricoeur notes that the philosopher can be
no preacher,13 and Heidegger has made a similar point.14 The philosopher must wait for the prophet. Heidegger and Derrida may help us
wait for the prophets.15 Levinas may announce the necessity of the
12. Cf. Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 182–83.
13. Ricoeur, “Religion, Atheism, and Faith,” 30.
14. See, for example, Martin Heidegger, “Phenomenology and Theology,” in The Piety
of Thinking, trans. James G. Hart and John C. Maraldo (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1976), 5–21.
15. Marlène Zarader, La Dette Impensée: Heidegger et l’Héritage Hébraïque (Paris:
Seuil, 1990), does an excellent job of showing how Heidegger’s work depends, probably
without him being conscious of it, on his understanding of the Bible and of prophecy.
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prophet. I believe these thinkers have helped me hear the prophets’
voices. But they can do no more than that. They cannot even be John
the Baptist for us, announcing the prophet. Only in the living prophets and in scripture can I find the announcement, the call, of what
philosophy has helped me wait for. In spite of the possibility that,
turned against itself, philosophy may be able to say something about
Zion, I believe that only in the prophets will we be returned to what is
beyond philosophy, namely to Zion.
But though many, if not most, Latter-day Saints are committed
to the idea that scripture is more important and more revelatory than
philosophy, it is also true that our mental commitment runs aground
on our everyday practices. We know what it means to take philosophy
seriously. We do not usually know what it means to take the scriptures
seriously.
We usually read scripture as if it were naive philosophy and ontology, looking for the principle of principles, for the theos that stands
behind what we are reading, asking constantly the question, “What is
it?”—even when we want to ask the question, “What must be done?”
We are taught to read scripture that way from our births, both inside
and outside the church. That way of reading scripture is something we
share with many, especially the majority of those in the evangelical,
charismatic, and other conservative Christian traditions. Like the image of good traditional philosophers, those who read the scriptures in
this way take the gospel to be a set of doctrinal propositions that one is
to learn, and they take the scriptures to be a record of those principles
and propositions behind which the “theological” gospel hides. When
we read scripture this way, it is as if we assume that God is simply a
poor writer—or that he chooses poor mouthpieces—and finds himself
unable to lay out clearly and distinctly, in an ordered fashion, the principles he wants to teach us. With amazing hubris, we assume it is our
job to do the work he was unable to do, the work of making everything
clear, distinct, and orderly.
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But scripture need not be read that way. In the New Testament, the
word gospel refers much more to the proclamation of the gospel than
to the content of that proclamation, though the content is certainly not
irrelevant. Nothing can be proclaimed if the act of proclaiming has no
content. Levinas explains this by distinguishing between the saying
and the said: the saying is the event; the said is the objectification of
the event of saying, its transcription, whether in writing, memory, or
a recording. There can be no saying without a resultant said, but it is a
mistake to think that the two are the same. A parent’s command, “Do
the dishes,” can vary wildly in meaning. It could be a gentle reminder
or a stern warning. It could, however, be part of a joke. Even if we were
to transcribe more of the context of that command, it would be possible to understand it in at least somewhat different ways, and we would
fail to capture aspects that the child hearing the command would have
known in the moment of the event. The said reflects but does not capture the saying. The saying is in the said only as a trace, as something
we can hear, but never see because when we try to look directly at it,
we see only its after-image. Similarly, there could be no proclamation
of the gospel if there were not a content of the gospel. However, as used
in the New Testament and, therefore, as it also informs our later uses,
the word gospel puts its emphasis on the saying, not the said. What is
most important is the preaching, the call to repentance which is in the
scriptures as a trace. Reading the scriptures requires likening them to
ourselves, because it requires us to read them as a saying—an event in
which we are addressed—rather than a said. If we read the scriptures
as scriptures, the written record becomes an address, the preaching of
the gospel.
When the scriptures proclaim, they disrupt what we are, what we
have made ourselves. They invite our response, our repentance. As
saying, scripture speaks the ethical rupture of my constant though
implicit claim to autonomy. Scripture ruptures the interiority I prize
so much, my consciousness and self-consciousness. Scripture disrupts
the natural and necessary movement of consciousness into itself and
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its principles, into its understanding, and it does so by calling me outside of myself. Scripture calls me out of the solipsistic universe toward
which I tend in reason, and in doing so it calls me to my obligation
to the Divine and to my fellows. It disrupts my focus on principle by
pointing out that my field of vision, as my field, excludes the other person, something that is not mine in that field. The speaking of scripture
opens me to that rupture of my solipsism and, so, to the understanding, as King Benjamin says, “That [I] must repent of [my] sins and
forsake them, and humble [myself] before God; and ask in sincerity of
heart that he would forgive [me]” (Mosiah 4:10).
It follows that scripture can and should be read ethically—as a
saying in which I encounter my obligation to others and God—rather
than philosophically. Scripture reading can be the response to the saying of the ethical rupture, rather than the thematizing said of principle
and ontology. To use Levinas’s language because it is useful, scripture
reading and study can be an encounter with the unsaying saying of
the other person, rather than the said of the same.
Unlike most of what is done in philosophy, scripture does not
demand violence in response to violence, though it often reveals
violence. Scripture does not take up philosophy against itself, so unlike the current criticisms of philosophy, including my own, scripture is not guilty of parricide. When not taken up as a defective or
naive form of philosophy, scripture engenders. It replaces murder and
scapegoating (the desire that everything be totalized in some static
Parmenidean One Thing) with the call for fecundity: “Be fruitful, and
multiply, and replenish the earth” (Genesis 1:28). When read as ethical demand, scripture disrupts my interiority with exteriority. It disrupts the universal and the merely moral (using Nietzsche’s sense of
that word),16 the desire for the theos. In doing so, scripture opens the
16. Nietzsche was certainly no Christian. Nevertheless, no one was more aware of
the limits and defects of conventional, merely rote Christianity than he. So, his work,
though no guide for life, can help us see the problems to which the gospel is an answer.
In Romans Paul teaches that the law by itself is dead, and he urges us to find newness of
life by accepting the Holy Spirit, the origin of the law. Nietzsche shows us that religion
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ethical demand and makes generation and continued life possible as
well as necessary. In scripture and with the prophets, I stand before
the other person, exposed and called upon prior to being anything at
all. In fact, whatever I am is a consequence of my position before the
other person. The ethical response to the ethical demand is the desire
for the other person rather than for the theos, which dissimulates and
displaces the other person, as in idolatry. Desire for the other person
and the concomitant rupture of interiority by the other person are
what philosophy has called community. They are what the scriptures
call Zion. Zion is always already here; it is already amongst us—within
us—though not our creation:
And when he was questioned by the Pharisees concerning
when the kingdom of God is to come, he answered them
and said, “The kingdom of God does not come with careful
watching, neither will they say ‘Look here!’ or ‘There!’ For
behold, the kingdom of God is within you.” (Luke 17:20–21)
For the most part, philosophy demands that we watch carefully.
Sometimes it demands nothing else. Usually it can demand nothing
else. Philosophy is primarily, but perhaps not necessarily, oriented toward vision and the unifying perspective of vision. That is what the said
requires, the seeing of reading. In contrast, scripture speaks the a priori
character of Zion and its demand for our ethical response. It speaks and
asks us to listen, to hearken. Scripture calls us back to the Zion in which
we are constituted; it calls us to a continuation of that Zion.
It is possible to end this discussion here, with an abstract,
philosophical appeal to the nonphilosophical. But surely that selfdeconstructing appeal is insufficient. So as a gesture, but no more than
a gesture, in the direction of allowing scripture to speak the ethical
as mere convention is dead and dangerous to our souls, a point very similar to, if not
the same as, Paul’s. But Nietzsche, though raised in a Christian family, was unable to
see the possibility of life by the Spirit and, so, could recommend nothing better than an
aesthetic life.
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demand, let me outline “disruptive” readings of two scriptural stories,
attempting to show some of the ways in which I hear the other person
exceeding principle and mere being in these stories. I have fuller expositions of these stories in another place awaiting completion.17 But
these outlines should serve to show some of what I find in an ethical
rather than philosophical reading of scripture. Because they are outlines, these readings will ignore the attention to textual details that
scripture calls for. They will remain philosophical in spite of themselves. But I think they will be enough to show that an ethical reading
of scripture is possible. I hope they will at least indicate that such a
reading can be fruitful.
The first story is that of the creation, a story that focuses explicitly
on ethical relation rather than ontology. First notice Genesis 1:1, 26;
and 3:22 (compare Moses 2:1, 26; 3:28; and Abraham 4–5):
In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth.
(Genesis 1:1)
And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our
likeness. (Genesis 1:26)
And the Lord God said, Behold, the man is become as one of
us, to know good and evil. (Genesis 3:22)
God’s oneness is the unity of Zion, a unity of multiple individuals
who remain individual in their unity. God’s unity is not the unity of an
overarching, metaphysical theos, for, as Latter-day Saints have pointed
17. For a more complete, but still incomplete, reading of the first of these stories,
see my “Adam and Eve—Community: Reading Genesis 2–3,” Journal of Philosophy and
Scripture 1/1 (2003): 2–14; http://www.philosophyandscripture.org/Archives/Issue1-1/
James_Faulconer/james_faulconer.html (accessed 8 May 2009). A fuller version of the
Abraham and Isaac story can be found in James E. Faulconer, “The Past and Future Community: Abraham and Isaac; Sarah and Rebekah, . . .” Levinas Studies: An Annual Review
3 (2008): 79–100. In addition, I have a similar reading of a third story, that of Moses and
Israel. It can be found in “Philosophy and Transcendence: Religion and the Possibility of
Justice,” in Transcendence in Religion and Philosophy, ed. James E. Faulconer (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2003), 70–84.
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out for years, God is spoken of in the multiple, not the singular. He is
not alone in any sense.
Latter-day Saints often use the language of the tradition to speak
of God, as well as the assumptions of the philosophical/theological
tradition to understand the scriptures. Therefore, they often assume,
although usually only implicitly and unconsciously, either that God
is the principle of principles or that he exists in virtue of his compliance with such a principle or set of principles. But because this assumption is a postulation of the theos, in making it, we implicitly deny
God’s multiplicity and the possibility of divine togetherness. In other
words, the assumption denies Zion because it takes God to be ultimately alone. However, in spite of that, the Latter-day Saint God is
everywhere implicated in multiplicity. As so implicated, the one God
cannot be the principle of principles. As those who accuse the Latterday Saints of heresy recognize quickly, a God who cannot avoid multiplicity breaks the bond between unity and being, destroying recourse
to God as theos. If traditional belief is the standard, we are heretics
and should be happy to be heretics. Being called a heretic by those
who have false beliefs is not a problem. However, that heresy is not
only a revealed truth and, so a better standard, it is also a philosophical advantage.
As both one and multiple, God can be the Other of ethical relation,
for every ethical relation implies not the I and Thou of Martin Buber,
but the Thou and we.18 Truth is reason—measure, account—and “I’ve
a Mother there”—and a Brother, and brothers and sisters. The creation
story, beginning in Genesis 1 and ending with Genesis 4:1, is the story
of multiplicity and the other person, the story of a living and loving
parent who creates, never from some null point, never alone. It is not
a philosophical story of how a Parmenidean One generated the many.
18. Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 68–69, 155. Levinas is deeply indebted to Buber,
but nevertheless critical. He criticizes Buber in several essays. For an example, see Emmanuel Levinas, “Martin Buber and the Theory of Knowledge,” in Proper Names, trans.
Michael B. Smith (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 17–35.
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The multiplicity of the Other is recapitulated in the story of Adam
and Eve. Genesis 2:18 (Moses 3:18; Abraham 5:14) literally speaks of
Woman as “the one who stands over against—across from—Adam,”
though our translation of the Hebrew is “help meet,” in other words
the appropriate helper. But Woman is an appropriate help to Man, not
by being another hand, or an extra arm, or an additional set of eyes;
Woman is not an addition to Man, not an ordinary supplement, if a
supplement at all. She is neither his subordinate nor his alter ego. She
cannot be reduced either to him or to some third term that encapsulates them both. Woman is the appropriate helper to Man by standing
opposite him, making ethical relation possible by being another to
whom he can be related and, in doing so, giving Man his identity. If we
read imaginatively, we can see that Woman is not simply an extension
of Man, she is “the mother of all living” (Genesis 3:20; compare Moses
4:26). In fact, in the Genesis version of the story, as long as Woman
can be thought of as an extension of Man, she remains uncreated; she
has no name. She is named only when she has ceased to be such an extension. Neither she nor he was fully a person until the fall was accomplished. Their lives together as independent beings standing opposite
one another makes their lives as human beings possible. Together, as
those standing “across from” one another, rather than as mirror images of each other, they make the lives of others possible, as we see in
Genesis 4:1 (compare Moses 5:2). The first thing that the Bible tells us
after it tells us of the expulsion from the garden is “And Adam knew
Eve his wife; and she conceived, and bare Cain.” Fecundity, sexuality,
fraternity and sorority—Zion—are functions of alterity, not functions
of identity and sameness.
Note also that the knowledge which Man and Woman gain in the
creation story is explicitly ethical knowledge, knowledge-with rather
than knowledge-about. We see this illustrated in the way in which
Man comes to know of his need for Woman: He does not know that
he needs another person because God tells him that he does; he does
not come to conclude that he needs a partner by logical deduction. His
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knowledge of Woman’s necessity is not propositional. Man comes to
know that need, a need beyond simple want or lack, only through his
relation to the Divine and through the experience engendered in that
experience. He learns of the need for Woman by assisting in the creation of animals and discovering that there is nothing that is paired
with him, nothing opposite him, no appropriate helper: “And Adam
gave names to all cattle, and to the fowl of the air, and to every beast
of the field; but for Adam there was not found an help meet for him”
(Genesis 2:18–23; compare Moses 3:18–23 and Abraham 5:14–21).
Likewise, having eaten of the tree of the knowledge of good and
evil—having the knowledge of the Gods (explicitly ethical knowledge)—Adam and Eve are like the Gods at the same time that they
are set across from them: “Behold the man is become as one of us,
to know good and evil” (Genesis 3:22; compare Moses 4:28). Divine
knowledge makes Adam and Eve in the image of the Gods at the same
time that it makes the Gods truly Other. The story of Adam and Eve
is the story of the necessity of the other person—a sexed other—with
whom one can stand before God, as a god, in ethical labor and ethical
knowledge. It is a story that undoes philosophical knowledge in favor
of personal and even sexual knowledge.19 It is a story that demands
ethical response. The story of Adam and Eve disrupts our totalizing
knowledge of each other and of God and demands, instead, that we
hear the ethical demand.
The question of the story is not, “What art thou?” (as much philosophy and all psychology supposes), but “Where art thou?” (Genesis
3:9; Moses 4:15). And the “where” of this question supposes neither a
geographic position nor a Heideggerian site in being. Instead it asks
about the ethical where: standing before me, face-to-face, God asks
“Where are you?” The question of the story of Adam and Eve is explicitly the question of ethics—of relation to the Other—not ontology.
Man’s answer to the question, however, is not straightforward
(as Abraham’s will later be). Rather than “Here am I” (compare
19. See Genesis 4:1 and Moses 5:2 where know is no euphemism.
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Genesis 22:1), Man responds with an excuse for hiding: “I heard thy
voice in the garden, and I was afraid, because I was naked; and I hid
myself” (Genesis 3:10; compare Moses 4:16). Guilt and shame come
because the possibility of community is also the possibility of alienation. In this case, by choosing knowledge—ethical knowledge—Man
and Woman have chosen both. They have chosen alienation from God
because only in doing so is human community possible.
There is separation, difference between each and between each and
God, and that separation is necessary if the otherness of either of them,
or of God, is to have meaning. Man and Woman must be separated
from the Divine if they are to image the Divine, but separation necessarily carries with it the possibility of alienation. However, they also
learn that their separation from one another, their difference, is the
ground of human and divine community. Without that, community
would not be possible. If our imaging of God did not include our otherness, we could only be like him; we could not be individuals. But if
we could not be individuals, then we would not be like him. We could
not be at all. Thus, though the absolute, transcendent otherness of God
would make human being impossible; otherness is nevertheless necessary, namely the otherness of persons, both divine and human.
After revealing themselves to God in response to his call, Woman
is told that the consequence of her knowledge of good and evil is pain,
and Man is told that the consequence of his knowledge is labor. But
these are not two distinct things. The fact that the pain of childbirth
is, in English, called labor is helpful. The words are also closely related
in Hebrew. Thus God does not say essentially different things to Man
and Woman. What he says to one he says to both.
The pain of childbirth is a particularly appropriate beginning.
For both creation and relation are represented in it. Knowledge, the
knowledge of good and evil, the knowledge that brings mortality,
makes pain—the pain of bringing forth community—possible. To escape that pain would be to cease to be human. And, implicitly, the
escape from pain is impossible even for God. Being in relation to us,
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he cannot escape the pain that is necessarily part of having created us.
God too must weep (see John 11:35 and Moses 7:29–31).
Labor too is an essential part of human-being. Man and Woman
were required to dress the garden and keep it (Genesis 2:15; compare
Moses 3:15), but they were not able to do so meaningfully. True, they
could work in it, but their work would have been unconscious and
self-gratifying toil. True labor is done only in relation to another (and
it must include the otherness and depth of the other). Only in labor
rather than toil can one have human being. The Hebrew word for
work, avodah, can equally well be translated “service.” As is pain, labor is concomitant with creation and required by relation.
The first part of Genesis 4:1, “Adam knew Eve his wife,” is a summary of the creation of humans, the final act of the creation story:
they have received knowledge by which they can be in relation to one
another, and through those relations they can be fruitful. Implicit in
all of this is the grounding in the Divine: “I have gotten a man from
the Lord” (Genesis 4:1; compare Moses 5:2). The story of creation in
Genesis lays the foundation for an understanding of the relationship
of humans in community by pointing to Man and Woman as unique
individuals bound to each other, and in virtue of what it means to be
human, to all others. To be human is to be in community, though not
always the community of God.
From this theme springs a major theme of biblical writers, namely
the return to true community.20 In order for such a return to occur,
humans must recognize themselves as created in the express image
of God: unique, potentially fruitful, knowing good from evil by intimate association, and capable of action. Perhaps more than anything
else, they must recognize themselves as bound to each other by their
being, by the pain and labor—each both positive and negative—of
human relation.
20. Cf. Isaiah and his call to come forth from physical and spiritual Babylon so Israel
can return to their calling as the people of God.
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The second story I would like briefly to consider is also the story
of ethical response and the relation to other persons. It is the story
of Abraham and Isaac. That story begins when Abram is set apart
from his country, his kindred, and his father’s house—in an order the
reverse of geographic order (Genesis 12:1). Chronologically and geographically, one must leave one’s father’s house first, then one’s kindred, and finally one’s country. However, Genesis reverses that order.
Abram’s leave-taking is not merely a chronological and geographic
leave-taking. He takes his leave spiritually. Given that he is defined
by country, kindred, and father, Abram becomes other than himself
and other than his family. Why? In order to make family and Zion
possible. Abram’s blessing has its origin in his otherness rather than
in his identity.
However, having been cut off from his family, having become
other, as I read the story, Abram searches for a theos. He seeks to create
Zion himself, to force it. He thinks of the promised seed as something
he can bring about, so he agrees to create that promised posterity with
Hagar. In doing so, he implicitly assumes that the other person is not
really other: one son is as good as another; for the purposes of the
blessing that has become abstract, one wife is as good as another. The
otherness of Abram’s promise is totalizable by his will; he believes that
the future promised in the original disruption is to be brought about
by totalizing, by taking control, by his will.
In spite of Abram’s attempts to control, his search for the community founded on a theos is interrupted. First it is interrupted by
his forced dismissal of Ishmael and Hagar. Then, after the covenant
marked by his name change, Abraham’s attempt to control is interrupted by a call that implicitly asks, as Adam was asked, where he
is, a call that erupts in the command to sacrifice Isaac (Genesis 22:1).
However, unlike Adam, Abraham responds to this interruptive call
with “Here I am”—“Behold me here” or “Ready.”
Within the space opened by God’s call, Abraham is finally able to
be separated from his son, and his son is finally able to be separated
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from him. The totality that Abraham has willed is finally broken. The
binding of the sacrifice, the binding that separates father and son at
the altar on Moriah, separates Isaac from Abraham. The community
can no longer be the product of Abraham’s endeavor because the
means of that production is no longer his. It has been taken away by
the command to sacrifice his son. Isaac is now genuinely an other person to him, given by God in the disruption of Abraham’s security.
Isaac is an other whose existence before Abraham makes an ethical
demand on Abraham. Isaac is one to whom Abraham must respond
as another person rather than as a possession. Isaac is one whom, in
Abraham’s confrontation with the dizzying command of the Divine
Other, Abraham is called to serve. In separating father and son, the
sacrificial binding binds father to son in Zion.
With the turn toward the ram in the thicket, the promise of posterity can be fulfilled; in that turn it is fulfilled. Thus, as soon as the
sacrifice is over, the text tells of the birth of Isaac’s wife, Rebekah, the
other person who marks the beginning of Abraham’s posterity (Genesis
22:20–24). Though Abraham’s trial begins with him alone, speaking not
even to his wife, this second separation, the one that occurs through the
binding and turning from sacrifice—separation from both wife and son
as individuals rather than extensions of himself—results in the biding
and the binding of Zion. Through Rebekah, not one of Abraham’s possessions, the second separation results in the fruitfulness of Abraham’s
covenant. That binding, Zion, is a binding of individuals who stand
“over against” each other as do Adam and Eve.
The binding of the sacrificial victim at Moriah results in the binding of Zion, but this binding is not the application of a universal principle. As Søren Kierkegaard argues in Fear and Trembling,21 Abraham’s response defies all merely universal principles. Instead, it is the
ethical response to the other person that makes possible continued relation to the other person, the continuation of otherness and response.
In the beginning, Abram’s response is the welcome of the power of the
21. Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling (New York: Penguin Books, 1985).
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Divine Other. In the end, Abraham’s response is the welcome of the
filial other and the Divine Other himself.
Though both these stories are stories of unity, they both warn us
against looking for the unity of Zion in unity of being, in a totality. In
a certain sense, both tell the same story, the story of our fruitful separation (difference), from each other and from God, in Zion. Both are
stories of welcoming the other in a relation that seals individuals to each
other as individuals. Both call us to our lives before each other. Both
make the ethical demand. Both deconstruct totality in favor of Zion.
Both these stories do what I believe all scripture does. They do
not describe the life that is required, nor do they give us its principles.
Scripture is not guilty of idolatry, though as readers of scripture we
often are. Rather than doing philosophy, these stories call to us and
disrupt the lazy and unethical comfort of our being-at-home with
ourselves and our present situation. In them we hear that Zion is not
to be found by looking because it is already here, though we often
cannot see it. As I assume do also other scriptural stories, the stories
of Adam and Eve and of Abraham and Isaac call us back to where we
already are so we can be there for the first time and so we can continue
to be there, constantly reborn into Zion.

chapter ten

Breathing:
Romans 8:1–17
•

I

am going to mingle scripture with the philosophies of men—not because I am unaware of the danger, but precisely because I am aware.
Scripture gets mingled with philosophy all the time in places such as
Sunday School, priesthood and Relief Society, Seminary, and religion
classes at BYU and in our institutes of religion. The problem is not so
much the mingling. That is inevitable if we speak reflectively of scripture. The problem is our ignorance of that mingling, our assumption
that we are not mingling scripture with philosophy when, in fact, we
are. Much of what we say about the gospel is simply late nineteenthcentury philosophies of men rather than contemporary philosophies
of men: Newtonian science mixed, oddly, with a little Comptean positivism, and a dash of idealism thrown in for good measure.
Here I wish to mingle the first seventeen verses of Romans 8 with
philosophical reflection. Set against the backdrop of chapter 7, these
verses tell of “life in Christ” or “the indwelling Spirit.” As a response
to the problem described in chapter 7, these verses offer a powerful
understanding of what Christian obedience means, an understanding
too often misunderstood or ignored by Latter-day Saints. From what
I hear from fellow Saints—from what I catch myself thinking—we
can well afford to be reminded of these verses and their solution to
the problem of human frailty. I hope my mingling of philosophy and
scripture will help breathe new life into these verses for those who find
themselves still in chapter 7, still living the life in which one intends
to be a Christian, but has not yet succeeded. I hope that what I say will
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help us recover from the suffocation we sometimes think we find in
our religious lives.
Romans 7 shows us how, even with the best of intentions, we fail
to do good: We know that the law is spiritual: but I am carnal, sold
against my will into slavery to sin: “For that which I do I allow not:
for what I would, that do I not; but what I hate, that do I. . . . For the
good that I would I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I do”
(Romans 7:14, 15, 19). Paul describes an ordinary failure, though a
tragic one: the inability to do good steadfastly. We have all had the
experience: I do something wrong and hate the fact that I have done it.
I resolve to do differently and, for a while, I succeed. Eventually, however, I fail. It often seems as if the more determined my resolve, the
less capable I am of doing what I believe to be right. In the face of this
problem, we comfort ourselves with a variety of excuses: “One step at
a time is good enough; nobody’s perfect”; “As long as I’m trying, that’s
what counts.” But such excuses fly in the face of the demand made of
us by the gospel, and we know it. We also know that our intentions
to obey the law are not good enough to guarantee that we will obey.
Among the many results are depression, on the one hand, and hypocrisy, on the other.
If we give up our excuses, the horror of Romans 7 is excruciating. Paul rivals anything Jean-Paul Sartre or Jean Genet has ever written about the excruciating impossibility of moral action. What Paul
writes demands that we acknowledge the problem of our inability to do
good—or that we wish it away, ignoring what he describes or twisting it
and turning it so he says something else. But the phenomenon will not
go away. Sooner or later anyone who sincerely tries to do good will be
brought to acknowledge what Paul has described here. And the consolations we proffer each other are small consolations because, on the one
hand, they deny the humanity of the Savior and, on the other hand,
they deny his divine power to save us in this world as well as the next.
If we are lucky, that consolation eventually evaporates in the face of our
own evil. If we are not lucky, we continue on, chanting “All is well in
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Zion; yea, Zion prospereth, all is well” (2 Nephi 28:21), and humming,
“if it so be that we are guilty, God will beat us with a few stripes, and at
last we shall be saved in the kingdom of God” (2 Nephi 28:8).
Our finitude seems to be the problem. The law is infinite. Therefore, it always exceeds my finite will and grasp. I cannot do what is
demanded because it is beyond my power to do so. The law requires
too much of me. At the heart of Romans, chapter 7 describes the human condition as tragic failure in the classical sense of “tragic,” the
failure of our finitude. In it we find a picture of the would-be Christian
as a Sophoclean hero, struggling to do good in the face of an absolute
inability ultimately to do good: it is not that we do not obey the law,
it is that we cannot obey it for any length of time or with any consistency because the law is too much for us. In the face of that inability,
we struggle to do good anyway. We are infinitely resigned to our fate,
though our resignation is pathetic.
I hope to show that the answer to this problem is a commonplace:
the problem described in chapter 7 is a consequence of the fact that
the person described in that chapter depends ultimately on only herself. She depends upon herself to do the good, and we all know that
we cannot depend on ourselves alone. If we are to do good, we must
depend on the Spirit instead.
I am not going to add anything to that commonplace. It is true;
what could be added? But in spite of its truth, everything about us
says otherwise. It may be a commonplace that we must depend on
the Spirit, but that commonplace is contradicted by the very structure that our history has given to ordinary experience: the structure of our culture, the structure of our language and ways of being.
These are what I believe almost naturally. At least these things seem
so obvious to us that they seem natural. We are sometimes warned
against “the philosophies of men,” and I think this supposedly natural belief in what our culture and history has taught us is often what
is intended by that phrase. As a consequence, though we pay lip service to the commonplace that we ought to live by the Spirit, I do not
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think we often fully believe it, and I think we often contradict it in
spite of ourselves.
Philosophers like the seventeenth-century thinker René Descartes have a penchant for clarity and distinctness. Others, like the
twentieth-century Austro-British thinker, Ludwig Wittgenstein, want
to dissolve philosophical problems. They want to “show the fly the way
out of the bottle,”1 so it will be bothered no more. In spite of that,
philosophers are notorious for making the simple difficult. I am more
in sympathy with Wittgenstein than Descartes, but my sympathy lies
most with Søren Kierkegaard, a nineteenth-century Dane, and one
of the most breathtaking philosophers to have lived. In Johannes Climacus, Kierkegaard reports that according to Climacus, the pseudonymous author of Kierkegaard’s most important work, Concluding
Unscientific Postscript, difficulty is the point of philosophy.2
That is what I propose to do here, to make more difficult the commonplace that we must depend on the Spirit. Such difficulty is not for
everyone. Those with the faith of a child certainly do not need it. Neither do those with the more mature faith of a second naivete,3 those
who have passed from childhood through the trials of adolescence,
where we confront the reality of evil and our finitude, and into the
maturity of genuine faith. But many of us remain religious adolescents. Many of us are beyond the faith of our childhood but still hoping for naivete to return in its mature form. We spiritual adolescents
need things to be more difficult. We need philosophy because it may
help us on our path toward mature naivete by awakening us from our
dogmatic slumber or from the skepticism to which we are so often
reduced when we awake from dogmatic slumber and find ourselves in
1. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscomb
(London: Blackwell, 1958), ¶309.
2. Søren Kierkegaard, Johannes Climacus, or De omnibus dubtitandum est, in Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus, trans. Edna H. Hong and Howard V. Hong
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1885), 113–73 at 137–38. And we must not forget
that Climacus, like many of us, does not understand Christianity, though he writes about
its central problem.
3. See the introduction in this volume for more on first and second naivete.
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the dark. This essay is for this latter group, for those like myself who
are on the way toward second naivete.
Some who know my work will recognize the melody of the song I
am about to sing as a beginning because it is one I’ve sung before. It is a
simple song about the history of Western thought, and it goes like this:
From the beginning, Western thought has insisted on unity. We have
inherited this emphasis on unity from the early Greeks, who might
have offered this argument: Whatever is ultimate must be unitary.
Why? Well, suppose it is not. Suppose there are two ultimate things. If
there are, how are they related to each other such that they are the ultimate source of everything else? If there is nothing that brings them
together, then there is no world, and we know there is a world. So there
must be something that brings them together, something common to
each. But if there is something common to each, then that thing, whatever it is, produces the one world from the two things that we assumed
were ultimate. In that case, it seems reasonable to say that whatever
uses the two things to make our world is more metaphysically fundamental, more ultimate, than the two things. In other words, if we
suppose there are two ultimate things, we come to the conclusion that
there is really only one.
Reasoning this way, everything must finally work out to one
thing, not two. There is only one reality; there can be only one ultimate explanation for any event or thing. That assumption is at the
heart of Western intellectual history. It has made science possible.
We have always sought for some unified and enclosed system that
would give the systematic and coherent law of reality without reference to anything outside it. As important as this assumption has
been for the development of science, it has been less salubrious for
our understanding of moral action.
The supposition of one ultimate means that there can be only one
origin for good. Either that one origin is me or it is something outside
of me. In other words, either I am the unified and enclosed system
that makes good possible, or something outside of me is. If I am the
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origin, fine (though we have the problem described in Romans 7, the
problem of my finitude and the infinity of the law). If it is something
outside of me, then either I encompass it or it encompasses me, since
we have to have closure in order to have unity. Unless I can encompass
the grounds for moral behavior, taking control over them, unless they
can become part of me, it seems they can never be any more than an
authority before which I must bow in acquiescence, which is hardly
a description of moral action. Most of us find it hard to imagine that
moral action is possible from any other origin than the ego, the “I
think.” Following the vocabulary of Emmanuel Levinas,4 I will call
this recourse to the individual as the source of moral behavior, autonomy, self-rule.
In autonomy, the individual must depend on himself to do the
truly good. I believe Bertrand Russell described the problem of doing
good in something like this way: “You can choose what you desire,
but you cannot choose your desires.” In other words, to most of us it
is clear that we can do what we desire to do. But what about what we
do not desire to do? If I want to do what is right, I can, but suppose I
do not want to do the good thing? How could I choose to do it? What
sense would it make for someone to say to me, “But you should want
to do it”? How can I choose to want something? It appears that either I
want it or I do not. Russell’s problem is a genuine conundrum for any
discussion of moral behavior, but Paul goes Russell one better: even if
you do desire to do something, you cannot be assured that you will,
especially if what you desire is to do good. It is not just that sometimes
we want the wrong thing and, so, choose what is wrong. We sometimes do the bad thing in spite of ourselves. Sometimes we desire to do
the right thing yet do the wrong thing.5
4. Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969).
5. Some try to avoid this by arguing that we must have wanted the wrong thing more
than the right thing if that is what we chose. But that goes directly against our experience
of our behavior.
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As Western thought is often understood, the only alternative to
the self-assertion of enclosure and autonomy is suicide or genocide,
though usually intellectual rather than physical suicide or genocide.
This alternative agrees that unity and closure are necessary, but it sees
the shortcomings and inability of the individual. Thus, it says that the
unitary, closed origin of good is outside of me and that I must become
part of it, if I am to do good. Rather than encompassing what is outside
of my autonomous self, taking control of it, I must be encompassed
by it. I must give up my individuality and freedom, my autonomy, to
the control of a closed totality that is bigger than I am. I must disappear into this larger autonomy. Some ideas of God require this kind
of self-annihilation. This has also been the Marxist alternative. This
way of seeing things comes in a variety of guises. Without taking the
time to explain why, let me say simply that I believe this alternative to
autonomy fails even more fully than the historically more common
individualistic alternative. It fails primarily because, though it is not
individualistic, this alternative continues to assert the primacy of autonomy: divine, social, historical, or state power, but totality, enclosure,
system, and power anyway. Autonomy is the rule, whether it is individual autonomy or the autonomy of history, the State, or a false god.
The individual is almost always assumed to be the ontological and
ethical origin of the good. It may be that an origin outside the individual is posited. But the individual can do good only because he includes that origin within himself. On this view, an act is only an ethical act if it is the internalized free choice of an individual. Many of the
ways we think about ethics assume the primacy of the individual and
of freedom. We say, for example, that unless the command I obey is
mine, I cannot be ethical. We struggle to teach our children that they
must learn to choose for themselves, that their ethical behavior must
come from within. In our academic discussions of ethics, the broadly
appealing ethics of Kant are an excellent example of our understanding of the relation of the good to the individual.
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For most of us, most of the time, recourse to the individual seems
the only possibility. With the fool, Polonius, we tell ourselves, “To
thine own self be true.”6 However, Romans 7 is a reductio ad absurdum of the desire to bring about the good by grasping it, willing it,
mastering it—by interiorizing it and then acting from that interiority
freely. Reliance on oneself seems unavoidable, but reliance on oneself ends in Sophoclean tragedy, at best. As Proverbs says, “He that
trusteth in his own heart is a fool” (Proverbs 28:25). Is there a way of
maintaining individuality and having something other than myself
as an adequate source of the ability to do good without committing a
kind of suicide, without giving up all semblance of individuality? Are
my only choices the tragedy of being a free individual but unable, ultimately, to do good or, in contrast, being subject to some force exterior
to me and, so, able to do good, but no longer an individual in any
meaningful sense? Paul’s answer is yes. But his answer does not mean
what we think it does. To make sense of his answer we must think
quite differently than we are accustomed to thinking. The Christian
alternative cannot easily be found within the structure of Western
thought, though it can be found there if one goes looking.
A beginning of this Christian rethinking of weakness of the will
is to be found in asking, “What if the law is not the kind of thing
ever to be willed or grasped? What if doing good is neither one of
my powers nor a power to which I must accede because it is not a
power of any kind? What if willing and grasping are themselves the
problem because they convert doing good into a question of control?”
Though Romans 7 shows us that autonomy—free self-rule—cannot
bring about the good, and it shows us the tragedy of autonomy, it does
not show us that there is no good or that we cannot do it—unless we
also assume, as we often do and as we think we must, that autonomy
is the only grounds for the possibility of the good.
Paul proposes that, in spite of what logically seems to be the case
at first glance, there is an alternative assumption. Romans 8 comes as
6. Shakespeare, Hamlet, act 1, scene 3.
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an answer to the Sophoclean problem by showing another kind of law
and another kind of obedience: We need not trust in our own hearts,
nor must we be swallowed up in something beyond ourselves. If Romans 7 shows us the problem of autonomy, then Romans 8 shows us
heteronomy, obedience to a law that is not mine to grasp, appropriate,
and master because it is the law of the Other. It shows us obedience
to a law with which I do not have to struggle and which I do not have
to make mine. In fact, the law of Romans 8 cannot be made mine or
anyone’s, even by an act of will, so there can be no question of struggle with it. Neither is it a matter of ceasing to exist in the face of the
new law by becoming one with something outside of myself. The law
of Romans 8—if, indeed, it continues to make sense to call law what
calls for the Christian’s obedience—is outside the Parmenidean logic
of unity. Rather than the dominance and necessity of ultimate unity,
we will see Paul propose another way of thinking about the world and
the possibility of good: the moral law is always the rule of another,
never self-rule, but it is not subjugation to or absorption into another.
Romans 8 shows us life in Christ Jesus, a life in which we remain individual while we are obligated but not subjected to the Other Person
and other persons. In chapter 8 we will see life in the Spirit.
Verses One and Two
1

This means there is now no condemnation for those whose
being is in Christ Jesus, 2for the law of the Spirit of life in
Christ Jesus has freed me from the law of sin and death.

Paul ends chapter 7 jubilantly: “Thanks be to God through Jesus
Christ our Lord! So, by myself I serve the law of God only in my
thoughts, while with the flesh I serve the law of sin” (Romans 7:25).
His jubilation comes before his summation of the problem, but that
summation is followed by verse 1 of chapter 8.7 Paul’s jubilation, joy
7. The chapter division, created more than a thousand years after Paul wrote his
letter, is unfortunate because it divides the single thought that extends across Romans

234

Faith, Philosophy, Scripture

in the face of the tragedy he has just described, is possible because
those who have their existence, not in themselves, but in the Other—
in the Divine Other—those whose life is not merely a life of autonomy,
do not find themselves judged and separated from the Good. They
are not doomed, for their being is neither in-itself nor for-itself. It is
being-in-and-for-another, but not an other that absorbs and digests
everything but itself. Rather than the closed, solid, impenetrable
Parmenidean being presumed in the history of Western philosophy,
for those in Christ, being is founded in what exceeds them and calls
them. The choices that seem so inevitable from within autonomy fade
away because we are not autonomous—and neither, as we will see, are
we subjugated.
Life in the Other, heteronomous law, frees us from the alienation
of simple autonomy, an alienation from God and even from ourselves,
because heteronomous life is incompatible with merely autonomous
life. If we live heteronomously, our lives are fuller because we are not
confined to the boundaries of our selves. Our lives are always a matter of excess and extravagance, the excess and extravagance of what
is other than us, of what cannot be subsumed or systematized in autonomy. We can and must create order. However, order and the Greek
logos (rather than Christian one) are not fundamental. Instead, order
and rationality come from the abundance of life as a loving response
to it. Life creates order and rationality; they do not make life what it is.
Order and rationality are a response to the fact that not everything is
contained within the ego, to the fact that something challenges the I’s
claim to autonomy, namely the Other. They are the human response
to an ethical demand, the demand that we explain ourselves, that we
accommodate our existence to the existence of others.8 According to
a common reading, as a history of autonomy, Western philosophy has
held its breath for 2,500 years.9 Its spirit has been its own (autonomy)
7:25 and Romans 8:1 into two pieces, causing us to miss the fact that they are part of the
same thought.
8. See Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 201.
9. There are, of course, better readings of that history.
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and not the Holy Spirit (heteronomy). Enclosed within itself, Western
philosophy has breathed nothing but itself. In fact, it has not even desired to breath something other than itself. Many of our metaphors for
knowledge are metaphors of vision: “I see what you mean.” As those
metaphors illustrate, Western philosophy has thought seeing to be so
important that it has, more often than not, not even thought about
breathing. Even Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, though a frank admission of the need for Spirit and breath in thought, ends up an exercise in holding one’s breath—suffocation—because it never opens itself to anything exterior. In spite of itself, like the usual reading of the
previous history of philosophy, Hegel’s Phenomenology is an account
of breathing in an ultimately closed space, the space of the totality of
knowledge, the Absolute.
Christianity proposes something else. It proposes that, like Adam,
the dust of our autonomous, dead flesh cannot make itself live, but
it can be brought to life if we receive the breath of God. Having the
Spirit, breathing, is always a matter of exteriority and exposure; to
breathe is necessarily to allow what is exterior to come in. It is to expose the interior of my lungs, the very center of my interiority, to the
exterior. In place of the suffocation and appropriation found in the
autonomous self, Christianity reveals exposure to the Other through
the Spirit, through life-giving breath. Life in another, namely Christ,
frees us from death and suffocation, for that life gives us our breath.
The solution to the problem we have seen—either self-enclosed, tragically heroic morality or self-annihilation in the Absolute—is found in
the Spirit, in bringing the Other into our autonomous, enclosed world
and fracturing our autonomy by that entry. The Spirit, the breath of
God, is not another enclosure in which our enclosure is subsumed.
The Spirit is not another all-encompassing law to which I must submit. If it were, it would be only another death. The alternative to the
death found in self-rule would be only the death of annihilation in the
Other. Instead of being a modification of the enclosed self or an enclosure into which the self must enter, the law of the Spirit is a breach in
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enclosure, the destruction of autonomy, the destruction of the law of
power. Breathing is not a matter of bringing everything into ourselves.
Neither is it a matter of giving ourselves over so completely to what is
exterior to us that we lose our identity. I cannot breathe if I do not have
a body into which the Spirit can enter, a body separate from the Spirit;
I must remain an individual if I am to receive the Spirit. But breathing breaks the solidity of the wall supposed between myself and my
exterior. I cannot breath if enclosure is the rule. Breathing the breath
of life, “having the Spirit,” requires the exposure of my interiority to
the exterior.
Jesus spoke to Nicodemus of salvation in the Spirit. Presumably,
Nicodemus was an obedient man. Many presume that he was a member of the Sanhedrin, and whether he was or not, it is clear that he was
an upstanding and exemplary member of his community, one of the
rulers (see John 3:1). But in spite of his self-discipline and uprightness
in the law, Jesus told him he must be transformed, reborn, and Nicodemus could not understand how that could be. We can imagine him
asking, “What remains for me to do? I am not yet perfect, but I try
very hard to do all that the law requires.” In answer Jesus said:
That which is born of the flesh is flesh; and that which is born
of the Spirit is spirit. Marvel not that I said unto thee, Ye must
be born again. The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou
hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh,
and whither it goeth: so is every one that is born of the Spirit.
(John 3:6–8)
By itself, the flesh is not the living, human body; it is the autonomous body, the unbreathing, uninspired body. Merely autonomous
life is suffocation. Rebirth requires breath and wind. Without that,
rebirth would be stillbirth. Only the end of autonomy, the entry into
the individual by the Other, can bring birth about.
The entry of the Spirit, the breach in autonomy by the breath of
God, is life, deliverance from mere flesh by the revivification of that
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flesh. But the Spirit that revivifies is not to be mastered, and it is not
something to be mastered by. The law of the Spirit gives life, but it cannot be reduced to a set of rules or written down in an agenda. Rebirth
is not a goal to be planned for and attained. One cannot master the
wind, the breath. But neither is one mastered by it; the Spirit is not a
ruler, at least not of the kind to which we are accustomed. Life is not a
matter of mastery, either of self or by another. Life, heteronomous life,
the only real life, is a matter of openness and exposure to the Other.
It is a matter of breathing. It is a matter of accepting the breath of life.
To open oneself to the breath of life is to be freed from death. To
breathe is no longer to suffocate. Exposure to the Other brings freedom from alienation and death, though that freedom is threatening
because it is exposure, because I must trust in someone other than
myself and because it is always possible, at least in principle, that the
Other to whom I am exposed can kill me. Those who would live must
give up holding their breath, breathing only their own flesh. They
must breathe the breath of another, the breath of Christ Jesus.
Verses Three and Four
3

What the law was powerless to do, because of the weakness of
flesh, God did, sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful
flesh for a sin offering, thereby condemning us in the flesh, 4 so
that the just demands of the law might be satisfied in us, who
conduct ourselves not according to the flesh, but according to
the Spirit.
Autonomous life, mere dead—because unbreathing, uninspired—
flesh, is weak. Without the breath of life, it is powerless. Perhaps that
is why autonomy makes such an issue of power. Romans 7 shows that
autonomy is unable to do what it desires to do, namely bring about the
good. But the Father, by sending his Son among us, was able to reveal
the barrenness of mere autonomy and, thus, to condemn it so that we
can live justly.
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For the Father, too, the law is a matter of heteronomy. He is not a
merely autonomous being who demands that we submit our autonomy
to his. The law of God is heteronomous through and through, not the
submission of one autonomy to another. The law that the Father offers
does not substitute his autonomy for ours. He does not condemn us
by making a demand of us with which we must struggle or by issuing
a decree to which we must submit. Rather, we are condemned by the
very fact that in response to our autonomous demand for freedom
(which turns out to be only alienation), he freely offers himself and his
Son. Without recourse to any “need” for freedom, he exposes himself
and his Son to us and our injustice. Indeed, his exposure of himself is
proof that he is not the autonomous being pictured by the tradition,
for an autonomous being cannot expose himself. In principle, cannot. In exposing himself and his Son, the Father reveals the alienation
inherent in our autonomy and freedom. His free gift reveals the paucity of our freedom, a freedom of needs and demands. In turn, that
revelation of freedom makes another freedom—freedom in Christ—
possible, a freedom of grace and love.
God’s offer of the Son, therefore, is anything but the offer of a
scapegoat. He does not offer his Son in response to some demand for
vengeance and retribution, whether that demand is a particular demand or a metaphysical one. To do so would be to authorize such
demands. To do so would be to put an end to the possibility of justice.
It would be to give power to injustice by acknowledging it and acquiescing to it. Instead, the Father puts an end to any such demand by
offering his Son and himself in response to our injustice. He does not
put an end to our injustice; he offers even the Divine to us in our injustice. There is no hint of autonomy, self-sufficiency, or misconceived
freedom in the offer. They are beside the point.
We popularly speak of the atonement as a matter of fulfilling the
demands of some impartial and even hateful metaphysical principle
of justice. The contemporary thinker René Girard has argued convincingly that such a conception is pagan, not Christian, and that the
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message of Christianity is not that there was an ultimate scapegoat,
but that scapegoating is avoidable and must be avoided.10 Christ has
called both himself and the Holy Spirit, “the Paraclete”—not just the
Comforter, though that translation is meaningful and important, but
the one who stands beside another, the advocate, the defense attorney
(see John 14:16; see also 1 John 2:1). Jesus offers himself in our defense—against our autonomous selves rather than against some metaphysical principle of justice to which he must bow. He offers himself
so that we will be able to meet the demands that justice makes of us.
Heteronomous law is the life of Christ.
The offering Christ makes is in the incarnation. By being embodied, the Son offers us his breath that we may breathe. Unembodied,
God would remain merely autonomous, either enclosed within himself and, therefore, never able to obligate us by offering himself to us,
or so open and amorphous as to be meaningless. A breath without a
body is not even a breath. God’s offering is the body and the blood of
his Son; it is his breath, his life.
Paul says that the incarnation presents the Son in the likeness of
sinful flesh, suggesting to some that his life among us was only an
appearance. Some gnostics of the first- and second-century church
believed as much, and it was against this denial of the incarnation
of Christ in a body like our own that the early church fathers fought
tenaciously.11 Today, if we speak of Christ as half human and half
Divine rather than fully human and, at the same time, fully Divine, I
think we make a gnostic suggestion. But the gnostic assumption is a
misreading. Christ did appear among us in the flesh, but his flesh was
not sinful, autonomous flesh, though it may have seemed to be so. We
mistake individuality and embodiment for autonomy, thinking they
10. René Girard, Violence and the Sacred, trans. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1978).
11. See Michel Henry, L’Incarnation, Une phénoménologie de la chair (Paris: Seuil,
2000), especially pp. 14–19, for a good synopsis of the relevant issues. Though we think of
the Council of Nicea as deciding the nature of the Godhead, its most important issue was
the refutation of the gnostic idea that the Son was not embodied.
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are necessarily identical. He was, indeed, an embodied individual, but
he did not live autonomously, and by not doing so, he both showed us
the possibility of living justly and condemned us for not doing so. By
living as an individual human, Christ demonstrated that alienation
is not essential to individuality, and he showed that the freedom of
arbitrariness and individuality, as well as the search for mastery and
domination—even of the self—is beside the point.
Justice is possible for and by those who breathe. It is a matter of
exhalation as well as inhalation, of expiration as well as inspiration.
But justice is not a matter of either mastery or submission. It is a matter of meeting our obligations, obligations to the Other incurred because of his sacrifice. Justice is not a matter of disciplining ourselves
to follow a rule imposed on us, but of being infused with the offering
of Christ. It is a matter of breathing in the breath which he expires and
returning that breath to another. It is a matter of being, ourselves, a
paraclete rather than a judge. It is a matter of finding our being, not in
ourselves, but in others.
If we live autonomously, we cannot meet the just demands of the
law, because we cannot breathe. Bounded flesh cannot reach beyond
itself, cannot get outside itself, so it cannot do justice, no matter how
hard it tries. But the living law is contrary to the dead and breathless
freedom demanded in autonomy and required in response to the law
of autonomy. Because the autonomous individual reacts allergically to
anything exterior to himself, assuming that it demands his subjugation, he insists on the freedom of autonomy (and, often, in subjugating
what is other than himself). As a result, he takes his obligation to the
Son to be nothing more than a threat: “Do what I say, or die.” Even
if the autonomous person desires to do otherwise, once the law is a
threat, he cannot obey it with any consistency. Sooner or later, he will
assert his own existence in the face of that threat. Sooner or later he
will act unjustly. But the person needs no self-defense, for the law he
perceives as a threat is really the manifestation of the Paraclete. It is
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really what breaks the boundary of his flesh so that the breath of life
may enter, a breath that makes justice possible.
Thus, the irony is that the Son’s demand is not the demand of another autonomy threatening a person’s autonomy. It is odd even to
call it a demand, since, though the person feels obligated, the Son
does not demand. He is Other than the person, and that otherness is
a threat. But the threat is only a threat to the person’s continued, dead
existence. It is a threat only to a suffocating life that breathes only
flesh and never Spirit. Rather than standing before a person making
a demand for the sake of his own autonomy, the Son stands beside
the person and beside any to whom the person would be unjust, always already breathing the breath of life into them, always already
disrupting the person’s claim to autonomy and opening the possibility
of justice. The disruption of autonomy by heteronomy does not negate
or overcome autonomy’s freedom. Freedom in the sense we usually
understand that term simply ceases to be an issue.
Experience (with the emphasis on the ex), not freedom, is the issue
in heteronomy. As the twentieth-century German philosopher HansGeorg Gadamer argues, experience is always of the individual, never
the universal,12 so it cannot be reduced to autonomy, to some systematic, complete, and in-itself whole. As he also argues, experience is
essentially negative: “Every experience worthy of the name crosses out
our expectation.”13 We are never left the same after an experience. Experience is always of what is other than the sameness we expect.
When Odysseus leaves Ithaca to travel in the world, one can argue
that he seeks knowledge, not experience. He wishes to see much and
to hear some, but he returns to the same place from which he left, essentially unchanged. For all of his sightseeing, he remains the same.
Though he appears to have ventured into what is exterior to him, he
12. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1960,
1975), 334; Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. rev. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G.
Marshall, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Continuum, 1975, 2004), 346.
13. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, 338; Gadamer, Truth and Method, 350, trans.
Weinsheimer and Marshall.
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has not really done so. He has had no experience. If I may coin a word,
we might say he has had only inperience. He has lived freely. He has
seen and done much. But he has encompassed what he has encountered, brought it into himself, to return home with it as booty. He now
owns more; he has appropriated events and places far from Ithaca,
but he is himself the same. As the homecoming scene of the Odyssey
emphasizes, the Odysseus who returns to Ithaca is exactly the same
individual as the one who left. Odysseus needs no paraclete, for he
can defend himself; what he does comes from within himself and, in
the long run, is what he chooses to do; what he encounters does not
change him, but he takes possession of it. Odysseus is the model of an
autonomous individual.
Abraham is different.14 As Abram he leaves his country, his
kin, and his father’s house, never to return. One might presume he
is alienated, but his separation from country, kin, and house are to
bring about justice: “In thee shall all families of the earth be blessed”
(Genesis 12:3). Abram is separated, but not alienated. The very point
of his separation is ethical life, justice.
Later Abram’s autonomy is interrupted once again by the command to be circumcised and his change of name to Abraham: he does
not return; his identity does not remain the same. In circumcision the
organ of regeneration is interrupted and exposed as a sign of Abraham’s exposure and obligation to God, an obligation to be fecund, an
obligation that is never merely individual and that cannot be mastered or, as Abraham discovers, planned. The question of Abraham’s
freedom—a question that cannot be avoided from within autonomy—
never comes up. He is the one with whom God has covenanted for the
blessing of the world. He is, therefore, obliged, but not subjugated. In
fact, in being obliged to God and the entire world, Abraham is a ruler,
not a subject (see Genesis 17:6–8). Abraham stands for the world as a
14. I owe this comparison of Odysseus and Abraham to a suggestion made by Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 271.
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lawyer stands for his client; he becomes its paraclete. By being obliged
to God, he becomes a defender and a blessing, and in that he rules.
The point of the Divine sacrifice is the satisfaction of justice. The
law demands that we be just, but, of ourselves, we are unable to do so
because we are unable to escape ourselves. Tragic heroism is the only
possibility. But when the breath of life, the Spirit, is breathed into us in
covenant, then we are alive and able to be just. We escape our lives, but
not through ourselves. The interruption of our autonomy by the Other
comes in order to bring about justice, perhaps justice for ourselves,
though it is difficult to imagine how one who is autonomous can demand justice for herself, and one who lives heteronomously would
have no need to make such a demand. Certainly the interruption of
our autonomy comes in order to bring the blessing of justice for all
the world. It comes to make possible ethical life, life with one another
rather than lives of domination and cruelty.
Verses Five through Eight
5

Those who have their being towards the flesh aspire to the
things of the flesh; those who have their being towards the
Spirit, the things of the Spirit. 6For, to aspire to the flesh is
death, but aspiration to the Spirit is life and peace, 7because
an aspiration to the flesh is hatred of God, not being subject
to God’s law, or even having the power to be subject to him;
8
those who are in the flesh are powerless to please God.
If autonomous being is fundamental, if we are, like Parmenides’
“Entity”—enclosed and enclosing solid bodies, without interstices and
unbreached by the influx of breath—then we can aspire to nothing not
already contained in those bodies of solid flesh. We can breathe only
ourselves, and we must quickly suffocate. In contrast, if our being is
predicated on what is exterior to us, on what is prior to that being, if
our flesh is infused with the breath of life, then we can aspire to life.
We become living bodies.
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Aspiration toward only ourselves is expiration, not aspiration. To
breathe only flesh is to be dead, and to be dead is to be in opposition
to life and the giver of life. In contrast, to aspire toward the Other,
to aspire to inspiration, is to aspire to life and peace. This is because
death—autonomy—is alienation from God. Autonomy is not only not
to be under the law of God, it is to be unable to be under that law because the very thing that constitutes the law, namely heteronomy and
the breath of life that it brings, is absent.
When we are autonomous, we see the question of ethics as a
question of power: do we have the power to do good? But to reduce
the question of the good to a question of power is to reduce ethics to
agonistics. War is the outcome of autonomy, and this is true whether
we speak of the autonomy of the self or the autonomy of some overarching entity to which we are subject. If I am complete in myself,
then anything exterior to me is a threat. Anything other than myself
must be subdued or I must give in to it, but in either case, the only
possible attitude is one of battle and struggle, the struggle to the
death that Hegel portrays in the fourth chapter of The Phenomenology of Spirit.15 For this reason, the autonomous self can have no relation to the law but one of struggle, and most of us—indeed, all—are
all too familiar with that struggle.
In such a situation, peace is impossible, even if it were possible finally to win the struggle with the law. For peace is not simply the cessation of war. To have won the war, finally to have disciplined the self or
to have submitted to the will of another, to have destroyed the enemy
or to have been destroyed, is not to have found peace. Peace and war
are not opposites; they are incommensurables. Since autonomy is an
insistence on the enclosed self and the enclosure of everything in the
self, it is the sin of Cain, murder for gain. It is the destruction of the
15. G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1977). Hegel, too, sees that the only way out of the struggle is to give it
up. Significantly, he argues that servitude rather than mastery will allow us to have the
selfhood we sought in mastery. Nevertheless, in his argument “Spirit” never gets outside
itself. It is condemned never to breathe.
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otherness of what is not the same (what is not enclosed within the autonomous entity) for the benefit of the autonomous entity. Autonomy
is not peace, even when successful, for finally to have murdered everyone who opposes me is not to have brought peace.
In contrast, peace is justice for and dedication to the Other. As a
consequence, those who are in the flesh and have no breath are powerless to be in a positive relation to God, for that relation requires living
in peace, not satisfying his whims. Though those whose being is in the
flesh would rid themselves of it if they could, murder is in their hearts,
for the only being that ultimately matters is their own. But to please
God is to be just, as he is just. It is to be accommodated to his character, the character of the Paraclete, not the murderer.
Verse Nine
9

You, however, are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit—if the
Spirit of God dwells in you. If anyone does not have the Spirit
of Christ, that person is not his.
The possibility of heteronomous life, obedience to the law, righteousness, is not a pie-in-the-sky possibility. It is not something we
must wait for the eternities to inherit. Those whose autonomy has
been disrupted by the sacrifice of Jesus Christ, by the offering without
demand, now find themselves under the law of heteronomy, open to
the Other, breathing and, therefore, capable of justice—as long as they
remain exposed to the Other, as long as they allow their lungs to turn
outward to the breath of God. The breath of the autonomous is only
their own; they breathe nothing more than their own flesh and, therefore, they die. But those who live heteronomously, those who have
been interrupted by the sacrifice of Jesus Christ and the influx of the
Spirit—who have been converted—are interpenetrated by the breath
of the Other. The movement of their diaphragm is not an autonomous
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act.16 It is the individual’s response to another, to the Other. Breathing
happens between the inner and the outer, not merely as a matter of
one or the other.
Verses Ten and Eleven
10

If, then, Christ is in you, the body is dead because of sin, but
the Spirit is life because of justice. 11If the Spirit of the One
who raised Jesus from death dwells in you, then he who raised
Christ from death will make your mortal bodies alive by his
Spirit which dwells in you.
If we have received the breath of God through Jesus Christ, we
have been resurrected, here and now. We await a second, final resurrection to immortal bodies, but the most important resurrection,
spiritual resurrection, has already occurred. It has brought our bodies
to life in this life so that we may be just.
If God has breathed into us through his Son, Jesus Christ, then we
become like Christ, the new Adam, the Unique One.17 Heteronomy
makes our individuality possible, for autonomous individuality is nihilism, death. Only if there is another can individuality make sense.
The mortal resurrection brought about by conversion is a resurrection
to life and individuality as well as community; it is a destruction of
death and autonomy and a foreshadowing of the resurrection that is
to come.
Verses Twelve and Thirteen
12

Therefore, fellow saints, we have an obligation—but not
to the flesh, to live according to the flesh; 13for if you live
16. Note that phronēsis (“prudence” or “good judgment”) is from phrēn (“diaphragm”). See Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, comps. A Greek-English Lexicon
(1843; repr., Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), s.v. θρήν.
17. John Bowker translates Genesis 3:22 as “He [Adam] is become like the unique
One among us.” John Bowker, The Targums and Rabbinic Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 117–18.
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according to the flesh, you are condemned to die, but if you
kill the deeds of the body by the Spirit, you will live.
Mortal resurrection creates an obligation in us, the obligation to
justice. But that is not an obligation to ourselves and our autonomy,
since our autonomy is dead. Neither is it an obligation to some exterior autonomy. We are obliged by our very being to be just to those
who stand before us. We are obliged to expose ourselves to their needs
and to work to satisfy those needs. The Other gives me my breath, the
breath upon which I draw for my life, so it is the breath which I must
exhale. To have received the Spirit of God is to be obligated, to give as
the Spirit gave to a brother or sister, to one who also needs the breath
of life.
Autonomy creates no real obligation; ultimately obligation to self
makes no real sense. As a result, those for whom life is a matter of
body but not of breathing are always at the moment of death. Ironically, though they fear death more than anything and do everything
to prevent it, they are always dying and, so, unable to live or to give
life. Sophoclean heroism, recognition of the imminence of death and
bravery in the face of it, is the only alternative for the constantly dying.
But the autonomy of the body is destroyed by inspiration; the breath
of the Other kills death and resurrects us; those who breathe in the
breath of life live and give life.
Verse Fourteen
14

All who are led by the Spirit of God, are the sons of God.

The answer to the contradiction between our finitude and the infinity of the law is found in the Spirit. But how can one be led by a
breath? There is nothing to see; how can we follow? Philosophy has
constantly demanded and continues to demand vision: we must see
the truth, we must behold it. But the gaze is the work of autonomy.
Vision converts the exterior into the interior. It takes a position of
superiority to what is seen and masters it. The eye is an extension of
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the hand; but the breath is an infusion through the nose and mouth. If
we are autonomous, we cannot be led by a breath, for there is nothing
to see, so we must constantly fail as we try to do good. Our own light
does not reach far enough for us to see, and the Other gives not light,
but breath. In the absence of light, what can we do? We can be led by
that breath if we inhale.
The command of the Other, a command to justice, is a breath we
can receive, as does the Son, and if we do, then we are also sons of God:
we do the same thing that he does. (The point is not about the gender
of God’s offspring, but their imitation of the Son.) To be Christlike is
to hear and to breathe. It is to respond by offering oneself to justice,
not merely to submit.
Verse Fifteen
15

You did not receive a spirit of slavery that caused you to fear
again; instead you received a spirit of adoption, by which we
cry out, “Abba! Father.”

The breath of life does not subjugate us. We are not simply subsumed into the will of God and his supposedly more primordial
autonomy. There is nothing to fear because, having opened ourselves
to the breath of God, we are not protecting our autonomy. Our resurrection in and through Christ makes us sons—children—of God. The
Father breathes into our dead, Adamic bodies and makes us his children. Though we were outside of the divine family ties in alienating
autonomy, we are, once again, part of a family and not merely on our
own. We obey because we are obliged to obey by our openness to the
Other in an eternal family, not because we are subjected but because
we love. Our obedience is a matter of our parentage and our filiation.
Verses Sixteen and Seventeen
16

The Spirit himself bears witness with our spirit, that we are
the children of God. 17But if we are children, then we are heirs:
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heirs of God, heirs with Christ—provided that we suffer with
him so we may also be glorified with him.
The Spirit breathes into us the knowledge that we are part of a
divine family, a group of at least three that immediately spreads out to
infinity. Our inhalation of the breath of life is the knowledge that we
live with others in fraternity and sorority.
If we continue to breathe, we become as the Son of God; we become the children of God. With Christ, we inherit what the Father
has to give: “And he that receiveth my Father receiveth my Father’s
kingdom; therefore all that my Father hath shall be given unto him”
(Doctrine and Covenants 84:38). We are accustomed to the promise of
the glory we are to inherit: power, authority, honor. In noticing these,
however, we often overlook the rest of that inheritance. We often forget that to inherit the glory of God is also to inherit suffering. Only the
dead, the absolutely dead, do not suffer. Those who live and breathe
must suffer with Christ—be exposed with Christ—or deny him.
The suffering of Christ is unjust suffering. It is not deserved or
even explicable. Christ’s suffering is the concomitant obverse of the
fact that he has poured himself out into the lives and bodies of others
in order to be just and to bring justice about (see Philippians 2:7). His
mercy is his justice, a justice that mercifully obligates us to justice by
exposing itself to injustice. By his mercy and justice, he disrupts the
agony of our autonomy. He calls us to justice by suffering unjustly.
We find autonomy, life in the Absolute, appealing because it
seems to hide us from exposure and suffering. But the avoidance of
suffering to be found in autonomy is unavoidably agonistic because
it is unavoidably egoistic. It is agony. Avoiding suffering brings us the
agony described in Romans 7, and it inflicts agony on those who are
other than ourselves. When we choose to avoid suffering, we choose
to suffer death and agony, and we choose to inflict injustice. If we
breathe in the breath of life, we cannot forget that God himself suffered and continues to suffer. His suffering—his allowing rather than
determining—is his glory.
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Jesus’s suffering injustice for justice is his glory, but Moses 1:5 and
1:39 indicate that his work is also his glory. The autonomous individual
conceives of work as that which is to be completed, as something to
be finished and then encompassed or left behind. The autonomous
individual conceives of her existence as a work to be accomplished
and is frustrated that, given her finitude, its only completion is death.
She cannot perfect herself, and so she assumes that perfection is impossible—“at least in this life,” as they say. For the autonomous individual, the point is to get to the point where one needs no more to
work, where everything that needs to be done has been done. In other
words, though she would never describe it in these terms, the autonomous individual desires death.
Although already dead—because unbreathing—the autonomous
individual seeks death by seeking to bring an end to time. He seeks to
be contemporaneous with himself and his works. Since he is autonomous, undisturbed by the Other, he would give his works to no one but
himself. He would have everything fit into one spherical and systematic ball of being, of which he is the identity. The living God, however,
not only does not renounce work, he affirms it. There is no completion
of the work of God, just as and for the same reason that there is no end
to his glory. For God, something always remains to be done. He has
never finished exhaling. He can never have been exposed to us and the
possibility of our injustice enough. Rather than living in the already
over, God lives in the “not yet,” where there is still time, where it is still
possible to act. Only in the not yet does justice remain a possibility,
and only in the not yet does our obligation to bring about justice make
sense. Unlike the autonomous, for the heteronomous, work is a matter
of grace, the gift to the Other, the breath of life.
God’s mercy is his justice. His work is his glory. His glory is his
suffering. His suffering is his grace. His grace is his Spirit.
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